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Abstract
It is hard to deny social media and its omnipresence is affecting users. What’s more, the
online mediated environment is becoming increasingly diverse, with more social media
platforms being created and used each year. What is social media doing to us? How do
different platforms affect views of users? To answer these questions, this study applied
cultivation theory to the mediated environment, which included the social media
platforms of Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, Snapchat, and TikTok. With 413
respondents, the results of this study indicated that Facebook consumption is related to
first order cultivation effects, and non-Facebook platforms contribute to a cultivation of
uncivil attitudes and the mean world syndrome. Demographics also played a major role in
cultivation levels, with certain groups being more susceptible to cultivation than others.
Finally, this dissertation proposes possible explanations for these cultivation findings and
argues for a new understanding of cultivation theory and its processes in the context of
online mediated environments.
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Preface:
A Meeting of the Minds
This dissertation originated out of a very simple question – what is social media
doing to us? Years ago as a young graduate student at the University of Memphis, I was
challenged in a class to take an “old” theory and apply it to a “new” medium. As I read
through the dozens of papers detailing the various media effects theories supplied to me
by my professor, I remember getting to “Living with television: The violence profile”
(Gerbner & Gross, 1976) and thinking – wow, this is it. In the beginning, my purpose was
merely to expand cultivation theory to social media. It seemed patently obvious that
social media had the ability to affect users much in the same way as television.
Along the way, as I began to more deeply research cultivation theory, I started to
realize that simply taking the theory and methods of Gerbner et al. and applying them to a
new medium would not be the right path. Mainly, I questioned how modern cultivation
researchers could definitively determine whether cultivation effects were occurring as a
result of television viewership alone, since in today’s time people are consuming multiple
forms of media across various platforms all day, every day. Maybe those views were
being cultivated as a result of things they saw on television, but maybe the cultivation
effect stemmed from things respondents saw on other media platforms, such as social
media. Or, maybe views were being cultivated across platforms. In contemplating these
questions and issues, it was Gerbner himself, along with Michael Morgan, who led me to
the conclusion that studying the total media environment, especially the online mediated
environment which stretches across multiple platforms, would be key.
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In The Mean World Syndrome: Media Violence & the Cultivation of Fear,
narrated by Morgan, footage of Gerbner is featured discussing the effects of media
violence on society (Earp et al., 2010). During the film, footage of McLuhan is shown
saying, “It’s like the fish in the water. We don’t know who discovered water, but we
know it wasn’t the fish. A pervasive medium, a pervasive environment, is always beyond
perception,” (p. 6). Morgan narrates, “…as he used to say [Gerbner], that with media
there is no before: we are born into a mediated environment. The question is: how to
measure the effects of a force that is present from the start?” (p. 6). At that moment, it hit
me – if Gerbner was concerned with the effects of the ever-present mediated
environment, and Morgan is using McLuhan’s “fish in water” comparison, it only makes
sense to study cultivation in the modern era by considering cultivation effects as a result
of the total media environment, rather than effects stemming solely from watching TV.
After all, when the theory was first conceived, the mediated environment was television
and pretty much television only; now, the environment consists of multiple platforms. To
fully understand the pervasive media environment of today, I realized a McLuhanist,
media ecological lens would need to be applied to cultivation. Consider the media
exposures that follow and how they demonstrate a need for scholarly research.
The Pervasive Environment, a Prologue
It’s Monday morning. People across America hear their alarm clocks and begin to
rouse themselves as they begin their day. At 6 a.m., a woman in Cincinnati lays in bed for
a few extra minutes to scroll social media, first checking Facebook for birthdays and
messages from friends, then Instagram for photo likes, and Twitter for news notifications
from her favorite reporters. She hops out of bed and goes to shower, asking Alexa for
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today’s weather and traffic reports. Afterwards, she styles her hair and puts on her
makeup with the TV in her bedroom on CNN so she can listen to national news updates.
She wakes up her daughter for school and switches on the living room TV to the local
news, flipping back and forth between that and Good Morning America. She begins to
make breakfast. While cracking eggs, her daughter enters the room watching the latest
TikToker to have gone viral. They watch a few videos together and laugh over their
plates of soft scramble; Robin Roberts reports in the background.
In the car as the mom drives her daughter to school, they listen to a podcast on the
Zodiac killer. The daughter continues to watch TikTok, but also toggles between
Snapchat and Instagram. Mom scolds her daughter for spending too much time on her
phone – the podcast is something they are supposed to do together. Once the daughter is
out of the car at school, the woman turns off the podcast and listens to CNBC on
SiriusXM, paying attention to market forecasts about a possible bubble. During
commercials, she switches to Ryan Seacrest in the Morning, his radio show out of Los
Angeles.
She gets to work and makes her way to her cubicle. Three flat screens run
noiselessly, all of them tuned to national news coverage. Half of the cubicles sit empty, as
the office has employees come in to work on alternating days. At her desk, she puts in her
headphones to listen to music, occasionally looking up to see news coverage showing
Coronavirus case, death, and vaccine numbers on one TV, nationwide protests on
another, and a senator giving an interview on another. Being up to date on national news
is required for her job, so Twitter and CNN notifications pop up in the corner of her
desktop screen. She checks her social media for notifications every 45 minutes or so, at
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times leaning back in her chair as she pauses to spend more time scrolling. Although she
would not admit it to her daughter, TikTok is such a good distraction from her tedious
project, she thinks.
Lunches must be socially distanced during a pandemic, so she eats at her cubicle
and binges the latest Netflix show on her laptop while messaging friends and scrolling
Facebook for the latest updates from her hometown. She Facetimes her grandmother for
the last few minutes of her lunch break – Grandma has been so lonely in what has turned
into a year-long quarantine. During a bathroom break late in the day, although her phone
is at her desk, she gets a notification on her watch about the latest celebrity getting
divorced, followed immediately by a text from the mayor’s COVID-19 task force.
Today’s numbers are grim. She washes her hands and speeds back to her desk, dictating a
message to a family member along the way to inquire about her great-aunt who is
hospitalized. In sum, her entire workday is spent looking at screens. Even meetings with
colleagues who are in the office that day require being logged in to Zoom, since half of
her project team is working from home that day. Despite never being without some type
of media device, she manages to log 6.5 billable hours on her assigned project in her
eight-hour workday.
On her way home from work, she picks her daughter up from band practice and
they listen to the serial killer podcast in the twenty minutes of traffic on the interstate.
They arrive home, walk in the door and flip on the television, watching the daughter’s
favorite Bravo reality TV show while cooking dinner. As the pasta boils, both of them are
on their phones. Mom flips through funny videos on Facebook Watch to decompress.
Daughter posts Snaps of herself sautéing veggies and whisking the pasta sauce as it
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comes together on the stove. They sit down for dinner just in time to see Monday night’s
new episode of a program they’ve been watching on HBO. After dinner, the daughter
does her homework while mom puts the leftovers away for tomorrow’s lunch. She
washes the dishes with a Grey’s Anatomy rerun on the TV, while also talking to her
friends in their group chat. All moms seem to be so exhausted these days. They watch the
10 o’clock local news right before bed to see if the neighbor boy’s basketball game is
featured.
Daughter goes to bed and mom climbs the stairs to her bedroom. While applying
her nighttime beauty regimen, she turns on her bedroom TV and flips it to a mindless
biography about the British royal family. Biographies always make her sleepy. It’s nearly
11, so she finally sets her alarm on her phone, turns off the television, and reads her
Game of Thrones iBook, occasionally toggling to Facebook or Twitter if a notification
pops up. She eventually falls asleep after 11, phone in hand. Sometime during the night,
she tucks the phone under her pillow. In her nearly 18 waking hours, she has been
without media for less than 60 minutes. Her alarm goes off at 6 a.m. It’s time to do it all
over again.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
As somebody said: “We do not know who discovered water, but we are fairly sure
that it was not a fish.”
- Marshall McLuhan, Letters of Marshall McLuhan, 1987, pp. 420-421
Over the past decade or so, the media landscape in America has changed
dramatically. Some things have remained largely the same, such as the dominance of
television within consumer media use. While television is still the single medium
drawing the most viewers each day, social media has been closing in on television’s
supremacy, consumption-wise (Nielsen, 2019). However, increases in social media usage
do not necessarily mean people are spending less time watching television; instead, users
are consuming more media on the whole, especially in the wake of COVID-19 (Jones,
2020). People are followed by screens nearly everywhere they go – they are in homes,
cars, offices, on the bus, in the doctor’s office, at the coffee shop. And whether or not
there is a television mounted on the wall or a computer screen nearby, most people
conveniently have mini supercomputers, i.e. smartphones, within reach, if not in their
very grasp. As a result, the total media environment of today is engrossing and
omnipresent. Members of modern society are, as Marshall McLuhan put it, “fish in
water” (Earp et al., 2010). The fish cannot perceive water because, quite simply, it has
always been there, surrounding them, engulfing them. Following McLuhan’s comparison,
modern humans, especially those in first-world countries, find themselves surrounded by,
engulfed by, media for nearly every waking moment of their lives.
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Old Theory, New and Old Media
Swaths of Americans experience the slice of daily life described in the above
prologue. People have never been more connected. Users have never been more
inundated by media, and its menu of options has never been more diverse. There is nary a
user who has not at one time or another asked this very simple question: What is all of
this media consumption doing to us? Such a concern is natural considering the current
and ever-increasing level of media saturation.
This dissertation seeks to enhance the scholarly literature on how users and
viewers are being affected by existing in the modern mediated environment of today by
synthesizing George Gerbner’s cultivation theory with media ecology, focusing
especially on Marshall McLuhan’s theory of the global village and his assertion that the
medium is the message, with Neil Postman’s approach to media as environments in a
supporting role. In No Sense of Place, Meyrowitz (a graduate of Postman’s media
ecology program at NYU) notes that while Gerbner aimed to, “…look beyond specific
messages” to study “the ‘environment of television’” cultivation analyses are largely
content-focused (1985, p. 14). Indeed, due to cultivation’s historical attention to content,
many may view the camps of cultivation and media ecology to be incompatible, as
context is a primary concern of the latter. Both camps, however, are concerned with
effects. Rather than studying media’s effects on users in relation to content, this study
seeks to analyze media’s effects on users in relation to context. For example, is the mean
world syndrome getting worse due to social media? In relation to television, Morgan says
the following of the mean world syndrome:
…With every change of the channel we’re likely to see the most banal content,
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alternating with the most bizarre and violent and frightening. So that what would
be shocking in our real lives, in the media world comes to seem normal and
mundane – reinforcing the sense that the world is a place of constant danger and
threat. (Earp et al., p. 7)
On social media, users are also exposed to shocking behavior – not violence per se, but
the violation of social norms such as civility – on an almost daily basis. Furthermore,
users can do a little norm-busting themselves in any number of ways, from posting
profane or explicit content to demeaning or attacking other users (or interacting with
content that does so). What is the effect of existing in an environment in which the
mediated context, spread across television and social media, is one of ever-normalized
violence and violation of norms?
The basic consideration of this dissertation deals with the sheer amount of time
users are spending consuming/interacting with media every day and the ensuing effects of
such high levels of consumption. Does increasing consumption across the mediated
environment cultivate certain views, period? For cultivation in the traditional sense, the
heaviest viewers were the ones most susceptible to negative effects, such as the mean
world syndrome. Will that trend continue when time spent on social media is added to
time spent watching television? Does consumption of a certain platform within the
mediated environment result in a stronger cultivation effect than consumption of a
different platform? Is there a certain cocktail of consumption that results in the greatest
effects? For example, are users who are heavy viewers of television and heavy users of
Facebook more fearful of being the victim of a crime? Are they more likely to report their
belief that certain values, such as equality, civility, and even truth, are in decline?
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Accordingly, the empirical heart of this study will be a cultivation analysis
structured much in the same way as classical cultivation studies. In addition to time spent
watching television, a notable difference will be the inclusion of time spent consuming
social media across all of its platforms, with a separate but specific emphasis on
Facebook since it is the most-used social media platform in the world (Clement, 2020). In
the end, the goal is to measure the role the mediated environment as a whole is playing in
perpetuating cultivation-like effects, with analysis of how various platforms contribute to
cultivation levels. If cultivation is occurring across the mediated environment regardless
of content disparities, that would support a new understanding of the theory itself:
cultivation 2.0.
Study Rationale and Overview
Media effects studies have long sought to understand and explain exactly how
individual media affect users. Each medium is largely regarded as if it is doing its own
thing – a different medium equals a different effect. And indeed, this treatment made
sense for millennia, as we moved through the various epochs of communication history.
According to McLuhan (1962), mankind has moved from oral tribe culture to manuscript
culture, then to the Gutenberg galaxy, or era of movable type, to finally arrive in our
current electronic age. Each epoch was generally dominated by one form of mass
communication, until now that is. In modern day, we are existing in a communication
environment that features two prevailing mediums – television and social media.
Since television came first, there has obviously been more research into this leg of
digitized media. Social media, too, has been and continues to be heavily researched;
media effects theories which were once applied only to “old” media have now been (at
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least somewhat) expanded to “new” media. The question of old theories and their
applicability to new media is a debate heard increasingly ‘round the watercoolers of
academia. Can we simply take an old theory and assume one size fits all when it comes to
new media and platforms? No. Instead, we must take what we have learned along the
way in our study of media effects and use it to determine in what ways the
communication atmosphere of today is both similar and different from that of the past. At
this moment, it is necessary to consider how the two forms of ever-present mass
communication, television and social media, exist alongside one another, aligning with
McLuhan’s definition of media ecology: “It means arranging various media to help each
other so they won’t cancel each other out, to buttress one medium with another,”
(McLuhan & Staines, 2004, p. 271). How are the two working together to create a single
communication environment, and how do the ways users participate in the environment
affect user effects? Attention to the broader communicative environment also aligns with
McLuhan’s contention that media content does not simply exist in a vacuum, meaning we
must take a comprehensive view to understand, “…the media themselves and the total
cultural environment within which the media function” (as cited in Rogaway, 1994, p. 3).
Ultimately, it is worth investigating whether existence in the modern mediated
environment cultivates certain views, regardless of content consumed, aligning with
Shanahan and Morgan’s 1999 statement, “The content of messages is more germane than
the technology with which they are delivered,” (p. 201).
This brings us to cultivation theory and the modern mediated environment – a
situation in which core messages are communicated by multiple forms of media and
thereby potentially heightened. Cultivation, which began in the late 1960s as the
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brainchild of George Gerbner, explored the long-term effects watching television had on
viewers’ thoughts about themselves, society, and their system of values (Morgan &
Shanahan, 2010). The theory has become one of the most well-known theories in the
studies of media effects, with more than seven hundred academic papers and books being
authored on cultivation/cultivation-related topics (Morgan, 2018). However, application
of the theory to anything other than television has been limited. This study seeks to fill
the gap in current cultivation research concerning not only social media alone, but how
messaging is communicated across the mediated environment, allowing cultivation to
happen across multiple forms of media.
In 1976, Gerbner and Gross said, “New technologies on the horizon may enrich
the choices of the choosy but cannot replace the simultaneous public experience of a
common symbolic environment that now binds diverse communities, including large
groups of young and old and isolated people who have never before joined any mass
public” (173-174). McLuhan himself also asserted television’s power in creating a
common symbolic environment for previously ununited publics, saying, “For good or ill,
the TV image has exerted a unifying synesthetic force on the sense-life of these intensely
literate populations, such as they have lacked for centuries,” (1964, p. 347). However,
both statements were made at a time in which there truly was only one stage upon which
“repetitive and ritualized symbol systems” were acted out. McLuhan would later
approach the “electric age” much more broadly, and such treatment is at the root of this
new cultivation analysis. It is too simple to merely assume there are now two stages, two
digital spaces used to cultivate “the common consciousness” (Gerbner & Gross, 1976, p.
174) that are operating independently of one another with completely different effects.
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Rather, a new analysis of our modern mediated environment is necessary. Ultimately,
considering the communicative ecosystem of today as one vast space – as one colossal
public square spread across cities, states, countries and even continents – means viewing
television and social media as two parts of the same whole, with each part playing a role
in the environment that is cultivating the beliefs of its viewers/users.
The Open Door
Meyer (1989) asserted that new forms of media and technology would contribute
to higher levels of cultivation as a result of the multitudinous pathways for viewer access.
Morgan and Shanahan (2010) suggested the future of cultivation theory should not be
bound to the strict parameters of television in the traditional sense: “... Can we still talk
about cultivation in the age of YouTube, Facebook, Hulu, Twitter, and TiVo? The answer
is yes,” (p. 350). This statement is highly significant in the furthering of cultivation
applications, since Morgan worked with Gerbner for years and is considered to be one of
the foremost researchers of cultivation. Furthermore, Morgan recently noted, “Cultivation
is too strong a theory and social media is too important a phenomenon to simply assert
they have nothing of potential significance to do with each other,” (2019, para. 2).
Despite what Morgan described as his, “own reservations and concerns” when it
comes to applying cultivation to social media, the door has clearly been opened for a
cultivation + social media formulation. As Shrum and Lee (2012) note:
One challenge for cultivation researchers in the next decade is to determine
whether there are any interesting interactions between the new media and the old,
whether the new media enhance traditional cultivation effects, and whether new
media may create some of their own. (p. 164)
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In contemplating how social media works in concert with television to communicate
stable, consistent societal norms – norms which were at the cornerstone of Gerbner et
al.’s work on cultivation theory – it is also important to consider how the process of
cultivation, known as enculturation, is morphing with the new formulation of our media
environment. Families no longer gather around a single TV set to watch programs
selected from a few (or even dozens) of channels. In the modern mediated environment,
we consume a smattering of content from across a wide variety of platforms: traditional
television, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, etc. Social media content has now
become so diverse that it is nearly impossible to pin down what “shared and stable
symbolic realities” (Morgan, 2019, para. 12) are being communicated by such
multifarious content. And yet, norms, values, and beliefs are still being disseminated. But
how could that be in an era in which no two people are consuming the same cocktail of
media content on a daily basis, much less over extended periods of time? As Meyrowitz
points out:
While much concern with television, for example, has focused on the effects of
violent or sexist content on the behavior of children, there has been almost no
attention paid to the possibility that different ways of communicating cultural
content may lead to different social conceptions of “childhood” and “adulthood”
or of “masculinity” and “femininity.” (1985, p. 15)
We must conclude the mediated environment itself is creating and communicating a
shared social reality. The environment is the message. A media ecological approach has
never heretofore been applied to cultivation. This study seeks to marry cultivation and
media ecology to better understand the heavily converged media atmosphere of 2021 and
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beyond.
Research Questions
Following an investigation into existing cultivation theory and media ecology
scholarship, the following research questions were generated:
● RQ1: How much time per day are people consuming media, in general? Jones
(2020) and Cramer-Flood (2021) both indicate that the COVID-19 pandemic has
caused media consumption to increase markedly, with time spent across platforms
increasing by 15% in 2020; growth rates are anticipated to be “retained” in 2021,
according to Cramer-Flood. While the question of total media consumption is
widely and continuously researched and updated, operationalizing media
exposure across platforms is an important stepping stone in understanding the
effects of ever-increasing consumption.
● RQ2: Are users in the mediated environment more passive or participative? Do
they spend their time mostly viewing/scrolling, or do they spend more time
posting, commenting, liking, or sharing? Do they view consuming media as an
escape from the world or as a method of interacting with it? While television may
be considered more of an escape than social media, it can still be a highly
participatory platform if users report inserting themselves into storylines,
becoming engrossed with the narrative, etc. Establishing a baseline for how
people view their use of platforms in the mediated environment is key for an
assessment of second order cultivation effects, which are detailed in RQs 3 and 4.
● RQ3: Does television or social media consumption more greatly impact
cultivation effects, such as the belief that violence is more widespread, or other
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negative worldviews? Which do users appear to be more susceptible to – first or
second order effects? While first order effects deal with judgements of probability
(a common example is for people to estimate the prevalence of crime in their
neighborhood or the number of police on the force), second order beliefs deal
with attitudes, values, and beliefs. Often cited statements designed to measure
second order judgements are things such as, “All men cheat” or “Judges should
punish criminals more severely” (Chong et al., 2012).
● RQ4: How do cultivation patterns for non-Facebook social media platform
consumption (Twitter, TikTok, Snapchat, Instagram, etc.) compare to Facebook
consumption? As Facebook is the most highly-used social media platform in the
world – but not necessarily the most highly-used for all demographics –
investigating the cultivation levels related to usage of various platforms within the
mediated environment would help in conceptualizing what future usage and
cultivation patterns may look like, since younger demographics tend to spend the
least time on Facebook.
● RQ5: Does social media consumption increase the likelihood of a user developing
mean world syndrome? The mean world syndrome and social media is of
particular interest of this study, and is based upon Gerbner’s question: “Who can
get away with what against whom?” (Stossel, 1997, p. 90). Gerbner’s
preoccupation with violence on television, along with his position on television’s
dissemination of stable, consistent societal norms, brings up many considerations
for social media. In modern day, rather than just exposure to violence on
television via content narratives or the news, users are first-hand witnesses to a
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different form of violence: the violation of social norms – sometimes by people
they know. For example, seeing close family members berate and debase others
for differing political views, or a friend from your hometown posting “rioters
should be shot on sight,” hits home in a way that is so personal, it becomes nearly
inconceivable that social media use does not cause negative views of the state of
the world. On social media, the “who” and “whom” of Gerbner’s question are
often people we actually know rather than abstract characters in a narrative or
subjects of news coverage. A study of the effects of seeing (and potentially
interacting with) those who perpetrate violent and volatile social media behaviors
has never heretofore been part of a cultivation analysis.
Chapter Outline
The following chapter will outline the theoretical framework of this new approach
to cultivation analysis. Next will be an overview of cultivation’s inception, its maturation
as a theory and various applications over the years, and current scholarship. The last
section of Chapter 2 will first review the roots of media ecology by focusing especially
on Marshall McLuhan’s conception of the global village. McLuhan’s notion of a vastly
interconnected electric world and his stance that the medium is the message would later
morph into media ecology and serve as an inspiration for Neil Postman, who established
the NYU media ecology program. Postman’s work will round out the section.
Chapter 3 will next introduce the dissertation’s effects study, which seeks to
investigate cultivation levels across platforms by surveying for time spent watching
television in addition to time spent on Facebook, as well as time spent on other social
media platforms to get a more complete view of media consumption as a whole. This
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chapter will introduce the premise of my survey and the methodology that will be used,
data collection and measures, variables, and results of the survey findings. The results of
the analyses will be discussed in Chapter 4, chiefly concentrating on how cultivation
levels are affected by consumption of media across platforms and the consumption
cocktails which reported the highest cultivation effects. Finally, in Chapter 5, will discuss
the study’s limitations, in addition to its theoretical contributions and suggestions for
future research.
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Chapter Two:
Review of Literature
The literature review will focus primarily on three things: first, the theoretical
rationale for synthesizing cultivation and media ecology, second, scholarship in
cultivation theory, and finally, an overview of media ecology, with specific emphasis on
McLuhan’s conception of the global village and Postman’s approach to media as
environments.
Why Media Ecology?
Approaching cultivation from a media ecology perspective, with the mediated
environment itself as the message, ties in explicitly to Postman’s (1970, p. 161) definition
of media ecology as “the study of media as environments.” He goes on to explain that
media ecology is concerned with “How media of communication affect human
perception, understanding, feeling, and value; and how our interaction with media
facilitates or impedes our chances of survival,” (p. 161) – issues very similar to those
addressed by cultivation researchers. Milberry (2012) expounds upon Postman’s
definition, saying:
Media ecology focuses on media as environments, and environments as media,
with an explicit concern for their evolution, effects, and forms. It comprises a
theory about the complex interplay between humans, technology, media, and the
environment, with the aim of increasing awareness of mutual effects. (para. 1)
Ultimately, the definition of media ecology as a field is clearly rooted in McLuhan’s most
well-known adage that the medium is the message, along with his parallel contention that
the medium is the environment (thereby making the environment the message). On its
13

face, the contention that the medium is the message may seem to be at odds with studying
the broad communicative space of today, since McLuhan’s use of the word medium
implies singularity. However, if we consider the medium as a vast, multi-faceted, single
space, as a solitary mediated environment with multiple platforms, that would reconcile
with the medium being the message, meaning the environment is the message. Of the
broad digital environment – the net cast ‘round the world – McLuhan and Fiore (1967)
said, “We have been rapt in the ‘artifice of eternity’ by placing our own nervous system
around the entire globe” (as cited in Maggio, 2008, p. 31). There is not one artificial
mechanism uniting the globe, but rather many mechanisms that create a common
communicative environment in which we are engulfed completely.
Moreover, as briefly discussed in the introduction, Gerbner and Morgan
themselves link the mediated environment to cultivation. They detail the broad mediated
environment, which is widespread and ever-present in our lives, extensively in the
documentary The Mean World Syndrome: Media Violence & the Cultivation of Fear
(Earp et al., 2010). Morgan, citing Gerbner and McLuhan, discusses the pervasive media
environment and what its omnipresence means for the study of media effects. He
narrates:
In Gerbner’s view…with media there is no before: we are born into a mediated
environment. The question is: how to measure the effects of a force that is present
from the start? A sea of images, as media scholar Marshall McLuhan liked to say,
that has become so familiar to us that we’re often as blind to its all-encompassing
presence as a fish is to water. (p. 6)
McLuhan’s statement, “It’s like the fish in the water. We don’t know who discovered
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water, but we know it wasn’t the fish. A pervasive medium, a pervasive environment, is
always beyond perception,” indicates that the mediated environment is wrapped up in our
social reality, with its everydayness making it just another part of life in the modern
world. This cultural environment, which, as Morgan explains, “We have become so
accustomed to… it’s like a fish that doesn’t know that it is swimming in water because it
has never experienced anything else,” is what leads to cultivation, since, “Cultivation is a
stable system of messages and images that shape our conception of the world and of
ourselves, and of life itself, and society, and power,” (2010, p. 6). In the end, the cultural
environment is the social environment, and the social environment, now mediated
digitally, is the message.
Social Norms and Messaging Overlap. In Teaching as a Subversive Activity, Postman,
along with media and educational theorist Charles Weingartner (1969) elaborated on
McLuhan’s assertion that the environment is the message through the lens of how
humans obtain learned behaviors:
The medium itself, i.e., the environment, is the message. “Message” here means
the perceptions you are allowed to build, the attitudes you are enticed to assume,
the sensitivities you are encouraged to develop– almost all of the things you learn
to see and feel and value. You learn them because your environment is organized
in such a way that it permits or encourages or insists that you learn them. (p. 18)
In the modern era, our mediated environment is necessarily social, and those who reside
in it learn the axioms, expectations, and standards of society. These implicit rules of the
road, which have been present for centuries, have been chiefly taught in social
environments, such as school, the workplace, etc. People once learned these social skills
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mainly through face-to-face observations or interactions with others, or possibly through
interactions witnessed on television. All of these things remain true in the modern
mediated environment, except now, we also learn norms digitally since the social
experience of life has moved online. In terms of cultivation, television operates as a
symbolic extension of our social reality; social media also extends that reality, but in a
way that is not necessarily viewed as symbolic by users. Heyer and Crowley (2008) note
this view is supported by Meyrowitz, who, “…Interprets television culture differently,
making a case for electronic media as the primary site for the negotiation of new
identities and new social behavior,” (p. 580). Fundamentally, the social environment is at
the root of the social norms which are part and parcel to our common consciousness as a
society, regardless of the medium or content through which that common consciousness
is cultivated and communicated.
Part of what makes the modern mediated environment so affecting and resonant is
its transmission of repetitive and cyclical messaging across platforms, especially within
the participatory construction of social media. We are existing in a communicative space
in which users can receive messages within a non-participatory platform, such as TV, and
then take those messages into social media’s heightened, highly participatory atmosphere.
Television viewers experience the symbolic social environments displayed on screen –
environments which repetitively communicate social values across a variety of TV
content – and then put those values to use within the non-symbolic milieu of social
media. Even if a user is not a regular consumer of traditional television and instead
consumes online content such as socially produced videos on YouTube, Facebook,
TikTok, etc., their very existence within the broader mediated environment likely means

16

they will still be on the receiving end of messaging that communicates the norms of
society.
This overlap and reinforcement of messaging further illustrates the need to
understand our communicative environment as a single, albeit expansive, space.
According to Onufrijchuk (1998, p. 6), McLuhan’s treatment of what he meant by
medium and media was fluid, noting, “From the mid 60s, McLuhan’s critics observed
that his account of media was ‘spongy:’ Anything whatsoever could be soaked up into it.
On occasion McLuhan was speaking about media (print, paper, TV, the spoken word)
and so forth. On other occasions he was talking about technology.” In this vein, taking a
more comprehensive rather than fragmentary view of studying the environment adheres
to McLuhan’s wide-ranging approach. French philosopher and social critic Jean
Baudrillard (as cited in Gordon, 2014) also supported viewing McLuhan’s work through
a broad lens, noting McLuhan viewed electronic media as the catalyst for “generalized
planetary communication” which would push society toward a global village (p. 5).
McLuhan described our forthcoming highly interconnected environment in the
experimental television translation of The Medium is the Massage. In the documentary,
McLuhan foresees a world in which we are receiving and sending messages via
technology – notably through televisions and computers. Speaking through a narrator,
McLuhan says:
We’ll work at home in created space, created by electric media, connected to the
corporation or boss, not by railroads or roads, but by television and other media.
We’ll relay information by closed circuit to a TV and by computer systems. The
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great mass of American rush hour will be over—and the hell with driving.
(Pintoff et al., 1967)
He later described the electronic environment as a space where, “Information and images
bump against each other every day in massive quantities, and the resonance of this
interfacing is like the babble of a village or tavern gossip session” (1974, as cited in
Benedetti & DeHart, 1997, p. 46), bolstering the study of effects on users of our broader
mediated environment, i.e. the global village, rather than emphasis on a single medium or
platform.
The Content Kaleidoscope. Focusing on environment and its context over
content means one of the common problems cited when it comes to applying cultivation
to anything other than television – content disparities – is not so problematic after all.
Indeed, Postman advocates for “context analysis” rather than content analysis in studies
using a media ecology approach. We are currently in an environment in which we are
ingesting legions of content – albeit a large amount of it in snippets spread across
numerous platforms and channels – and social norms are still being circulated despite
time spent on social media outpacing time spent watching television for younger
generations. When online video consumption is added into social media usage, the
overall online screen time is significantly higher than time spent watching traditional TV
for Gen Zers and Millennials (Jones, 2020). In the wake of COVID-19, all media
consumption has tremendously increased worldwide across traditional broadcast TV,
social media, online videos, etc. However, both Millennials and Gen Zers report greater
increases in time watching video on social and online platforms than they do watching
traditional television, even while quarantined. While both Gen Xers and Baby Boomers
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reported larger increases in time spent watching broadcast TV, they also indicated that
they had started consuming more online and social content, with Gen Xers reporting
greater increases in this area than Baby Boomers (Jones, 2020).
These jumps in consumption correspond with pre-Coronavirus data concerning
millennial and Gen Z content consumption. As of late 2019, nearly half of Gen Zers in
the U.S. are consuming content online for more than 10 hours per day, with 55%
reporting they are on their smartphones for more than five hours per day; 71% of them
reported watching more than three hours of online videos per day (“Generation Z
statistics”, 2020). In terms of millennials, 48% report they are engaged with online
content for 10 or more hours per week; of that 48%, 20% reported spending more than 20
hours per week (“Millennial content consumption”, 2020). In this same time period, Gen
Xers also reported spending more time consuming online content and using social apps
for more minutes per day than they did watching broadcast television. Baby Boomers
were the group that spent more time watching TV in 2019, but still reported spending 256
minutes per day consuming online and social content (Nielsen, 2019).
So, what does all of this mean? Taking pre and ongoing Coronavirus data into
consideration, it is clear people in America are still spending a lot of time watching
traditional broadcast television. At the same time, they are also consuming an abundance
of online and social content. Consumption between these two major forms of media –
broadcast and online/social platforms – is pretty balanced when all usage for all
demographics is averaged together. Participation in the modern mediated environment is
at an all-time high. Returning to the question of how the broad, interactive
communicative space of today – one in which messages “bump against each other” – is
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affecting users, the first step is understanding the environment. Approaching the modern
mediated environment from a media ecology standpoint allows for insight on the context
of our mediated environment’s major communicative arenas, television and social media,
while investigating whether social media’s digital, mobile, and participatory construction
is one that contributes to rather than detracts from cultivation effects. Television and
social media are similar in some ways and vastly different in others; however, again,
those distinctions do not necessarily mean cultivation is not happening or should not
apply to any medium other than television, or be applied across the mediated
environment.
Cultivation Theory
According to the Dictionary of Media Studies, cultivation theory is defined as,
“the theory that the mass media ‘cultivates’ ideas, attitudes, values, etc., which are
already present but have not been reinforced or widely disseminated” (Cultivation theory,
2006, para. 1). Prince (2018) boils cultivation down to the following:
Cultivation theory is founded on the premise that television serves the function of
society’s storyteller. Further, according to the cultivation perspective, the
portrayals, plots, and scenarios — the “stories”— we see depicted on screen have
become so entrenched in our everyday lives that television plays an integral role
in shaping our conceptions of social reality. (p. 4)
The foremost cultivation scholar was Gerbner, who began his analysis into television’s
effects on viewers while writing his master’s thesis (Stossel, 1997).
Even Gerbner’s work dating back to the mid 1950s was cultivation related. Before
becoming the father of cultivation, Gerbner developed a general model of communication
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illustrating the dynamic communication processes that happen not only between humans,
but also in communication mixed between humans
and machines (see Figure 1). His model was an
expansion upon Lasswell’s (1948) formula of:
“Who? à Says what? à In which channel? à To
whom? à With what effect?” Gerbner’s model
states: “Someone perceives an event and reacts in a
situation through some means to make available
materials in some form and context conveying
content with some consequences” (1956, p. 173). His
graphical model notably defines “someone” or “M” as a

Figure 1: Gerbner’s basic generalized
graphic model of a communication event

man or a machine.
Just as McLuhan and Fiore (1967) would later assert “the medium is the
message,” in Gerbner’s general communication model, he articulates a similar situation
in which the message is always tied to channel – there is always a, “Relationship between
communication agent and communication product” (1956, p. 173). According to Prince
(2018), Gerbner’s general model of communication was also similar to his later work on
cultivation in that it was also concerned with long-term effects. She says:
Rather than analyzing the degree to which a single media message enacted a
specific attitudinal or behavioral change, Gerbner’s foundational model of
communication was concerned with long-term consequences of exposure to “the
‘built in’ qualities of communication products as they reflect aspects of the
communication sequence of which they are a part.” (Prince, 2018, pp. 9-10, citing
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Gerbner, 1956, p. 198)
By the mid 1960s, Gerbner went on to contend that television had the sweeping
ability to affect beliefs, relationships, and attitudes of viewers. Concerning Gerbner’s
early thoughts on cultivation, Hermann (2016, p. 6) says:
He [Gerbner] considered message systems as means of social interaction to be at
the heart of communication and equated their massive production and distribution
to mass communication (Gerbner, 1966, 1967). The transformation of this mass
production and distribution (through social and/or technological change) altered
message content and the public symbolic environment.
Cultural Indicators
Gerbner’s first major research study into cultivation was known as “Cultural
Indicators.” During this project, he explored ways to track television content in relation to
viewers’ societal beliefs over time (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). Gerbner describes the
project as fulfilling a, “Need to know what general terms of collective cultivation about
existence, priorities, values, and relationships are given in collectively shared public
message systems,” (Gerbner, 1969, p. 141). Essentially, he wanted to understand the
effects of television’s shared symbolic messaging environment had on viewers by
charting television content over time. During the late 1960s, Gerbner’s work gained
significant traction in academic and governmental arenas. According to Gerbner (1998, p.
11):
The Cultural Indicators Project began in 1967-1968 with a study for the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. It continued under the
sponsorships of the U.S. Surgeon General’s Scientific Advisory Committee on
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Television and Social Behavior, the National Institute of Mental Health, The
White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, the American Medical
Association, the U.S. Administration on Aging, and the National Science
Foundation.
Additionally, Gerbner notes the project had three parts: first was the “…study of
the organizational forms, functions, and decision-making that compose and structure
these [message] systems”; second was a systematic study of the structure of television
and its content; and finally was the “….study of the relationships between institutional
processes, message systems, and the public assumptions, images, and policies that they
cultivate” (Gerbner, 1970, p. 71). The latter two prongs, one dealing with content and the
other with viewer effects, tend to be the most relevant research paths in modern
cultivation studies. The cultural indicators project continued on for years, and Gerbner
notes that while it initially zeroed in on violence, it eventually came to encompass,
“…areas such as gender, minority and age-role stereotypes, health, science, the family,
educational achievement and aspirations, politics, religion, and other topics,” (1998, p. 5).
Violence was at the forefront of Gerbner and Larry Gross’ “Living with
Television: The Violence Profile,” published in 1976; Gerbner would later become
known as the “man who counts the killings” (Stossel, 1997). Gerbner and Gross (1976)
had been collaboratively researching cultivation theory throughout the start of the
seventies, with the paper being the fruit of their analysis. The pair declared television was
a revolutionary form of media with the power to create major cultural change, affecting
viewers’ perspectives about themselves, society and ethical ideologies. During this study,
which centered on the violence present in television, the concept of “heavy” viewers was
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brought about; per Gerbner and Gross (1976), “heavy” viewers were more likely to
internalize what they saw on television and apply it to their own lives, and were more
probable to cultivate certain views of the world.
In the study, Gerbner and Gross found heavy viewers were more likely to have a
greater perception of violence or crime (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). They also suggested
that aside from making viewers feel unsafe, television also was capable of fostering
passivity toward violence and a distrust of others. As it was published in 1976, this paper
represented one of the first times Gerbner was able to study the long-term effects of
television on viewers, since nearly 80 percent of American households had a television
by 1960 (Washington and Lee University, 2014). According to Hermann, Gerbner was
concerned most with, “…the long-term reciprocal relationships between institutions
producing media messages, the message content, and mental structures embedded in
culture [that] define communication effects rather than short-term attitude and behavior
change,” (2016, p. 7). Subsequent violence profiles authored by Gerbner and Gross, who
by that time had joined forces with Morgan and Signorielli to continue to flesh out the
theory, also focused on violence and the high occurrence of violent acts on television,
which led to viewers being more likely to think they themselves were likely to be the
victim of a crime. Prince notes this is because in content analyses of television
programming, “…statistics indicate that the likelihood of being involved in violence in
the television world was, at minimum, 100 times that of the real world,” (2018, pp. 1112).
Mean World Syndrome. After spending more than a decade focusing on the
effects of television violence, Gerbner et al. concluded, “The most significant and
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recurring conclusion of our long-range study is that one correlate of television viewing is
a heightened and unequal sense of danger and risk in a mean and selfish world,” (1979, p.
196), i.e., the mean world syndrome. Gerbner (1998) later described the mean world
syndrome, which was also used to create the “Mean World Index,” as follows:
I have found that long-term exposure to television, in which frequent violence is
virtually inescapable, tends to cultivate the image of a relatively mean and
dangerous world. Responses of heavier compared to matching groups of lighter
viewers suggest the conception of reality in which greater protection is needed,
most people “cannot be trusted,” and most people are “just looking out for
themselves.” (citing Gerbner et al., 1980a; Signorielli, 1990)
The latter notion, that most people are just looking out for themselves, is verbatim one of
the measures in Gerbner et al.’s Mean World Index, whereas the issue of whether people
could be trusted was broken into two measures concerning trust for others during
interpersonal interactions.
Mainstreaming and Resonance
Major progress for cultivation theory came in the 1980s with mainstreaming and
resonance, which Gerbner et al. asserted in their “Final Reply to Hirsch” (1981) as an end
to a notorious academic feud between Paul Hirsch and the team researching cultivation.
Gerbner et al. (1982) more definitively detailed mainstreaming in their eleventh violence
profile, saying:
The “mainstream” can be thought of as a relative commonality of outlooks and
values that exposure to features and dynamics of the television world tends to
cultivate. By “mainstreaming” we mean the expression of that commonality by
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heavy viewers in those demographic groups whose light viewers hold divergent
views. In other words, differences found in the responses of different groups of
viewers, differences that can be associated with other cultural, social, and political
characteristics of these groups, may be diminished or even absent from the
responses of heavy viewers in the same groups.
Concerning mainstreaming, Calzo and Ward (2009) say exposure to media, “Brings
people with discrepant perspectives closer together, toward a central mainstream,” (p.
285). So essentially, heavy viewers see society similar to the way all heavy viewers see
society.
Resonance revolves around viewers perceiving connections between what they
see in their lives and on television, thereby causing viewers to experience stronger
cultivation effects (Gerbner et al., 1981). Shrum & Bischak (2001) describe the concept
of resonance as follows:
Like mainstreaming, resonance suggests that viewers’ life experiences may
moderate the cultivation relation. However, resonance predicts an interaction
between television viewing and life experience that is essentially opposite to that
of mainstreaming. Resonance suggests that those people whose life experiences
are more congruent with the experiences of the television world will be most
affected by the television message, rather than least affected as mainstreaming
predicts. When a viewer’s personal experiences involve crime and violence,
heavy viewing of television programs depicting crime victimization “may result
in a ‘double dose’ of the television message and significantly boost cultivation.”
(Gerbner et al., 1980, p. 15)
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According to Hermann (2016), in Gerbner et al.’s analysis of resonance, they found a
pattern of resonance among heavy viewers occurring more frequently with female
members of the study, and within participants who lived in urban areas. They determined
these results might be a result of respondents living in areas with higher crime rates, such
as cities, or because women are frequently conditioned by society to fear being
victimized. In the end, as Calzo and Ward note, “With the mechanism of resonance,
viewers are more accepting of and influenced by content that matches their existing
beliefs,” (p. 285). Hermann notes that Gerbner and his team determined that viewers who
experience resonance are likely to display the highest cultivation differential, as they are
more affected by, “An issue [that] was personally relevant and salient for an individual
and his/her life,” (Hermann, 2016, p. 12).
Effects, Perception, and Memory
As a theory, cultivation has matured since Gerbner’s inception of it. Key findings
throughout the theory’s advancement in the 1980s moving into modern day deal with the
types of effects viewers experience, and the cognitive processes involved in the
development of those effects. Hawkins and Pingree (1982) brought attention to what they
termed as “demographic beliefs” (p. 225) and “value system measures” (p. 237), which
would later be dubbed as first order and second order effects. According to Chong et al.
(2012, p. 954), “The first type of judgment are those made with regards to the perceptions
of probability of situations and prevalence of issues, while the second type are judgments
that indicate people’s belief and attitudes.” Chong et al. further elaborate on the
measurement of first order effects:
In the case of first order judgments, a person provides a numerical yardstick of
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certain issues; this numerical yardstick can be in absolute numbers or expressed as
a percentage. An example of this may be the number of rape crimes in a city in a
given year, or the percentage of students that make it through university
education. This is not limited to judgments about the external world; it could also
be judgments about the individual’s own environment. For example, an individual
could ask to estimate the chances of him/her being robbed while walking on the
street. (2012, pp. 954-955)
So, it is somewhat easier to measure first order effects, since a researcher can take
answers from respondents, such as the number of crimes happening in a neighborhood
and compare that rate to the rate of crimes on television. Gerbner would later note that
television representation concerning race was problematic and created negative first order
effects. For example, on television there often appear to be more African Americans
working in difficult to attain positions (such as medical doctors, lawyers, etc.). This can
result in non-Black Americans thinking American institutions are more diversified than
they really are, which results in beliefs by some that there is not a problem with racial
equality/justice in the United States (Earp et al., 2010). This aspect of first order effects
was more extensively fleshed out by those researching cultivation and memory/cognitive
retrieval, particularly Shrum et al., and will be discussed in the following section.
Second order effects, on the other hand, are somewhat less objective of a measure
because they deal with belief systems and values. Chong et al. (2012) use the following
examples of questions that could be used to measure second order effects: “Most men are
cheating behind their wives’ back” or “Judges should punish criminals more severely.”
They also note that second order questions can be used in questions that ask respondents
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about themselves, such as, “I am afraid of being raped,” (p. 955). Hawkins and Pingree
also highlight a troublesome issue that comes with the study and attribution of second
order effects, saying, “The zero-order relationships reported between television viewing
and these aspects of value systems may be spurious, or the relationship may hold up only
under certain conditions,” (p. 237). According to Prince (2018), in the years that followed
Hawkins and Pingree’s initial finding of first and second order effects, “Researchers
would offer alternative and refined models of the cognitive processes through which
these beliefs and attitudes are formed,” (p. 21).
Cultivation Effect Processes
While Hermann (2016) notes that Hastie and Park (1986) were the first to
highlight the differences in mental processes that go into first and second order effects,
Larry Shrum and colleagues are arguably the foremost group of researchers studying
cultivation and cognitive processing, especially in the realm of cultivation and
memory/mental retrieval. Shrum and O’Guinn (1993), note their primary thesis as, “The
accessibility of information in memory contributes to the cultivation effect,” (p. 460).
This has largely remained Shrum’s thesis and primary finding throughout his research. In
their 1993 study, Shrum and O’Guinn found that for heavier viewers, “…relevant
information, presumably ‘cultivated’ from television viewing, is more accessible in
memory for heavier viewers… overestimations of frequency or probability are associated
with this enhanced accessibility,” (1993, p. 436).
The basis of Shrum’s work lies in research on social cognition – especially the
heuristic processing model, which, according to Prince (2018), “…refers to the tendency
for people to take cognitive shortcuts when they are faced with answering questions for
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which they may not have a ready answer,” (p. 21). For example, when a person is asked
to provide an estimation of the occurrence of crime in their neighborhood, they generally
rely on the accessibility heuristic, meaning the most easily obtained information is most
likely to be used in the formulation of their estimate (Shrum, 2009; Shrum & Lee, 2012).
In terms of crime, Gerbner and Gross (1976) demonstrated that on TV, the prevalence of
crime is much higher than that of the real world. So, if a person is a heavy viewer of
television and is asked to make an estimate about the amount of crime in their
neighborhood or city, they can access the construct of crime prevalence more readily and
quickly since that construct is frequently (and likely has been more recently) reinforced
on TV (Hanson, 2012). Hanson also notes, “If activated frequently enough, particular
constructs may become chronically accessible,” (2012, p. 37).
Heuristic Processing and First Order Effects. Aside from pure accessibility, the
heuristic process, which is used in estimation of prevalence and other first order
judgements, is based on sufficiency. According to Chaiken et al. (1989), sufficiency deals
with data retrieval in the process of making a decision. Under the sufficiency concept,
individuals wind up not searching their memory comprehensively for all pertinent
cognitive data when they need to make a decision. Rather, they retrieve relatively minor
amounts of information based on what they believe is sufficient to support a conclusion
or judgement. Motivation and ability to process information, or the lack thereof,
determine what a person deems as sufficient (Chaiken et al., 1989). A more highly
motivated person will be more likely to deeply scan their brains for cognitive data to
make the best-informed judgement, while a less-motivated person is more likely to rely
on heuristic processing. Likewise, if a person is forced to make a decision quickly, they
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have less ability to thoroughly process the cognitive information available to them,
resulting in heuristic processing needing to be used (Prince, 2018). Or, the person may
simply have a low level of real-world background knowledge pertaining to a particular
issue, so they must rely on heuristic processing, i.e. what they’ve seen on TV or in other
media, to make a judgement.
The matter of a person having less real-world experience with certain issues,
events, or situations, is also tied to the “vividness” of constructs (Shrum, 2009, p. 52).
Even if an individual does have some background knowledge or experience with
situations which are portrayed on television, usually the TV portrayals are more vivid
since they are quite literally studio produced and designed to be memorable. An example
of this would be a person who has spent little to no time in a hospital having vivid
memories of scenes in emergency rooms and on the operating table because they
frequently watch dramatized television shows based on life as a hospital worker, such as
Grey’s Anatomy or Chicago Med. Even if that person has been to the emergency room or
hospitalized a few times in their lives, their television “experiences” will likely be more
vivid, thereby making that person more biased toward retrieving their cognitive data
based on what they’ve seen on TV.
Shrum notes that the heuristic processing issues of frequency, recency and
vividness can also work together to increase accessibility (2009). And, with increased
accessibility of one construct comes increased accessibility with highly similar
constructs. He says, “Constructs are stored in memory in the form of nodes, and links are
formed between the nodes. When a particular node (stored construct) is activated, other
constructs will also be activated to the extent that they are related to that node,” (2009,
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53). So, the increased accessibility of the constructs of anger and aggression could make
other closely related constructs more accessible, such as those of crime and violence. For
instance, if a certain racial group is consistently portrayed in media as angry – e.g. the
“mad” Black woman – even if that group is not shown on TV being violent or breaking
the law, a heavy viewer could be more likely to activate the construct of crime and
violence in addition to that of anger, making snap judgements that Black women are
angry, and thereby necessarily violent.
Processing and Second Order Effects. Shrum (2009) notes the distinctions in
processing between first and second order cultivation effects, and argues that second
order effects are more relevant to the day to day lives of viewers. While first order
judgements are, “fairly uncommon and seldom spontaneous,” second order judgements
are, “typically spontaneous, everyday judgments that influence many aspects of our
lives.” He details the processes and their differences, saying:
First order judgments tend to be memory-based judgments. Memory-based
judgments are constructed by recalling information from memory and
constructing the judgment in real time. In contrast, second order cultivation
judgments such as attitudes and values tend to be online judgments. Online
judgments are constructed by relying on information as it comes into memory
storage from an outside source (e.g., an ad, a speech, etc.)… Online judgments are
much more common and tend to be made spontaneously as information is
received. (p. 67)
Shrum links the processes involved for second order judgements to cultivation’s most
foundational assumptions. “The premise of cultivation theory is that frequent viewing
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influences attitudes, values, and beliefs in the direction of the television message. Put this
way, television viewing can be conceptualized as a persuasive communication,”
according to Shrum (2009, p. 67). As a form of persuasive communication, the dynamics
of television can at times encourage, and at other times impede, cultivation effects.
Second order judgements are diametrically opposed to first order judgements in that
when the factors of motivation and ability to process information are high, that increases
the likelihood of persuasion and thereby cultivation effects; for first order judgements,
high motivation and ability to process detract from the likelihood of cultivation effects.
This also means that during second order cultivation judgements, constructs of
background information from personal experiences are activated and thereby inserted
during viewing – something that also increases the level of persuasion, of which viewers
are on the receiving end.
In testing of second order cultivation effects, Shrum et al. (2005), “…Looked at
the relation between frequency of television viewing and the personal value of
materialism,” (Shrum, 2009, p. 68). They have continued to study television viewing and
materialism (a value that is presented on TV quite frequently), and report those who
watch more television frequently are more likely to report higher levels of materialism
(Shrum et al., 2005; Shrum, 2009; Shrum et al., 2011; Shrum & Lee, 2012). Furthermore,
individuals with a higher ability or motivation to process reported higher cultivation
effect levels. According to Prince (2018, p. 23), “In their research, motivation to process
information is operationalized as ‘need for cognition,’ which refers to the extent that an
individual enjoys engaging in complex thinking, while ability to process information is
operationalized as ‘attention to viewing.’” Shrum et al.’s findings indicate persuasion is
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highest for those who are both heavy viewers and motivated/have a high capability of
processing information.
In their continuing research on cultivation effect processes, Shrum and colleagues
had various other significant findings revolving around the amount and effects of
audience participation when watching television, which results in televised content being
inserted into viewers’ mindsets concerning values and beliefs. (Shrum et al., 2010) note
the issue of viewer “transportation,” saying, “Viewing level influenced materialism, but
only among participants who reported being transported by the narrative, supporting a
process model in which cultivation effects for value judgments occur online during
viewing,” (p. 34). They define narrative transportation as the following:
Narrative transportation refers to a process by which audience members (readers,
listeners, and in our case, viewers) are absorbed into the world of the narrative. In
such a state, viewers become engrossed in the story and are highly involved and
cognitively engaged, react emotionally, and have vivid thoughts…To achieve and
maintain this transported state, viewers may suspend disbelief and actively avoid
counterarguing, thereby setting aside real-world facts that may contradict the
narrative’s message (Shrum et al., 2010, p. 39).
Overall, this area of Shrum et al.’s research is most key to a study of cultivation in
relation to the communicative environment via a context analysis, as the issues of
transportation, memory-making in mediated spaces, audience participation, etc., are
directly related to the form of TV and social media, as well as the capabilities afforded to
users in the space(s).
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Newer Applications
More recently, cultivation theory has been applied to a large array of subjects and
areas of media. Studies relating the theory to television have been conducted by literally
scores of researchers since the theory was articulated in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. The
most relevant research relating to this study would be the application of the theory to
various online/social media. The groundwork for those studies was laid by researchers
who sought to expand the theory into different genres or types of television/television
delivery platforms, and their studies have been many. To name a very select few, Perse
(1986), Perse et al. (1994), Meyer (1989), Hetsroni (2012) and Hetsroni and Lowenstein
(2013) have all authored reports that have supported the theory and expanded upon its
original precepts. Similarly, Potter (1986), published research in support of the resonance
concept.
Online Content. From 2010 forward, cultivation theory has been applied to
online content and social media in some contexts. Chong et al. (2012) studied cultivation
among video gamers who mostly use the internet to access games. Subjects in this study
more highly reported the belief that drug use and overdose are pervasive in society, and
also more highly reported the belief that they would be victims of car accidents. In 2014,
Lau applied cultivation to television viewing coupled with online broadcast media via
sites such as YouTube. Results of the study showed the use of online media to be an
indicator of participating in certain activities, which with increased use over time, became
behaviors (Lau, 2014). Over the years, cultivation has also been applied to general social
media use and its effects on consumerism amid millennials for the purposes of marketing.
North (2011) analyzed the role of Facebook and Twitter in cultivating feelings of trust
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and loyalty among consumers of certain brands. Her results indicated organizations can
boost trust in their brands through strategic social media use, showing users do cultivate
certain feelings based on what they view via Facebook and Twitter. In another study, Cho
and DeCook (2015) noted that millennials who buy things because of a social media
influence are more likely to exhibit irresponsible consumer behavior. So, social media
can influence the things its users buy, thereby causing some users to be more reckless
with their spending/purchases.
Since 2015, there has been significant progress toward definitively establishing
that cultivation effects do occur as a result of social media, or at least that social media is
propagating cultivation-like effects, with multiple researchers having made headway on
the topic. Lau (2015) followed up his previous work with “Cultivation effects of
television broadcasting and online media,” in which he found:
There is a strong relationship between Use of Online Media and Behavioral
Intention, which means if an individual is an intensive user of Online Media,
he/she would intend to act in some activities and after a period of time, altered
and to become a kind of behavior. (p. 20)
An important limitation of Lau’s work, however, is that the only “online media”
investigated were YouTube and MyTV, which was Amazon’s precursor to Prime. While
YouTube is indeed a social network, in many ways it is merely an online purveyor of
actual studio-produced content, or television-like content that is produced socially – i.e.,
content viewers watch, but do not interact with quite the same way as they would on
platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter.
In another analysis of social media use and the cultivation of brand images,
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Hermann (2016) found positive and negative first and second order cultivation effects in
relation to Facebook use during the study he performed for his dissertation. Specifically,
he found that Facebook use can contribute to the first order effect of users believing the
world is more ethnically diverse than it really is, since the diversity level of Facebook is
greater than that of the real world. Hermann also reports negative second order effects in
relation to Facebook use, resulting in users having a more negative view of both local and
global brands. Arguably the most important aspect of Hermann’s work in relation to a
media ecological approach to cultivation is in the broad implications of his findings. He
states, “…Cultivation is not only based on one-way communication and exposure to
content generated by third parties (like in the case of traditional media) but on interactive
communication, mutual interaction, and highly personal, user-generated content,”
(p.138). Although his work does not directly delve into the nature of television versus
Facebook, his results imply that further research is necessary to understand how
Facebook has the ability to affect users in ways that are different, and likely more
impactful, than television. In many ways, Hermann’s dissertation has served as a
jumping-off point for this one, in that he established what is happening (that social media
use does result in cultivation effects), but did not answer the questions of how or why
cultivation is occurring as a result of Facebook use, or address the interplay between
Facebook and television, other social media platforms, etc.
Media Convergence. A necessary consideration for cultivation and media effects
more broadly as modern media becomes more and more converged is the question: What
is happening as a result of what? Can the messaging on one platform affect the messages
which wind up on other platforms? The interplay of content and messaging across media
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is an important concern when taking a media ecological approach to cultivation, as the
various platforms are all a part of the mediated environment as a whole. There has been
some headway into investigating the effects of messaging across different forms of
media, which is detailed below.
In a turn toward expanding cultivation to social media platforms beyond
YouTube, Doornwaard et al. (2015) conducted a study in which they reviewed “sexrelated internet use” of teens, including the viewing of sexually explicit material and
general social media use. While their analysis is not a cultivation study per se, they did
find, “…concurrent, direct, and indirect effects between sex-related online behaviors,
perceived peer norms, and experience with sexual behavior,” (p. 1). A key finding in
terms of cultivation and social media was that, “…among boys, more time spent on SNSs
directly predicted increased levels of experience with sexual behavior 18 months later.”
Additionally, they found that increased social media use across both genders resulted in
adolescents perceiving their peers to be “approving of sexual behavior,” (p. 13).
While their first finding is not necessarily a cultivation-like finding, the second
one, dealing with changes in perceptions about how their peers view sexual behavior in
the context of social norms is much more akin to the findings of more traditional
cultivation studies. Doornwaard et al. (2015) also emphasize an “integrative” approach to
studying how online content across platforms can work together to affect thoughts and
behaviors in users, indicating effects may occur and compound across platforms. In this
way, Doornwaard et al.’s approach is similar to the “cross-fertilization” methods
employed by media ecology, and supportive of this study’s proposition that cultivation is
occurring across platforms in the mediated environment.
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Also in 2015, Cicchirillo et al. (2015) studied the mainstreaming of verbal
aggression online with an emphasis on political behaviors and civil discourse. According
to their study:
The results show that individuals less inclined to engage in aggressive
communication tactics (i.e., low in verbal aggression) become more accepting of
flaming and show greater intention to flame as their attention to uncivil media
increases. By contrast, those with comparatively higher levels of verbal
aggression show a decrease in acceptance and intention to flame as their attention
to these same media increases.
Hence, as their results suggest, “uncivil media” can take a viewer/user who was initially
unlikely to engage in divisive or violent political discourse online and primes that user’s
pump. This makes them inclined to take out their political aggression on others in online
spaces despite the fact that this would have been something they would have been
unlikely to do had they not been exposed to the divisive messaging that is often displayed
on cable news. An important factor of Cicchirillo et al.’s work is that it investigates the
relationship between content viewed on television (in this case, uncivil debates as
commonly featured on cable news) and behaviors online. This is supportive of the
position that effects of messaging can travel across different platforms, with users taking
the messaging with them as they switch from one platform to another throughout the day.
In another study on messaging across media platforms, Cheng et al. (2016)
analyzed the role of mass media and social media in the aftermath of the 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake and found that while mass and social media each had their own role in
providing information during the earthquake, the two mediums can be used together
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strategically to increase the reach and effectiveness of messaging. They propose the
following dual strategy for employing mass and social media:
They [a disaster-relief organization] can utilise television as the main medium to
promote public awareness on post-disaster recovery and disaster preparations,
especially to the general public that did not experience the disaster directly. With
the knowledge that television will cultivate the perceptions of bonds which are the
most influential as well as the perception of concerns and anxieties which are less
effective, they can utilise social media in parallel to achieve the optimal results.
Especially, with the knowledge that social media can reduce some of the
perceptions of concerns and anxieties. For example, they can provide the
supplementary information as well as the communication platform over social
media. (p. 770)
An important point to note regarding Cheng et al.’s (2106) study is that they report
approaching users from the “passive audience perspective” and concede that this is a
limitation of sorts (p. 771). They also, however, advocate for further research that
approaches audiences as both passive and active to establish a more complete and clear
picture of the roles mass and social media play, how their messages can work together,
and their ensuing effects.
The Newest of the New. In the most recent research linking cultivation to social
media, some have been applications of the theory to social media generally, while others
have directly applied it to a specific platform. Intravia et al. (2017) investigated the
cultivation of fear of crime in relation to social media use on Facebook and Twitter. They
report, “Overall social media consumption is significantly related to individuals’ fear of
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crime. Specifically among the full sample of respondents, overall social media
consumption appears to be related to fear of crime above and beyond the other mediarelated measures,” (p. 163). Much like Hermann’s 2016 study, Intravia et al. (2017)
found that social media does cultivate certain outlooks and attitudes. Additionally, also
like Hermann’s work, what is most relevant to this inquiry is their concession of what
their study did not do, and what they say should come next in terms of cultivation and
social media. Intravia et al. note:
Our measures do not specifically examine the unique characteristics, such as
engaging in stories, found in social media platforms. Perhaps stories that involve
crime/violence that receive more attention (e.g., likes or shares) and/or discourse
(comments/informal discussion) may affect how information is processed (e.g.,
leads to greater fear). More nuanced measures of social media engagement are
needed to address why and how this is occurring. For instance, crime content that
has more worried individuals commenting may affect how a story is perceived
and generate fear among those who are engaged in the information. (2017, p. 166)
In 2018, Tsay-Vogel, Shanahan and Signorielli investigated the link between
Facebook use and relaxed privacy issues online, finding that increased Facebook use does
indeed result in users having a relaxed outlook on their privacy in both online and offline
contexts. Their work also correlates with the general findings of cultivation analyses over
the years – that heavy viewers/users are the most susceptible to cultivation effects and
with lighter users, the cultivation effect is reduced, but still consistent.
The most significant aspect of Tsay-Vogel et. al’s study is not only their results
which are consistent with television cultivation effects, but also the researchers
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themselves. Nancy Signorielli was one of the primary researchers working for Gerbner;
she has authored or contributed to more than 130 scholarly articles and books on
cultivation, making her one of the subject’s most qualified researchers. James Shanahan,
although not one of Gerbner’s original researchers, has also been a major figure in
cultivation studies and has worked extensively with Michael Morgan, who (along with
Signorelli) worked with Gerbner for decades. Shanahan has also authored or contributed
to more than 65 scholarly articles or books on the subject. Furthermore, Morgan and
Shanahan’s 2010 article “The state of cultivation” was one of the first to propose
cultivation could be applied to social media. Reading that article in 2011 was the catalyst
for a deep study of social media and cultivation, which has finally materialized into a
dissertation.
Both Medhat Negm (2018) and Stein et al. (2019) performed studies on media
usage and the cultivation of certain beliefs on body image. While Medhat Negm did not
specifically research any specific social media platform, she did find that social media in
general contributes to altered beauty expectations that may not be realistic (2018). Stein
et al., on the other hand, focused exclusively on Instagram – their article is the first peer
reviewed article to have applied cultivation to the platform. They found, “Highly-visual
social media constitute a meaningful cultivation system for body-related attitudes and
behaviors among young adults,” (p. 2). The emphasis on visual aspects of social media
platforms is very significant for this dissertation, which seeks to articulate how the
various components of social media affect the senses and cognitive processes of users.
Stein et al. further note, “Our study indicated that it might be much less important how
often people use social media than what they use it for,” (p. 21), implying a need for a
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more nuanced look into users’ uses and gratifications, which in terms of form would deal
with the capabilities social media platforms afford to those who log on.
Hermann, along with researchers Eisend and Bayón (2020) have continued
Hermann’s dissertation study which investigated cultivation in relation to ethnic
diversity. Their results were largely in line with those found by Hermann in 2016.
However, they do spend time discussing some of the primary concerns of this study –
namely, how the environment of social media is affecting users (especially via
Facebook’s algorithm), and how the participatory aspects of Facebook impacts the
messaging users receive. They state:
Cultivation effects depend on the message system and communication content
individuals are exposed to. Facebook users are mostly exposed to content through
their news feed, and the composition of Facebook users’ friendship networks, the
Facebook algorithm and self-selection (i.e. individual choice) are the most
important factors influencing the mix of content users encounter… Given the
ubiquity of social media and their importance in users’ (everyday) lives, such
algorithms should be thoughtfully designed and curated to avoid content-related
filter bubbles and respective adverse attitudinal and ideological polarization.
(2020, para. 40)
Ultimately, while the current research has established cultivation theory can
indeed be applied to social media, there has yet to be an analysis of the broader mediated
environment in relation to cultivation effects since most current studies have only taken
cultivation and applied it to a specific social media platform. Some have considered
general social media use in addition to television to examine cultivation across platforms,
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but none have studied the mediated environment as a whole, which is the hole this study
hopes to fill, so to speak.
Media Ecology
For media and communication scholars, media ecology is a subfield of media
effects studies that has been studied and written about since the early 1970s, when Neil
Postman founded a media ecology studies program at NYU (Gamaleri, 2019). It is
debated whether Postman or McLuhan actually coined the term, and the two men
approach the term differently, although both use it metaphorically. It cannot be denied
that McLuhan’s early work on the medium as message was foundational to the field;
some consider McLuhan the father of media ecology (Wachs, 2012), while others deem
him its “forefather” (Meyrowitz, 2001, p. 15). Overall, it is safe to say McLuhan laid the
groundwork theoretically, while Postman institutionalized media ecology as a field by
expounding upon McLuhan’s corpus with research that is clearly articulated and
systematically coherent.
Though McLuhan argued that media effects studies are less important than a
study of the medium, he did write extensively on how media affect the senses. This key
aspect of McLuhan scholarship is an area ripe for connection to Shrum et al.’s work on
cultivation and memory. Postman’s approach to media ecology considers media as
environments and focuses on the social effects of those mediated environments.
Postman’s concern with effects, especially social effects, ties in more closely with
Gerbner et al.’s work, with the former considering effects as a result of the mediated
environment and the latter considering effects as a result of content. For this study,
McLuhan’s conception of the global village and his contention of the ubiquity of media

44

has served as a catalyst for studying cultivation across the mediated environment.
Nevertheless, Postman’s understanding of media as environments which are intrinsically
capable of transmitting messaging themselves is fundamentally a synthesis and extension
of McLuhan’s axiom that the medium is the message and his notion of the global village.
Consequently, Postman’s work will play a complementary role throughout this literature
review and study.
McLuhan: The Global Village
Any discussion of the global village must begin with McLuhan, who began using
the term as early as 1959 in a letter to a magazine editor Edward Morgan (Molinaro et al.,
1987). According to Ozturk (2014), in the letter McLuhan,
…Explains how a continuous and instantaneous flow of information from all
directions at the same time blurs the lines between the producer and consumer,
and how it also changes the interactions between people in an epoch when the
dimensions of space and time have been altered. (p. 423)
McLuhan (1959, as cited in McLuhan et al. 1987, p. 253) also states, “The globe
becomes a very small village-like affair, under electronic conditions, in which whatever
happens to anybody, happens to everybody.” The Letters of Marshall McLuhan
(Molinaro et al., 1987) also includes a likely inspiration for his early use of the term –
Wyndham Lewis’ American and Cosmic Man (1948), which McLuhan was known to
have owned. In the text, Lewis says, “…the Earth has become one big village, with
telephone lines laid on from one end to the other…” (as cited in Molinaro et al. 1987, p.
253).
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Three years after writing his letter to Morgan, McLuhan would formally coin the
term in his first major work on the evolution and role of the mass media on man and
society, entitled The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962). Although much of the book’s pages are
dedicated to the role of Gutenberg’s printing press and other communicative processes
and mechanisms throughout history, the global village is arguably the concept for which
the work is most remembered. McLuhan contends the “electro-magnetic technology” of
the future – primarily radio, television and computers – is causing humans to make a turn
away from text-based literacy and back to the more primitive mode of communication,
orality. In his chapter gloss, “The new electronic interdependence recreates the world in
the image of a global village” he notes, “…we must learn today that our electric
technology has consequences for our most ordinary perceptions and habits of action…”
and goes on to state, “These consequences occur, not in our thoughts or opinions, where
we are trained to be critical, but in our most ordinary sense of life…” (p. 30). Thus, new
technologies are affecting the way we communicate in everyday life so much that we
come to depend upon them – a dependence which further ties us to the other users of said
technology, “…so that the human family now exists under the conditions of a ‘global
village’” (p. 31).
His Early Ideas
Key to understanding how McLuhan arrived at his idea of the global village is his
early work. Before his definitive articulation of the global village, McLuhan was already
considering the effects of industrialism and technology on modern society in The
Mechanical Bride (1951). Gordon (2014) highlights a key passage from the original draft
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of the book that discloses McLuhan’s earlier somewhat ambivalent stance on
technological reliance and interconnectivity:
Know-how and technology isolate man at work and play just as much as a big city
and unemployment do. But this fact is also the basic condition of science. A
scientific experiment has to be carefully isolated from normal conditions. And the
success formula certainly sets you apart. A man of distinction. Sing Sing or a
padded cell couldn’t be more effective in this respect. By making each cell (home,
hotel, blonde, car) in the world exactly alike, technological man manages to create
the illusion of being at home everywhere and with everybody. At the same time
he has created a bright and salubrious hell from which, as Sartre noted, there is
“No Exit.” (McLuhan, 1951, as cited in Gordon, 2014, p. 77)
Here, technology’s role in making the world more homogenous and the use of it
by man for industrial purposes shows a less optimistic view than McLuhan would later
take concerning the global village. However, there are several important takeaways from
this short (stricken) section of The Mechanical Bride. First is McLuhan’s assertion of
technology creating the illusion that we can be “at home everywhere and with
everybody,” which is a clear precursor to his later conception of the global village. The
passage also asserts that the illusion of such a uniform world is essentially unavoidable in
the high-tech age and provides insight to McLuhan’s early views on technology operating
as a structure, with his “Sing Sing or a padded cell” (p. 77) comparison. His nod to
Sartre’s No Exit suggests being bound together with others is a defining characteristic of
the space – the “bright, salubrious hell” – and according to Sartre (1989, p. 45), “Hell is –
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other people!” Social media users of today are now, without a doubt, bound together as
well.
Visualizing the Global Village
Following his initial articulation of the global village, McLuhan spent decades
delineating his conception; in doing so, he described not only the effects of
communication technologies of his time, but also the effects of those to come. He
foresaw that televisions and computers would merge the world socially before socialspecific components (i.e. the internet and later social media) existed. In a 1969 Playboy
magazine interview (as cited in Rogaway, 1994, p. 15), he elaborated on his idea of the
global village: “Through radio, TV and the computer, we are already entering a global
theater in which the entire world is a Happening.” He asserted that mankind’s entire
“cultural habitat” is not just a container of many peoples and cultures, but also a living
environment unto itself. Here, his environmental approach to the global village was not
new. During a lecture in 1966 he said, ”A medium creates an environment. An
environment is a process; it is not a wrapper. It’s an action, and it goes to work on our
nervous systems and our sensory lives, completely altering them,” (as cited in McLuhan
& Staines, 2004, p. 91). Understanding what McLuhan envisioned the global village to
be, including its structure, components, and capabilities is key to visualizing the broader,
highly digital and social global village of today.
Toward a New Environment. McLuhan wrote extensively on media as an
environment in Understanding Media (1964), which was aptly subtitled Extensions of
Man. In the text, McLuhan argues that media operates as an extension of the human
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body, and messages operate as new environments that have been created by technology.
He says:
In this electric age we see ourselves being translated more and more into the form
of information, moving toward the technological extension of consciousness…By
putting our physical bodies inside our extended nervous systems, by means of
electric media, we set up a dynamic by which all previous technologies that are
mere extensions of hands and feet and teeth and bodily heat-controls – all such
extensions of our bodies, including cities--will be translated into information
systems. (p. 57)
Additionally, McLuhan engages in an extended dialogue documenting the,
“structural changes in the organization of space as they resulted from wheel, road, and
papyrus,” following the, “extension and translation of the human organs into the village
model” through to the city model of ancient Greek city-states, to eventually, the world of
today. In short, the “human scale” of the world expanded greatly with the invention of
new technologies – these technologies operated as disruptors to the way of life current to
the period (p. 97-98). By tracing human organization throughout history, but doing so in
a “biological” manner, McLuhan emphasizes the systemic structural qualities inherent to
human expansion:
All organizations, but especially biological ones, struggle to remain constant in
their inner condition amidst the variations of outer shock and change. The manmade social environment as an extension of man’s physical body is no exception.
The city, as a form of the body politic, responds to new pressures and irritations

49

by resourceful new extensions always in the effort to exert staying power,
constancy, equilibrium, and homeostasis. (p. 98)
This pattern of technological breakthroughs, acceleration, and extension of human
organization and social structure has continued throughout history until the modern
electric era, which McLuhan argues has caused the greatest and most accelerated
upheaval of human life. In modern day, electric technology has disrupted human
organization to the point of obscuring time and space:
When information moves at the speed of signals in the central nervous system,
man is confronted with the obsolescence of all earlier forms of acceleration, such
as road and rail. What emerges is a total field of inclusive awareness. The old
patterns of psychic and social adjustment become irrelevant. (McLuhan, 1964, p.
104)
McLuhan further noted these contemporary technological breakthroughs would produce
“problems of human involvement and organization for which there is no precedent”
created by “our electric-extensions of ourselves [which] simply by-pass space and time”
(p. 105), which nods toward the consequences of vast and rapid changes to human social
structure. In 1966, during a “Sunday Showcase” television panel, he put his ideas on the
global village modifying time and space into layman’s terms, saying:
Today, the instantaneous world of electric information media involves all of us,
all at once. Ours is a brand new world of all-at-onceness. Time, in a sense, has
ceased and space has vanished. Like primitives, we now live in a global village of
our own making, a simultaneous happening. The global village is not created by
the motor car or even by the airplane. It is created by instant electronic
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information movement. The global village is at once as wide as the planet and as
small as the little town where everybody is maliciously engaged in poking his
nose into everybody else’s business. The global village is a world in which you
don’t necessarily have harmony; you have extreme concern with everyone else’s
business and much involvement in everybody else’s life. It’s a sort of Ann
Landers column written larger. And it doesn’t necessarily mean harmony and
peace and quiet, but it does mean huge involvement in everybody else’s affairs.
And so, the global village is as big as a planet and as small as the village post
office (McLuhan et al., 1966).
Components and Capabilities. After Understanding Media, McLuhan also
continued to emphasize the importance of the medium(s) which communicate messages,
most notably with his book The Medium is the Massage (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967), but
also throughout his lectures, interviews, and subsequent works. Within this context, he
still elaborated extensively on what he saw happening within the global village and
further outlined how it would continue to modify our communication environment into
the future. His accounts of the components and capabilities of the global village played a
large role in conceptualizing the theoretical approach to this study.
Innis: McLuhan’s Inspiration
In considering media ecology’s roots, it is vital to also call attention to Harold
Innis, whose writings were certainly a precursor to those of McLuhan. For a time, Innis
and McLuhan were work colleagues at the University of Toronto (Grosswiler, 2002).
Gordon (2014, p. 82) refers to Innis as McLuhan’s “sometime mentor.” Indeed, there are
many, many parallels between the work of the two men. Innis’ study of “…how different
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media of communications affect communication content, cognition, and the character of
societies,” (Deibert, 1999, p. 273) seems to be a clear harbinger for McLuhan’s later
articulation that the medium is the message. Furthermore, while Innis largely approached
media as either being biased toward time (stone, clay, etc.) or biased toward space
(papyrus, paper), he used these biases to define communication periods. According to
Grosswiler (2002, pp. 437-438), “Innis divides history into writing and printing periods,
noting the influence of clay, papyrus, parchment, and paper on the writing period, as well
as the influence of machinery and wood pulp on the printing period.” In time, McLuhan
would define what he refers to as “epochs” of communicative history; the similarly of
McLuhan’s epochs to that of Innis’ writing and printing periods is just another example
of Innis serving as the antecedent of McLuhan’s work.
A point of disagreement in the two scholars is their outlook on communication
technologies – McLuhan (for most of his career) viewed the expanding communicative
apparatuses optimistically while Innis’ view was inherently negative. He argued against
communication monopolies (Grossweiler, 2002) and for a balanced approach by empires
and societies in order to avoid the negative consequences of one type of media
dominating social discourse. In his introduction to the second edition of The Bias of
Communication, Watson (2008, p. 236) delineates the effect of such a disequilibrium:
Innis understood that the capacity of modern electronic mass media to divert
(entertain), advertise (sell services and products), and justify (“spin” politics) was
leading to imbalance at the centre of the West—the United States. Many
phenomena that we are seeing there so many years later were foreseen by Innis.
Examples would be the emphasis of revelation over reason, the presentation of
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politics as entertainment, and the employment of war (force) to solve relatively
small problems that would have been previously addressed by diplomacy
(intelligence).
While McLuhan’s predictions of the world’s forthcoming communicative environment
have largely been proven true over the course of decades, Innis’ views on the downside
of media is highly relevant in the total media ecosystem of modern day – an environment
in which negative effects are readily apparent. Watson (2008) concludes, “For Innis, our
culture was becoming so saturated with new instantaneous media that there was no longer
a hinterland to which refugee intellectuals could retreat to develop a new paradigm that
would allow us to tackle the new problems we are facing,” (p. 244).
Outside of the direct correlations and contrasts to McLuhan’s work, Innis wrote
prolifically about communication toward the end of his career. Previously, his work
centered on economic topics such as, “cod fisheries, the fur trade, and railways in
Canada,” (Grossweiler, 2002, p. 438). His switch in interest, understandably, caused
some consternation among his colleagues in economics and political science, but his later
writings have stood the test of time and remain relevant in communication. This is
particularly true in the subfield of media ecology, of which his work The Bias of
Communication (1951) is especially significant. Watson (2008) notes:
At the level of theory, Innis posited that the characteristics of media will influence
the type of empire that employs them… Innis was attempting something much
more intellectually challenging; nothing less than a new grand synthesis that
combined a theory of the state, a theory of culture, and a theory of technology…
(p. 221)
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Despite the fact that Innis was never able to fully realize his sweeping, universal theory
of communication (he simply died too soon), his study of media on a grand scale gives
further support to approaching media and their effects holistically. The preface of The
Idea File of Harold Adams Innis states Innis’ position was that, “…It was civilization as a
whole, and not just parts of it, which ought to be studied,” (p. xi). Aside from his position
supporting a broad understanding of media, Innis, like McLuhan, deemphasizes the
content of a medium and emphasizes the medium itself as the originator of effects.
According to Heyer and Crowley (2008), “Innis…chose to take the measure of media
effects not in terms of individual responses to content, but in terms of how each medium,
as it developed, restructured the broader patterns of interaction,” (p. 564).
Innis displays his comprehensive approach when he opens chapter two of The
Bias of Communication by saying, “A medium of communication has an important
influence on the dissemination of knowledge over space and over time and it becomes
necessary to study its characteristics in order to appraise its influence in its cultural
setting,” (2008, p. 33). He also describes media that has become too dominant as
“pervasive” – a notable link to the descriptions used by both McLuhan and Gerbner. The
link to what McLuhan would later write continues, as Innis asserts, “We can perhaps
assume that the use of a medium of communication over a long period will to some
extent determine the character of knowledge to be communicated,” (p. 34).
In “A Plea for Time,” Innis reiterates his emphasis on the need for balance among
communicative mediums, so neither time nor space becomes overly dominant. “The
character of the medium of communication tends to create a bias in civilization
favourable to an overemphasis on the time concept or on the space concept and only at
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rare intervals are the biases offset by the influence of another medium and stability
achieved,” according to Innis (2008, pp. 63-63). The type of bias a medium exhibits also
affects how they are used by society. According to Meyrowitz (1985):
Innis argues that different media have different potentialities for control. A
medium that is in short supply or that requires a very special encoding or
decoding skill is more likely to be exploited by an elite class that has the time and
the resources to gain access to it. Conversely, a medium that is very accessible to
the common person tends to democratize a culture. (1985, pp. 16-17)
Innis’ insistence on the need for balance is notably pertinent in the era of the internet
since it is written in ink (making it biased toward time) but can also quickly traverse
countries or even continents in mere seconds (making the internet biased toward space).
Postman: Media as Environments
As Neil Postman is the person who, quite literally, founded the school of media
ecology and brought the field into the mainstream of communication theory and studies,
his work is key to viewing media as environments, a concept which has direct bearing on
this study. Milberry (2012) explains Postman’s conception of media as environments as
one that was inspired less by ecology and more by biology: “In biology, a medium is
defined as a substance within which a culture grows; in media ecology, a medium is a
technology within which human culture grows, giving form to its politics, ideologies, and
social organization,” (para. 1).
Postman authored more than twenty books, along with scores of papers, reports
and presentations, throughout his career. As a follow up to his Teaching as a Subversive
Activity, coauthored with Weingartner (1969), Postman addressed the National Council of
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Teachers of English. In his presentation, “The Reformed English Curriculum,” (1970), he
argues for a turn away from teaching English in the traditional sense. Instead, Postman
contends, we should teach media ecology, which would give students a more relevant
understanding of “…the dominant communication media of their own culture,” (p. 160).
On his concept of media ecology, he elaborates:
Its intention is to study the interaction between people and their communications
technology. More particularly, media ecology looks into the matter of how media
of communication affect human perception, understanding, feeling, and value;
and how our interaction with media facilitates or impedes our chances of survival.
The word ecology implies the study of environments: their structure, content, and
impact on people. (p. 161)
Media ecology, according to Postman, must be concerned with the structure and roles
contained within mediated environments, even if users do not readily perceive them.
Postman says:
An environment is, after all, a complex message system which imposes on human
beings certain ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. It structures what we can
see and say and, therefore, do. It assigns roles to us and insists on our playing
them. It specifies what we are permitted to do and what we are not. Sometimes, as
in the case of a courtroom, or classroom, or business office, the specifications are
explicit and formal. In the case of media environments (e.g., books, radio, film,
television, etc.), the specifications are more often implicit and informal, half
concealed, by our assumption that what we are dealing with is not an environment
but merely a machine. Media ecology tries to make these specifications explicit. It
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tries to find out what roles media force us to play, how media structure what we
are seeing, why media make us feel and act as we do. (1970, p. 161)
His note on people’s misconception of technology as simply machinery rather than a
complex system harkens back to early work in communication theory and electric
technology/machines (including Gerbner’s general communication model) which largely
positioned the messages a machine was conveying as the most important aspect of the
communicative process, or at least more important than the overall mediated
environment. The view of passive machinery merely passing along content, rebutted
above by Postman, has also been refuted by McLuhan and the field of media ecology as a
whole.
Arguably Postman’s most well-known publication is the seminal Amusing
Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (1985). Throughout
his research and writings, he was primarily concerned with how media affect all modes of
thought and social structures, as is the case for his 1985 work. His ecological view of
media meant that when media changes, so does society. In Amusing Ourselves to Death,
he defines his thesis as the following:
My argument is limited to saying that a major new medium changes the structure
of discourse; it does so by encouraging certain uses of the intellect, by favoring
certain definitions of intelligence and wisdom, and by demanding a certain kind
of content – in a phrase, by creating new forms of truth-telling. (1985, p. 27)
He goes on to detail his position and puts it in an ecological context, saying, “Changes in
the symbolic environment are like changes in the natural environment; they are both
gradual and additive at first, and then, all at once, a critical mass is achieved, as the
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physicists say,” (1985, p. 27). Postman directly applies his theory of ecological change to
technology as a whole in Technopoly and notes that changes in media environments are
all-encompassing (1992, p. 18): “…A new technology does not add or subtract
something. It changes everything,” which is reminiscent of McLuhan’s assertion that new
forms of media absorb all past forms of media.
Postman’s Warning. In a divergence from McLuhan and adherence to Innis,
Postman is highly critical of media’s role in society, especially television and electronic
media. He uses the metaphor of a polluted river to explain his position:
A river that has slowly been polluted suddenly becomes toxic; most of the fish
perish; swimming becomes a danger to health. But even then. the river may look
the same and one may still take a boat ride on it. In other words, even when life
has been taken from it, the river does not disappear, nor do all of its uses, but its
value has been seriously diminished and its degraded condition will have harmful
effects throughout the landscape. It is this way with our symbolic
environment. We have reached, I believe, a critical mass in that electronic media
have decisively and irreversibly changed the character of our symbolic
environment. (1985, pp. 27-28)
Bermudez (2012) notes Postman’s outlook on media technologies is that of a “Faustian
bargain, simultaneously giving to and taking away from society attributes such as
freedom, independence, skill, and culture,” (p. 14). In general, Postman viewed media
through a moral lens, making his view starkly negative; McLuhan, on the other hand, left
morality out of the question and was markedly optimistic about the capabilities electric
technology afforded to the world. While they are both technological determinists, the
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trajectories of where the two men felt technology would take society are quite different.
In terms of the modern mediated environment, Postman’s “Faustian bargain” mostly
rings true, but McLuhan’s vision of the possibilities technology would open up for the
world via “extensions of man” has also come to fruition.
In Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology, Postman (1992)
continues to view technology through a highly critical lens and discourages its
idolization. He warns against excessive dependence on technology, as it could hurt our
ability to objectively think. He says, “New technologies alter the structure of our
interests: the things we think about. They alter the character of our symbols: the things
we think with. And they alter the nature of community: the arena in which thoughts
develop,” (p. 21). Postman also goes back to the idea that technology is generally always
a tradeoff, using the example of Johannes Gutenberg and the printing press. Gutenberg,
Postman claims, would have been “horrified” to see his invention used for the protestant
(yet at the time, heretical) purposes of Martin Luther, as Gutenberg was a devout
Catholic. Luther saw the mass printing of the Bible as a way for people to no longer need
the Catholic Church, since by reading scripture their connection and relationship with
God would be direct – no priests necessary. Hence, with increased religious literacy came
decreased papal supremacy.
This concern with the far-reaching, long-term, and potentially negative effects of
media environments was not new for Postman, who had been considering mediated
environments from a social viewpoint since his inception of media ecology as a field. In a
1974 speech at the Speech Communication Association’s summer conference, he asks a
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series of questions which hint at where he would eventually land on the nature of media
and its effects:
What media ecologist wants to know is how media environments work – how
they structure what we see and say, and, therefore, do, and how this structuring
changes as the media themselves move from one environment to another. A very
difficult task. But the difficulty of it has not stopped us from asking some of the
big questions. For example, in what ways does technology generate social
change? What are the consequences of new communication environments – from
computers to communes – for education, politics, literature, and religion? In what
ways do speeded-up communication environments affect interpersonal
relationships? What role does language itself play in conserving social
institutions? (1974, p. 8)
His ending question directly foretells Postman’s later, more cynical, position on the role
of media in society. Strate (2003) notes that Postman was commonly concerned with the
theme of survival. When our survival is threatened and our control over mediated
environments is tenuous at best, and even worse our understanding of those environments
is lacking, such a skeptical viewpoint is understandable; at any rate, it is certain that
Postman’s outlook on media environments was informed by decades of research –
research that left him with more questions than answers. In his “Introduction to the
Twentieth Anniversary Edition” of Amusing Ourselves to Death Postman’s son Andrew
argues that his father was not a “curmudgeon” as so many people believed. “It was never
optimism he lacked; it was certainty. ‘We must be careful in praising or condemning
because the future may hold surprises for us,’ he wrote,” (p. xv). Viewed in the light of
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modern day, Postman’s sentiments have a Fahrenheit 451 feel, warning against the
negative ramifications of a technological big brother – ramifications that are palpable in
2021 and highly relevant to an analysis of the modern mediated environment.
Melding McLuhan with Postman. So, who is right? McLuhan with his almost
blind optimism about the future of technology, or Postman, who may not be quite a
“curmudgeon,” but is certainly a killjoy when his outlook is juxtaposed with McLuhan’s.
In reality, both men were correct in their assessments in some ways. McLuhan’s view of
technology and how far it would expand to extend the capabilities of man was
unquestionably visionary. He foresaw the world in which technology would become a
part of us – a world in which we would be constantly connected by an invisible web of
communicative technology. That web literally became the world wide web we are
surrounded by and consumed with each day. In today’s time we have smartphones,
smartwatches, tablets, laptops, computers, televisions, smart TVs, AI smart devices, etc.,
etc. Whether we like it or want to admit it, technology has indeed become a part of us.
But, at the same time, Postman’s cautioning about the negative social effects of
technology cannot be discounted, as some of those effects are already readily apparent in
modern society.
Technological innovation has extended our capabilities to a level McLuhan only
dreamed of, but at the same time, we are reaping what we sow technology-wise. During
COVID the citizens of the world largely became more isolated than ever, despite living in
a mediated environment that keeps us “connected” 24/7. Even before we became
unwilling recluses as a result of Coronavirus lockdowns, people felt detached from those
around them because of the disproportionate amount of time spent looking at screens.
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The truth is, we live in a paradoxical world in which technology has come to dominate
our lives and is pretty much a requirement for survival and success in modern times.
Simultaneously the technology which provides us with vast opportunities for constant
connection and unprecedented extensions of human capabilities makes us feel
disconnected and alone.

62

Chapter Three:
Method
This dissertation argues for a new understanding of cultivation as an effect
resulting from existence and participation in the modern mediated environment, and as
such, this study performed statistical analyses that are much in the same vein as those
originally used to test television’s effects on users. The idea behind this was to survey
users on the amount of time they spend watching television daily, their time spent on
Facebook, and additionally their time spent on other social media platforms such as
Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok before asking them questions that are similar
or nearly identical to questions asked in traditional television studies (e.g. questions on
whether they believe they will be a victim of violent crime, questions on traditional
gender roles, opinions on the civility of others, etc.).
Research Design
The crux of this study’s research design is statistical analysis through a study of
users. Drawing on Chong et al. (2012), Lau (2014), and Hermann (2016) all of whom
applied cultivation theory to content viewed over the internet (social media in the case of
Hermann), as well as Prince (2018) who applied cultivation across television and
internet-based TV programming such as streaming services, investigating cultivation
effects in users across different types of media, i.e. the modern mediated environment,
became the primary aim of statistical analyses.
Although survey questions asked about use across television and several social
media platforms, Facebook was the most vital social media platform to examine, since
usage of the site by American citizens is all but universal, with 81% of Americans having
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a Facebook account and 71% who say they use the platform regularly (Dobrilova, 2021).
As Nielsen (2018) indicates, social media usage among some groups is nearing levels of
T.V. viewership, cultivation in relation to the use of Facebook, which is the most widely
used platform, was a pertinent area of investigation.
Additionally, the effects of Facebook (or any social media platform) use could be
heightened and truly taken to heart, since, according to Valkenburg and Peter (2013), in a
shared media environment, users are highly sensitive to other users’ beliefs and therefore
react to content in a more intense or emotional way than in a non-shared media
environment. As it is well established through decades of research, user consumption of
television has small, but consistent cultivation effects. So, the premise of this study is that
user/viewership across television and social media leads to a “double-whammy” effect.
Users are being bombarded with messaging and images across media and are also
existing in a participatory atmosphere online that affords users a “stage” to conduct social
life and act out social norms. While users are exposed to symbolic violence on television,
they are exposed to actual violations of social norms, verbal/textual violence, and in some
cases, actual violence via photos, videos, live streaming, etc. This study proposes that all
of these factors likely add up to users cultivating certain views of themselves, and
expectations of/beliefs about the world around them.
Participants
In order to test the research questions advanced in the Review of Literature, data
were collected by administering a voluntary online survey to students, faculty and staff of
several U.S. universities, and to adult members of the general public across the country.
Specifically, a call for participants was placed on the social media platforms Facebook,
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Instagram, and Twitter. Consistent with existing research, the target sample size of the
survey was 450 to 500, and 413 participants wound up completing the survey. Survey
questions were posed as closed-ended so responses would be well suited for quantitative
analysis.
Undergraduate and graduate students were drawn from students attending
colleges and universities across the United States. Contact was made with representatives
of six universities, and those contacts were able to send out the survey link in an email to
students with an invitation to participate. In order to further solicit the survey, an email
message was sent to the researcher’s business and personal contacts, as well as the
representatives of colleges and universities. As needed, the current email addresses of the
already-established contacts were obtained from university/business websites. Since the
survey was publicly posted on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, it was shared by
various social organizations with which the researcher had an established relationship.
IRB approval was obtained before the survey was solicited. While this study used a
convenience sample, the healthy sample size of 413 participants resulted in results that
generally well-represented variables of race and age, but less so for gender. The majority
of respondents were young adults ages 18-24 and 25-34; those two groups are the age
demographic which most heavily uses social media.
Study Variables. The following variables were utilized to test associations
among variables in the study.
Independent Measures. Respondents were asked to list how many hours they
spent watching television across all television viewing platforms, including timeshifted/DVR programs and streaming services, as well as hours spent on Facebook per
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day, and also how many hours they spent on other social media sites, including Twitter,
Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube per day. To give an example, for Facebook
consumption, respondents were asked, “On a typical day, about how many hours do you
spend on Facebook?” Time of consumption was offered as ranges, with 0, less than 1
hour, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, and more than 8 as the options. Survey questions for TV,
Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube were all phrased in the same manner. Survey
participants were also asked to select their age range, education level, gender (including
male, female, nonbinary, and other), and select all ethnic groups/race with which they
identified, including: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander,
Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, White/Caucasian, and other/selfdescribe. Individuals who selected more than one ethnicity/race were coded as
“multiracial” in SPSS. A complete copy of the survey instrument is located in Appendix
A.
Dependent. Survey participants were asked a combination of styles of questions,
depending on whether the question was designed to test first or second order effects, as
defined in the Review of Literature. Questions designed to test for second order effects
largely centered on participants’ beliefs, such as, “It is acceptable to respond uncivilly to
someone whose views I believe are incorrect,” and “On the whole, the United States is
headed in the right direction.” Questions largely designed to test for first order effects
dealt with snap judgements of general world views; some of the first order questions
mirrored questions asked in previous, traditional cultivation studies, particularly the
seminal works of Gerbner and Gross (1976) and Gerbner et al. (1977, 1978).
Procedure. Before the survey was solicited to potential study participants, the
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researcher performed a pilot test of the survey instrument with ten volunteers in order to
examine potential variance in responses and adjust question wording and usage level
ranges. Preliminary results supported the premise that social media, as a more
participatory platform, causes users to more frequently actually interact with content and
interactions than television. These results also supported the inclusion of these questions
in the final survey instrument in terms of understanding first vs. second order effects.
Overall, the results of the pilot study indicated social media were more effective
in absorbing users; this prompted greater interest in how users would respond to the
second order questions alongside their hours of usage and reports of being/not being
frequently absorbed in social media content. There was much more variance for the
questions regarding television, in which responses reflected users who were much less
likely to become absorbed in narratives by being reminded of past experiences or
imagining themselves within the narrative. This finding provided a basis for adjusting
questions in order to more definitively distinguish between experiences in the mediated
environment that occur via television and social media.
Statistical Analyses. For the initial analysis of survey responses, the researcher
used descriptive statistics, including frequencies and the three measures of central
tendency, mean, median, and mode. The use of frequency counts or measures of central
tendencies were contingent on the data being nominal, ordinal, or quasi-interval (e.g.,
responses to Likert-type questions). Standard deviations were noted with each mean and
graphics were generated in SPSS to visually represent proportional distributions. This
study’s data analysis was conducted in three steps: descriptive statistics, bivariate
analysis, and multivariate analysis. The researcher used the descriptive and bivariate data
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findings to help inform which independent variables should be used in the next phase of
statistical analysis – hierarchical multiple regression, which was chosen due to its ability
to show exactly what occurs to the model when new predictor variables are incorporated.
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Chapter Four:
Results
Data analysis is presented in this chapter, which is accompanied by tables related
to the research questions and overall research topic. The results of this quantitative study
were based on the results of a voluntary online survey completed by students, faculty and
staff of several U.S. universities, and to adult members of the general public across the
country. This chapter will first address the data descriptively, opening with the sample’s
demographics, then descriptive statistics for all variables for RQs 1-6. Additionally, RQs
3-6 will be addressed by first using bivariate analysis, and then by hierarchical linear
regression.
Descriptive Statistics
Before undertaking an investigation into overall media consumption and various
patterns of exposure or “consumption cocktails” that could potentially contribute to
cultivation effects, a descriptive analysis of the sample was conducted.
Sample Demographics
Of the 413 respondents who completed the survey, 21.4% of the respondents were
male (n=88), 76.5% were female (n=315), 1.2% identified as non-binary (n=5) and 1%
(n=4) elected to self-describe. In terms of ethnicity/race, .5% of participants were
American Indian or Alaskan Natives (n=2), .5% were Asian or Pacific Islanders (n=2),
10.2% were Black (n=42), 2.7% were Hispanic or Latino (n=11), 76.9% were White
(n=317), 6.6% were of more than one race/ethnicity (n=27), 1.7% selected “other” (n=7)
and 1% chose “prefer not to respond” (n=4). Of those who selected more than one
race/ethnicity, 74% (n=20) were people of color. Age-wise, the sample was dominated by
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those under 35, which although not necessarily representative, is central to this study
since Gen Z and Millennials are the two generations which most heavily use social
media. The 18-24 age group made up 36.6% of the sample (n=151), 18.4% were 25-34
(n=76), 17.7% were 35-44 (n=73), 11.9% were 45-54, 9.7% were 55-64 (n=40), 4.8%
were 65-74 (n=20) and 1% were 75 or older (n=4).
While income levels were not collected in this study, educational and political
demographics were. Those with a bachelor’s degree or higher made up the majority of
the sample, with 28.2% indicating the highest degree they had completed was a
bachelor’s degree (n=116) and 32% (n=132) that their highest degree of completion was
a master’s degree. Those with at least an associate degree made up 6.8% of the sample
(n=28), while 26% reported they had some college but no degree (n=107), 5.6% had at
least a high school diploma (n=23) and 1.5% indicated they had completed less than a
high school diploma (n=6). Politically, 44.3% (n=183) of respondents said they lean
toward the Democratic party, 24.9% (n=103) said they lean Republican, and 30.8%
(n=127) reported they do not lean toward either party.
Daily Media Consumption
Daily media consumption is the prime concern of research question 1, which was
answered with descriptive statistics.
RQ1: How much time per day are people consuming media, in general?
This question sought to establish a baseline for post-2020 total media consumption by
asking, “How much time per day are people consuming media, in general?” The survey
instrument measured this by asking respondents to select the range that best represented
how many hours per day they spent watching television, and how many hours they spent
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per day on each of the following social media platforms: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter,
YouTube, TikTok, and Snapchat. To formulate an answer to this research question, the
medians and modes for television and social media consumption were computed; the
results are presented in Table 1, as are the frequency counts for each usage level, which
are nonusers (0 hours), lightest users (less than 1 hour), light-to-moderate users (1-2
hours), moderate users (3-4 hours), moderate-to-heavy users (5-6 hours), heavy users (7-8
hours), and heaviest users (more than 8 hours). In SPSS, usage levels were coded
according to the following scale: 1 (0 hours); 2 (less than 1 hour); 3 (1-2 hours); 4 (3-4
hours); 5 (5-6 hours); 6 (7-8 hours); 7 (more than 8 hours).
Table 1
Frequency counts, median and mode, daily media consumption across media platforms
Platform

N

Percent

Television
0 hours
Less than 1 hour
1-2 hours
3-4 hours
5-6 hours
7-8 hours
More than 8 hours

38
78
160
93
33
5
6

Mode

3

3

3

3

9.2%
18.9%
38.7%
22.5%
8%
1.2%
1.5%

Facebook
0 hours

65

15.7%

Less than 1 hour

117

24.6%

1-2 hours

141

29.7%

3-4 hours

64

13.5%

5-6 hours

19

4%

7-8 hours

5

1.1%

More than 8 hours

2

0.4%
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Median

Platform

N

Percent

Instagram
0 hours
Less than 1 hour
1-2 hours
3-4 hours
5-6 hours
7-8 hours
More than 8 hours

133
141
99
32
6
2
0

0 hours

279

67.7%

Less than 1 hour

78

18.9%

1-2 hours

32

7.8%

3-4 hours

16

3.9%

5-6 hours

2

0.5%

7-8 hours

3

0.7%

More than 8 hours

2

0.4%

YouTube
144
142
73
37
8
5
3

0 hours

233

56.4%

Less than 1 hour

45

10.9%

1-2 hours

70

16.9%

3-4 hours

44

10.7%

5-6 hours

14

3.4%

7-8 hours

3

0.7%

More than 8 hours

4

1%

72

2

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

35%
34.5%
17.7%
9%
1.9%
1.2%
0.7%

TikTok

Snapchat

Mode

32.2%
34.1%
24%
7.7%
1.5%
0.4%
0%

Twitter

0 hours
Less than 1 hour
1-2 hours
3-4 hours
5-6 hours
7-8 hours
More than 8 hours

Median

Platform
0 hours
Less than 1 hour
1-2 hours
3-4 hours
5-6 hours
7-8 hours
More than 8 hours

N

Percent

225
81
56
27
13
6
4

54.6%
19.7%
13.6%
6.6%
3.2%
1.5%
1%

Median

Mode

Overall, results indicated that television is still the most highly consumed single media
platform; however, results also indicated that users are actually spending more time on
social media in general, i.e., their consumption on each individual platform tends to be
lower than that of television, but their combined total consumption across multiple social
media platforms is higher than their TV consumption.
Reasons for Media Platform Use and Resulting Experiences
Descriptive statistics also outlined users’ reasons for using various media
platforms and their experiences while doing so, which was at the core of this study’s
second research question.
RQ2: Are users in the mediated environment more passive or participative? Do
they spend their time mostly viewing/scrolling, or do they spend more time posting,
commenting, liking, or sharing? Do they view consuming media as an escape from the
world or as a method of interacting with it?
This research question sought to ascertain how people view their use of the
various platforms in the mediated environment, which is related to later research
questions that deal with first and second order effects. For second order effects
specifically, Shrum (2004) found cultivation to be most pronounced in not only heavy
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viewers – a crucial premise of Gerbner et al.’s (1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984)
work – but also in viewers who were highly motivated and tended to insert themselves
into television narratives. For social media, which is inherently participative and
engrossing to users, it is especially pressing to operationalize the degree to which users
insert themselves into the content or interactions they encounter on social media (whether
only cognitively, or literally). In order to assess the aforementioned issues surrounding
viewer/user immersion, respondents were asked the following questions:
•

How important is social media in conducting your social life? Note: In this
instance, social life refers to your communication/interaction with those outside of
your household for non-work purposes.

•

Do you view television as more of an escape from or extension of your everyday
life?

•

Do you view social media as more of an escape from or extension of your
everyday life?

•

When using social media, do you use it mainly to just view others’ content or to
view and then participate/interact with others?

•

Which more greatly affects your views on the state of society and world as a
whole?

•

When watching TV, does what you see (storylines or interactions) remind you of
times you have been in similar circumstances?

•

When watching TV, does what you see (storylines or interactions) make you
consider what you would do in the given situation?
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•

When using social media, does what you see (content or interactions) remind you
of times you have been in similar circumstances?

•

When using social media, does what you see (content or interactions) make you
consider what you would do in the given situation?

•

When using social media, how often do the content or interactions you see prompt
you to actually react by liking, commenting, or sharing?

•

What people post on social media has changed my opinion of them.

To understand how users view their use of platforms in the mediated environment (as an
escape from everyday life or an extension of it), and if users are more participative or
passive in the mediated environment, the means for the above questions were computed,
along with their medians and modes; the results are presented in Table 2. In SPSS,
responses to the questions shown in Table 2 were coded according to the following
scales:
•

How important is social media in conducting your social life?
o 1 = “Not at all important”
o 2 = “Slightly important”
o 3 = “Moderately important”
o 4 = “Very important”
o 5 = “Extremely important”

•

Both of the following questions used the below scale: Do you view television as
more of an escape from or extension of your everyday life? Do you view social
media as more of an escape from or extension of your everyday life?
o 0 = “An escape”
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o 1 = “Mostly an escape”
o 2 = “Slightly an escape”
o 3 = “Slightly an extension”
o 4 = “Mostly an extension”
o 5 = “An extension”
•

When using social media, do you use it mainly to just view others’ content or to
view and then participate/interact with others?
o 0 = Just view”
o 1 = “Mostly just view”
o 2 = “Slightly to view”
o 3 = “Slightly to participate”
o 4 = “Mostly participate”
o 5 = “Participate”

•

All of the following questions used the below scale: When watching TV, does
what you see (storylines or interactions) remind you of times you have been in
similar circumstances? When watching TV, does what you see (storylines or
interactions) make you consider what you would do in the given situation? When
using social media, does what you see (content or interactions) remind you of
times you have been in similar circumstances? When using social media, does
what you see (content or interactions) make you consider what you would do in
the given situation? When using social media, how often do the content or
interactions you see prompt you to actually react by liking, commenting, or
sharing?
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o 1 = “Never”
o 2 = “Rarely”
o 3 = “Sometimes”
o 4 = “Often”
o 5 = “Always”
•

What people post on social media has changed my opinion of them.
o 1 = “Strongly disagree”
o 2 = “Disagree”
o 3 = “Neither agree nor disagree”
o 4 = “Agree”
o 5 = “Strongly agree”

Table 2
Measures of central tendency for questions dealing with purposes for media use,
immersion, and participation
Question

Mean

Median

Mode

SD

How important is
social media in
conducting your
social life?

2.7

3

2

1.12

1

1

1.46

Do you view
1.66
television as more
of an escape from
or extension of your
everyday life?
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Question
Mean
Do you view social 2.77
media as more of an
escape from or
extension of your
everyday life?

Median
3

Mode
3

SD
1.54

When using social
2.23
media, do you use it
mainly to just view
others’ content or to
view and then
participate/interact
with others?

2

1

1.59

When watching TV, 2.83
does what you see
(storylines or
interactions) remind
you of times you
have been in similar
circumstances?

3

3

.76

When watching TV, 3.14
does what you see
(storylines or
interactions) make
you consider what
you would do in the
given situation?

3

3

.91

When using social
2.98
media, does what
you see (content or
interactions) remind
you of times you
have been in similar
circumstances?

3

3

.86

When using social
media, does what
you see (content or
interactions) make

3

3

.91

2.98
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Question
you consider what
you would do in the
given situation?

Mean

Median

Mode

SD

When using social
3.3
media, how often
do the content or
interactions you see
prompt you to
actually react by
liking, commenting,
or sharing?

3

4

.9

What people post
3.83
on social media has
changed my opinion
of them.

4

4

.89

In general, results indicated that respondents used different platforms within the
mediated environment for different purposes. Examining Table 2, the question that asked
about how important social media is in conducting respondents’ social lives, the M=2.75
(SD=1.27), indicating users view social media as somewhat to moderately important in
conducting their social lives (for proportional distributions, see Figure 2, Appendix B).
Respondents also more greatly reported that they view social media as an extension of
their everyday lives (Figure 3), with a M=2.77 (SD=1.54); for television, on the other
hand, responses skewed more toward TV being viewed as an escape (Figure 4), M=1.66
(SD=1.46). For the question on whether social media or television more greatly affected
respondents’ views about society and the world as a whole, 59.8% of respondents chose
social media as being more affecting, while only 11.9% chose television as more
affecting (Figure 5). Respondents also on average more greatly agreed with the statement
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“What people post on social media has changed my opinion of them,” (Figure 6) with a
M=3.84 (SD=.89).
To answer RQ2, overall responses to the questions dealing with social media
operating as an extension of users’ lives and playing a very real role in their views of the
world and others indicate that social media is viewed and used in a way very different
than television. Social media is engrossing and immersive because it is part of users’
social lives. Television, on the other hand, seems to be immersive and engrossing for the
opposite reason. Aside from television being more highly regarded as an escape from
everyday life, respondents indicated that while watching television, they were more likely
to consider what they would do in a given situation they are seeing play out on screen
(M=3.14, SD=.91). In the work of Shrum et al. (2011), viewers inserting themselves into
television narratives was a key component of television and second order cultivation
effects. On social media, on the other hand, a user is more likely to actually react to
content or interactions they are seeing on the platform (M=3.3, SD=.9), as opposed to
merely considering what they would do.
The Consumption Cocktail
For the remaining descriptive statistics, there are three main areas of concern, all
of which deal with the effects of media consumption levels and the specific “cocktail” of
consumption which results in the greatest cultivation effects. Typically, cultivation
analyses separate effects into two categories: first order and second order. Additionally, a
concept stemming from these two types of effects is that of the mean world syndrome.
For first order effects, a person offers a snap judgement of specific concerns in first-order
judgements, such as the number of violent offenses in a neighborhood in a particular
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period of time. First order judgements do not have to be restricted to judgements about
the outside world, but also might include assessments about one’s own environment. For
example, a person may gauge the likelihood of their being mugged while strolling along
the street. In order to assess first order effects, survey respondents were asked to answer
the following questions:
•

During any given week, about how many people out of 100 are involved in some
kind of violence?

•

What percent of all crimes are violent crimes-like murder, rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault?

•

Do most murders take place between strangers or people who know each other?

•

What percent of medical doctors in the U.S. are Black?

The first three of these questions were drawn directly from Gerbner’s “Cultivation
analysis questionnaire,” (n.d.) and were used in Gerbner et al.’s traditional cultivation
studies in the 1970s and 1980s. The final question regarding the percent of Black medical
doctors also comes from Gerbner. In the documentary, The Mean World Syndrome:
Media Violence and the Cultivation of Fear, Gerbner notes there is a strong false
dichotomy in how Black people are portrayed on television:
Peculiarly, they are healthier, they’re wealthier, they’re more successful, they’re
more middle class than characters in general, giving the impression that there’s no
problem, their problems have been solved, that they’re very successful…Leading
to the notion that the African-American civil rights and equality movement has
achieved its goal and there’s no problem…It’s as if to say, “You see that there’s
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no problem anymore. There’s no race problem.” The switch comes when African
Americans are portrayed in the news. (Earp et al., 2010, p. 15)
In short, there is a tendency to over-represent both Black success and Blacks in relation to
crime. The overrepresentation of Black success may lull viewers into a false sense of the
United States being more equitable in terms of access to education and employment, in
addition to the socioeconomic status that said employment engenders. This point is
especially relevant in today’s times, as highlighted by the “All Lives Matter,” response to
the Black Lives Matter movement. Descriptives of the questions designed to assess firstorder effects are available in Table 3. In SPSS, responses to the questions shown in Table
3 were coded according to the following scales:
•

During any given week, about how many people out of 100 are involved in some
kind of violence?
o 1 = “About 1 out of 100”
o 2 = “About 5 out of 100”
o 3 = “About 10 out of 100”

•

What percent of all crimes are violent crimes-like murder, rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault?
o 1 = “About 5%”
o 2 = “About 10%”
o 3 = “About 20%”

•

Do most murders take place between strangers or people who know each other?
o 1 = “Between strangers”
o 2 = “Between people who know each other”
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•

What percent of medical doctors in the U.S. are Black?
o 1 = “5%”
o 2 = “10%”
o 3 = “15%”

Table 3
First order effects frequency counts and measures of central tendencies
Question
During any
given week,
about how
many
people out
of 100 are
involved in
some kind
of violence?
What
percent of
all crimes
are violent
crimes-like
murder,
rape,
robbery,
and
aggravated
assault?
Do most
murders
take place
between
strangers or
people who
know each
other?

N
About 1 out of 100
About 5 out of 100
About 10 out of 100

About 5%
About 10%
About 20%

Between strangers
Between people
who know each
other

84
155
171

136
176
100

26
387
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Percent Mean Median Mode SD
2.21

2

3

.76

1.91

2

2

.75

1.94

2

2

.24

20.5%
37.8%
41.7%

33%
42.7%
24.3%

6.3%
93.7%

Question
What
percent of
medical
doctors in
the U.S. are
Black?

N

Percent Mean Median Mode SD
1.71

5%
10%
15%

193
145
74

2

1

.75

46.8%
35.2%
18%

Second order effects refer to the media’s influence on users’ values and
preconceptions. This type of effect deals with user beliefs rather than requiring a person
to make a snap judgement about a certain demographic percentage or amount of crime.
For example, a question meant to address second order effects might ask: “Do you
believe humans are essentially honest?” Second order effects are also connected to the
way users participate in the mediated environment. Users with a higher level of
motivation may insert themselves into media narratives and add their own prior
information to form their judgements in a “online” manner. Users who are more engaged
tend to blend their own critical thinking and experiences with the material they are
seeing, resulting in higher degrees of cultivation.
The mean world syndrome is closely connected to second order effects.
According to Gerbner, long-term exposure to television, in which regular violence is
almost unavoidable, causes heavier viewers to believe the world to be mean, cruel, and
dangerous. Gerbner’s Mean World Index (Gerbner et al., 1986) asked people to indicate
the degree to which they agree with the following statements: “Most people are just
looking out for themselves,” “You can’t be too careful in dealing with people,” and
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“Most people would take advantage of you if they got the chance,” (p. 12), making the
mean world index composed of only second order type questions.
Second order effects were evaluated with the below survey questions. Questions
that also address the mean world syndrome are denoted by an asterisk (*).
•

Social media makes me feel like I am not performing as well as I could in life, or
not performing as well as others appear to perform in their lives.

•

What people post on social media has changed my opinion of them.

•

The majority of what I see on social media aligns with beliefs I already have.

•

I believe I will be the victim of a violent crime during my lifetime.*

•

It is acceptable to respond uncivilly to someone whose views I believe are
incorrect.*

•

Everyone believes what they want to believe, regardless of facts.*

•

I believe I will be the victim of police or government misconduct during my
lifetime.*

•

In today’s times, U.S. values, such as liberty, equality, and justice are consistently
upheld.*

•

On the whole, the United States is headed in the right direction.*

•

Most men cheat on their wives.

•

Judges should punish criminals more severely.*

•

The lot of average Americans is getting better.*

•

Generally speaking, do you think most people would try to take advantage of you
if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?*
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•

Generally speaking, would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful,
or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?*

•

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?*

The majority of all of the above questions were drawn either directly from traditional
cultivation studies undertaken by Gerbner et al. (1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982,
1984), or were drawn from more recent cultivation researchers’ work. The questions
which were not drawn directly from cultivation literature were inspired by previous
cultivation work and tailored to be meaningful and informative in the 2021 mediated
environment.
Specifically, the following questions were drawn from or explicitly inspired by
work by Gerbner et al.: “I believe I will be the victim of a violent crime during my
lifetime,” (Gerbner et al., 1979); “In today’s times, U.S. values, such as liberty, equality,
and justice are consistently upheld,” “On the whole, the United States is headed in the
right direction,” “The lot of average Americans is getting better,” (Gerbner et al., 1981);
and “Generally speaking, do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if
they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” “Generally speaking, would you say that
most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for
themselves?” “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Gerbner et al., 1986).
“Most men cheat on their wives,” and “Judges should punish criminals more
severely,” were based on the work of Chong et al. (2012). “Social media makes me feel
like I am not performing as well as I could in life, or not performing as well as others
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appear to perform in their lives,” was inspired by Belden (2010) and Stein et al. (2019),
both of whom researched cultivation in relation to body image. “The majority of what I
see on social media aligns with beliefs I already have,” was included based on the work
of Shehata et al. (2021), who argue that media effects on beliefs hinges upon the beliefs
that users already hold. “What people post on social media has changed my opinion of
them,” “It is acceptable to respond uncivilly to someone whose views I believe are
incorrect,” “Everyone believes what they want to believe, regardless of facts,” I believe I
will be the victim of police or government misconduct during my lifetime,” were all new
questions created by the researcher, and were designed to be especially informative in the
post-2020 mediated environment, of which misinformation and incivility are hallmarks.
In SPSS, responses to the questions shown in Table 4 were coded according to the
following scales:
•

Generally speaking, do you think most people would try to take advantage of you
if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?
o 1 = “Most people would try to take advantage of you”
o 2 = 'They would try to be fair”

•

Generally speaking, would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful,
or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
o 1 = “Most people try to be helpful”
o 2 = 'They are looking out for themselves”

•

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
o 1 = “You can trust most people”
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o 2 = '”You can't be too careful”
Table 4
Second order effects frequency counts, measures of central tendencies (non-Likert)
Question
Generally
speaking, do
you think
most people
would try to
take
advantage of
you if they
got a chance,
or would they
try to be fair?
Generally
speaking,
would you
say that most
of the time
people try to
be helpful, or
that they are
mostly just
looking out
for
themselves?
Generally
speaking,
would you
say that most
people can be
trusted or that
you can’t be
too careful in
dealing with
people?

N

Percent

Most would try
to take
advantage of
you

226

54.9%

They would try
to be fair

186

45.1%

Most people try
to be helpful

201

48.9%

They are
looking out for
themselves

210

51.1%

You can trust
most people

112

27.3%

You can’t be
too careful

299

72.7%
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Median

Mode

1

1

2

2

2

2

89

90
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The question dealing with police or government misconduct was inspired by the Black
Lives Matter movement and mass protests following the deaths of George Floyd and
Breonna Taylor, among countless others. Descriptive statistics for all of the above
questions are shown in Table 4 (non-Likert style questions) and Table 5 (Likert style
questions); proportional distributions are available in Appendix B, Figures 7-21.
Bivariate Analyses
Before conducting hierarchical multiple regression, the first task in answering
RQs 3-6 was use of bivariate analysis in order to examine the association between the
media consumption levels (the independent variable), control variables, and dependent
variable questions designed to investigate first and second order effects, as well as the
mean world syndrome. Following the well-established precedent of using Pearson’s r in
relationship to regression, Pearson’s r was the measure of association used to test the
direction and strength of the relationships between variables in order to determine to what
extent demographics were associated with independent and dependent variables, and to
what extent dependent variables are associated with independent variables. The bivariate
associations of the dependent variable (cultivation effects), the independent variable
(media consumption), and control variables (age, gender, ethnicity, education, and
political affiliation) were then examined to determine which variables should be included
in testing RQs 3-6. This bivariate analysis was used to screen potential interactions to
include in the regression analysis. Correlation matrices are shown in Tables 6-9. It must
be noted that in Table 6, the variables male and White do not appear, as they are the
reference category variables.

92

Demographics and Media Consumption
Among the findings in the Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficient that dealt
with demographics and media consumption were many significant findings, with the
strongest correlations coming in the categories of age and education. As shown in Table
6, age is negatively correlated with social media consumption on all social media
platforms, and most strongly negatively correlated with the platforms Instagram (r =
-.478, p < .001), TikTok (r = -.431, p < .001), and Snapchat (r = -.567, p < .001). These
moderate to strong negative correlations indicate that the younger a person is, the more
likely they are to use a diverse array of social media platforms. TikTok and Snapchat, in
particular, are targeted toward a younger demographic. In terms of education, there were
also negative correlations between education level and use of Instagram, YouTube,
TikTok, and Snapchat. Of these platforms, the strongest negative correlations were
between education level and TikTok and Snapchat use, with r = -.397, with r = -.482, p <
.001, respectively. These moderate negative correlations indicate the more highly
educated a person is, the less likely they are to use an array of social media platforms –
specifically TikTok and Snapchat. This finding is a logical one considering the findings
in the age category, as education level is positively correlated with age in this study (r =
.453, p < .001).
Consumption Levels and First, Second Order Effects
For first order effects, there were significant, but small, correlations between
TikTok and Snapchat use and questions dealing with the prevalence of violence.
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As shown in Table 7, there were significant correlations between TikTok use and the
question, “During any given week, about how many people out of 100 are involved in
some kind of violence?” with r = .207, p < .001. There was an even stronger correlation
between TikTok and Snapchat use and the question “What percent of all crimes are
violent crimes-like murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault?” with r = .241, p <
.001 for TikTok use and r = .224, p < .001 for Snapchat use. There were also other
significant but low level correlations between Instagram use and the two aforementioned
questions on the prevalence of violence. Since these platforms are dominated by younger
users, these findings indicate that younger people have a greater perception of violence.
Although correlation levels were low to moderate when considering media consumption
and first order effects, this is actually in line with a long-established cultivation theory
premise that media use produces small but consistent effects.
In terms of media consumption and second order cultivation effects, correlation
levels were once again small, and were even more consistent than those reported for first
order effects. Starting with Facebook use, there were significant negative correlations
between the number of years a respondent had used Facebook and the statements, “In
today’s times, U.S. values, such as liberty, equality, and justice are consistently upheld,”
(r = -.150, p < .001) and “Generally speaking, do you think most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” (r = -.110, p < .001).
As means for years of Facebook use increased, the means for these questions decreased,
indicating Facebook use over time contributes to a negative outlook on issues dealing
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with equality and fairness. There was also a negative correlation between hours of daily
Facebook use and the question on U.S. values being upheld (r = -.118, p < .005). Overall,
these results imply that Facebook use, both in terms of years and hours daily, contributes
to a mean world outlook – a finding that will be further explored in regression analyses.
While significant findings for Facebook were largely in the mean world vein,
significant correlations for Instagram use were more widespread. One of the most marked
correlations was between Instagram hours of use per day and the statement, “Social
media makes me feel like I am not performing as well as I could in life, or not performing
as well as others appear to perform in their lives,” (r = .210, p < .001). This indicates that
Instagram use moderately contributes to a lower sense of self-efficacy – a finding that is
in line with previous cultivation research concerning Instagram use (Stein et al., 2019).
Other significant Instagram correlations dealt with questions relating to incivility,
everyone believing what they want regardless of facts, a belief in the likelihood of
government misconduct (as shown in Table 8), along with issues of fairness and trust (see
Table 9). On the whole, Instagram use was weakly correlated with the mean world-like
views that incivility is acceptable, everyone believes what they want regardless of facts,
government misconduct is likely, that people are mostly looking out for themselves, and
that you can’t be too careful in trusting people. However, there was also a low to
moderate level of correlation between Instagram use and the belief that most people will
try to be fair when dealing with others, which runs counter to the abovementioned
negative worldviews.
Like Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok consumption was positively
correlated with incivility, everyone believing what they want regardless of facts, a belief
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in the likelihood of government misconduct (Table 8). YouTube use and TikTok use
were also correlated with the belief in the likelihood of violent crime victimhood.
Additionally, following the same trend as Instagram use, TikTok and Snapchat use were
positively correlated with a lack of self-efficacy (r = .247, r = .229, p < .001,
respectively), along with the views that people are mostly looking out for themselves, and
that you can’t be too careful in trusting people, although the level of correlation was
higher for the self-efficacy question. As it was with Instagram, there was a light to
moderate level of correlation between TikTok and Snapchat use and the belief that most
people will try to be fair when dealing with others. However, a positive correlation that
was not present with usage on any other platforms than TikTok and Snapchat was that of
the belief in the likelihood of men cheating on their wives.
For the most part, bivariate correlations indicate that social media use does
contribute to several second order effects, and those effects predominantly take the form
of negative worldviews. Multivariate analysis will be informed by these bivariate
analyses, with bivariate results being used to screen potential interactions and covariates
to include in the regression analysis. The independent variable of TV consumption per
day was largely not found to be significant on any of the first or second order measures;
however, regressions will be conducted with television consumption as an independent
variable in order to confirm or reject its non-significance in larger, multivariate models
where other factors are controlled and there may be unseen confounding influences.
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Multivariate Analyses
Informed by correlations found in bivariate analyses, which revealed patterns of
results particularly in terms of second order effects and negative worldviews across
platforms, a principal components analysis (Jolliffe & Cadima, 2016) was performed to
help evaluate whether indices could be formed to serve as dependent variables for first
order, second order, and mean world effects.
First, it should be noted that although the scale of measurement was ordinal, it
was regarded as continuous in this research. Although viewed by some as problematic,
ordinal variables are often treated as continuous variables in statistical analysis (Pasta,
2009). It is important to emphasize that this difficulty of presenting ordinal scales as
continuous is not specific to this dissertation but rather ubiquitous in social sciences
research. Pasta (p. 1) notes that certain ordinal measures are a, “…measure of an
underlying continuous or approximately continuous value,” meaning that some ordinal
measures lend themselves well to continuous treatment. He further argues, “It is, in
general, a more powerful approach to analyzing ordinal variables to treat them as
continuous and to fail to consider that possibility may cause many useful relationships to
be overlooked,” (p. 2). This view is supported by Williams (2021), who points out the
benefits of treating ordinal data as continuous usually exceed any potential downsides,
although the downsides should be considered. In short, by treating ordinal variables as
continuous, researchers may evaluate the relationship’s linear component; as that was a
goal of this study, the continuous treatment was adopted.
Next, a principal components analysis was run to determine which factors had an
Eigenvalue of 1 or more. The “elbow” of the Scree plot was also examined, which is
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where the Eigenvalues appear to level out (Woods & Edwards, 2011). Components to the
left of this point should be examined, and accordingly, four factors were retained. These
factors had Eigenvalues of 2.872, 1.800, 1.403 and 1.117; although two more factors did
have Eigenvalues greater than one, they were to the right of the elbow on the Scree test
and therefore were not included as factors. The Scree plot is shown in Appendix B,
Figure 18. The four factors accounted for 44.95% of total variance. Table 10 shows the
factor loadings, with the variables that were insufficient (factor loading of <.4)
eliminated, and variables that negatively affected Cronbach’s alpha also eliminated.
McDonald’s omega (McDonald, 1999) was also used as a secondary reliability measure
aside from Cronbach’s alpha on three of the four factors. According to Dunn, Baguley
and Brunsden (2013), omega is a better reliability measure for social sciences research, as
survey instruments in this area may use “incongruent response formats,” (p. 405) i.e.,
may not have all questions written in the same style, with the same levels of
measurement, etc. Omega was not used on the first order effects factor, since it requires
at least three variables to be loaded in order to run.
Table 10
Factor loadings for 4-component solution based on a PCA with oblique rotation
Construct/Items

Loading

Mean World
Generally speaking, would you say that most of the time people try to be
helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

.63

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?

.50

Generally speaking, do you think most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

.72
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α

Ω

.68

.68

First Order Effects

.60

During any given week, about how many people out of 100 are involved
in some kind of violence?

.72

What percent of all crimes are violent crimes-like murder, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault?

.81

Second Order Effects, Factor 1
I believe I will be the victim of a violent crime during my lifetime.

.71

It is acceptable to respond uncivilly to someone whose views I believe
are incorrect.

.70

I believe I will be the victim of police or government misconduct during
my lifetime.

.76

Second Order Effects, Factor 2
In today’s times, U.S. values, such as liberty, equality, and justice are
consistently upheld.

.65

On the whole, the United States is headed in the right direction.

.67

The lot of average Americans is getting better.

.68

While the Cronbach’s alpha for each factor was lower than the .7 sufficiency for
reliability standard that is widely applied in social science (Allen, 2017), shorter scales
are known to produce lower Cronbach’s alpha levels. Furthermore, other cultivation
analyses have also used lesser than ideal Cronbach’s alpha levels, since many indices
used in studying cultivation rely on shorter scales, consisting of only two, three, or four
items. Specifically, in Gerbner et al.’s foundational work on the mean world index
(1986), their alpha was also .68, using the same three test items. Other cultivation studies
that have relied on indices with lower Cronbach’s alpha scores include Woods (1997),
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.60

.65

.50

.54

Morgan and Shanahan (2017), Prince (2018), and (Hu & Li, 2019), with the most vital
support for using indices with alphas of lower than .7 being the fundamental work on
cultivation theory by Gerbner et al., and that of Morgan, who belonged to the Gerbner et
al. team for decades.
Furthermore, according to Pallant (2016) because a scale with less than 10 items
is likely to have a low alpha value, the mean of the inter-item correlation should also be
reported. According to Clark and Watson (1995), average inter-item correlations should
be between.15 and .50, with anything below .15 indicating the construct is too broad and
anything above .50 indicating items on the scale are redundant. Inter-item correlation
means were as follows: mean world index, .41; first order index, .43; second order index
one, .33; second order index two, .25. These optimal inter-item correlation levels, in
addition to the inclusion of indices in previous cultivation students with alpha levels
lower than .7, support using the four above-mentioned indices to approach research
questions 3-6 via hierarchical multiple regression.
Effects of the Consumption Cocktail
As noted in the bivariate analyses section, a primary concern of this study is
understanding how the “consumption cocktail” – i.e. how the types of media a person
consumes interact to affect their views about themselves, including their own personal
safety and self-efficacy, and their views about the world around them. Research questions
three through five were explored using hierarchical multiple regression (Cohen et al.,
2003). Hierarchical multiple regression was chosen to examine if media consumption
independent variables explained a statistically significant amount of variance in
cultivation levels after accounting for demographic and political predictors. Research
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question three is the first of three consumption cocktail questions and seeks to investigate
the relationship between media consumption levels and the type of cultivation effects
stemming from media consumption.
RQ3: Does television or social media consumption more greatly impact
cultivation effects, such as the belief that violence is more widespread, or other negative
worldviews? Which do users appear to be more susceptible to – first or second order
effects?
To answer this research question, hierarchical regression was used to determine
the amount of variance in cultivation levels that could be accounted for by media
consumption levels of television and six social media platforms. Media-related predictor
variables, all of which were treated as continuous variables, were: hours/day spent
watching TV, hours/day on Facebook, hours/day on Instagram, hours/day on Twitter,
hours/day on YouTube, hours/day on TikTok, and hours/day on Instagram, with the
demographics of gender, race, age, education level, and political leaning serving as
control variables. The outcome or dependent variables were the first and second order
indices; the first order cultivation effects index was composed of two measures, while
both second order effects indices were composed of three measures each.
First Order Effects. The first hierarchical multiple regression analysis for RQ3
(see Table 11) consisted of loading all demographic independent variables into model 1
as the control variables. It should also be noted that in Table 11, demographic categories
of ethnicity (White) and political leaning (Democrat) served as the reference categories
for ethnicity and political leaning in dummy-coded measures. In terms of demographic
findings, the first demographic variable to be significant as an independent measure was
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gender, as it had significance at the p<.001 level in the first two regression models, and
significance at the p<.01 level in models three through eight. Its positive parameter
estimate increases the probability for the dependent variable, with females the higher of
the two values for gender (1 for male, 3 for female) more likely to believe that violence is
widespread. Age and education level, on the other hand, had a reverse effect, with both
showing negative parameter estimates throughout all levels. Age was significant at the
p<.05 level for models one and two, and was significant at the p<.01 level for model
three. Education level was significant at the p<.001 level for model one, at the p<.01
level for models two through seven, and at the p<.05 level for model eight. The negative
parameter estimates indicate that younger people are more likely to believe in the
prevalence of violent crime, as are people with lesser education.
In other demographic results, for ethnicity, the “other” category, composed of all
respondents that did not identify solely as Black or White, showed significance at the
p<.05 level in all models for regression one. Black showed higher levels of significance,
but not across all models of the regression, with significance at the p<.01 level for models
one and two, at the p<.05 level for models three through five. Since “other” was
composed entirely of people of color, the positive parameter estimates regarding ethnicity
overall indicate that people of color who do not solely identify as Black are more likely to
believe that violent crime is pervasive, as do those who identified as Black only – up to a
point. For Black respondents, since results were not significant in models six through
eight, this indicates the effect of race on the belief in the prevalence of violent crime may
be tamped down by increased media consumption across diverse platforms.
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Finally, Republicans also showed significance in all models of regression one at the
p<.01 level, signifying this group is more likely to believe in the prevalence of violent
crime.
Models 2-8 were loaded with the media consumption level independent variables,
with television, then Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, and Snapchat
loaded into Models 2-8, respectively. Examination of the model summary revealed that
for model 1, demographics accounted for 13.1 % of the variance (∆R2 =.131). In the
examination of Models 2-8, the adjusted R squared showed television consumption was
not a significant determinant. However, with television exposure in the model, the
addition of time spent consuming Facebook per day (model 3) increased the variance
explained to 14.8%, which was a significant change in adjusted R squared (∆R2 =.148, p<
.001). Upon examination of both demographic parameter estimates and parameter
estimates for Facebook, which were significant at the p<.01 level for models 3 through 8
(all of the models which had Facebook consumption loaded in), it is apparent that with
Facebook consumption comes a decrease in the belief in the pervasiveness of violent
crime for most groups. Additionally, the relationship between Facebook use and a lesser
belief in widespread violent crime was minimally changed by increased media
consumption across more diverse platforms. The introduction of Instagram consumption
reduced Facebook’s parameter estimate by only 0.01, resulting in a parameter estimate
that held at 0.13 for models four through eight.
Second Order Effects. The second hierarchical multiple regression analysis for
RQ3, which tested the first of two second order effects indices, (see Table 12), like the
regression analysis that tested for first order effects, consisted of loading all demographic
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independent variables into model 1 as the control variables. This second order effects
index largely dealt with respondents’ beliefs about their own experiences and behaviors,
with questions on respondents’ belief in the likelihood that they would be a victim of
violent crime and government misconduct, as well as their belief that incivility is
acceptable when dealing with those who have conflicting viewpoints.
Once again, demographic categories of ethnicity (White) and political leaning
(Democrat) served as the reference categories for ethnicity and political leaning in
dummy-coded measures for Table 12. Overall, demographic results were less significant
than in the regression analysis testing first order effects. Gender was not significant in
any of the regression models; however, age was found to be significant as an independent
measure, with p<.05 significance in the first regression model and p<.01 significance in
models two and three. Since negative parameter estimates decrease the likelihood of the
dependent variable as the independent variable increases, results indicated that younger
people are more likely to believe that they will personally be the victim of violent crime
and government misconduct, and are more likely to feel that incivility is acceptable when
dealing with people with whom they disagree; the negative effect of age increased as
television and Facebook consumption were added into the model. In a similar vein,
education level had a more widespread impact, exhibiting negative parameter estimates
from levels 1-6, showing that those with lower education levels are more likely to agree
with the aforementioned statements dealing with their probability of crime and
government misconduct victimhood, as well as the propriety of uncivil conduct.
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While ethnicity was not a significant predictor for this index, political views for
both the Republican and “neither” categories were, with the Republican political view
being the most significant predictor (p<.001) in the entire regression analysis. The
parameter estimates for Republicans were all negative, denoting that Republicans are less
likely to think themselves to be future victims of violent crime or government
misconduct, and less likely to deem incivility as appropriate. The negative parameter
estimates did decline as media use across platforms was added in to models 3-8,
indicating diverse social media use tends to curb these beliefs. While the “neither”
political view parameter estimates were also negative, the demographic was not as
significant as Republicanism (p<.05). Still, as a predictor it followed the same pattern of
media usage across platforms mitigating the level of disagreement with the index.
As it was with the previous regression analysis, Models 2-8 were loaded with the
media consumption level independent variables, with television, then Facebook,
Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram loaded into Models 2-8,
respectively. Examination of the model summary revealed that for model 1,
demographics accounted for 9.6 % of the variance (∆R2 =.096). In the examination of
Models 2-8, the adjusted R squared showed television, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter,
TikTok, and Snapchat consumption were not significant determinants. However, with
Model 6, which was composed of television, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and finally
YouTube exposure added into the model, the variance explained increased to 11.3%,
which was a minor, but significant change in adjusted R squared (∆R2 =.113, p< .05),
showing YouTube consumption contributes to the belief in the probability of violent
crime and government misconduct victimhood, and the propriety of uncivil conduct. The
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positive parameter estimates for YouTube were significant at the p<.05 level for models 6
through 8, although the estimate was highest when only YouTube was added in, and
decreased by .01 with the addition to TikTok, and by .01 again with the addition of
Snapchat consumption.
The third hierarchical regression analysis for RQ3 tested the second of two second
order effects indices. Following the same pattern as the first two regression analyses, this
analysis consisted of loading all demographic independent variables into model 1 as the
control variables. The index was composed of questions regarding the current state of the
U.S., including whether U.S. values are upheld, if the country is headed in the right
direction, and whether the lot of average Americans is getting better.
The reference categories for ethnicity and political leaning in dummy-coded
measures for this regression were ethnicity (White) and political leaning (Democrat). On
the whole, results for this regression analysis were less significant than any of the
previous analyses, with all independent variables only accounting for 3.7% of variance in
Model 8, with no significant changes to adjusted R squared in Models 1-8. Demographic
findings were less significant than those obtained from the first two regression analyses.
Gender was shown to be significant as an independent variable, with p<.05 significance
in Models 1 and 2, with a negative parameter estimate of -.187 in Model 1 and -0.086 in
Model 2. A positive parameter estimate would make observations in the higher of two
values coded to represent gender (with men as 1 and women as 3) more likely. A
negative parameter estimate suggests the opposite effect, i.e. men are more likely to have
a negative outlook on the circumstances in the United States today; the negative effect
remained consistent throughout all eight models in the regression.
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Republican political views were a significant predictor throughout the regression
analysis (p<.05), with the exception of Model 2 (p<.053). Republicans’ parameter
estimates were all negative, indicating that they are less likely to have a positive outlook
on the state of affairs in the U.S. today. Model 2, which included only television
consumption, had the highest negative parameter estimate at -.396, but once social media
platform usage was added in across Models 3-8, parameter estimates were progressively
more negative on a consistent basis, with a final negative parameter estimate of -.451 for
Model 8. This indicates social media use significantly contributes to a negative outlook
for how things stand in the United States in terms of U.S. values and whether the country
is headed in the right direction, with the negative outlook increasing as consumption
increases.
Summary of Findings, RQ3. Overall, analyses for RQ3 indicate social media
consumption is more likely to impact cultivation effects than consumption of television,
with the effect of Facebook use on first order beliefs being the most significant finding
for this research question. Another noteworthy finding was the potential attenuating
effect of diverse social media use across platforms in relation to questions related to
crime, especially in terms of gender and race. Results showed that for first and second
order indices pertaining to crime and personal safety, social media consumption makes
users feel more safe. The only major exception to this trend was YouTube consumption,
which accounted for a significant amount of variance for responses to questions in second
order effects index 1, which focused on respondents’ personal safety and behavior. This
indicates that YouTube consumption is related to users feeling more unsafe and being
more willing to act in an uncivil way. A more in-depth exploration of cultivation effects
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of diverse social media consumption in comparison to Facebook is the subject of research
question 4.
RQ4: How do cultivation patterns for non-Facebook social media platform
consumption (Twitter, TikTok, Snapchat, Instagram, etc.) compare to Facebook
consumption?
Hierarchical regression was utilized to assess the amount of variation in
cultivation levels that could be accounted for by media consumption levels of six social
media platforms in order to address this research question. Hours/day spent watching TV,
hours/day on Facebook, hours/day on Instagram, hours/day on Twitter, hours/day on
YouTube, hours/day on TikTok, and hours/day on Instagram were all treated as
continuous variables, with TV hours/day, gender, race, age, education level, and political
leaning serving as control variables, with regression analyses run on responses to all 18
survey questions that served as dependent variables designed to test cultivation levels.
It should be noted that a significant result by “chance” is more likely when
numerous analyses are carried out, and some researchers argue that altering the p value
might help minimize Type I error. In other words, because of random variability, there is
a possibility of false significance. On the other hand, Type II error/false negative rates are
a consequence of minimizing Type I error (Rothman, 1990, p. 43). This means the tradeoff between these two forms of error must be contemplated. Due to the lack of research
on cultivation theory and multiple social media platforms, the present study would be
categorized as exploratory. Consequently, the researcher didn’t adjust p values for the
multiple regression analyses since identifying possible predictor variables is desired in
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this research. As such, significant results were found for five dependent variables,
including:
•

I believe I will be the victim of a violent crime during my lifetime.

•

It is acceptable to respond uncivilly to someone whose views I believe are
incorrect.

•

During any given week, about how many people out of 100 are involved in
some kind of violence?

•

What percent of all crimes are violent crimes-like murder, rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault?

•

What percent of medical doctors in the U.S. are Black?

Violent Crime Victimhood. Like the regression analyses used in RQ3, the first
hierarchical multiple regression analysis for RQ4, which evaluated the belief in the
likelihood of being a violent crime victim (see Table 13), consisted of loading all
demographic independent variables and television consumption into model 1 as control
variables. This regression used ethnicity (White) and political leaning (Democrat) as
reference categories for ethnicity and political leaning in dummy-coded measurements.
There were many significant findings in terms of demographics. Gender was not
significant in any of the regression models, but age was, with p<.01 significance in
Models 1-4 and p<.05 significance in Models 5 and 7. Since negative parameter estimates
reduce the likelihood of the dependent variable as the independent variable increases, the
findings revealed that younger people are more likely to believe they will be personally
victims of violent crime; these results partially mirror those found in RQ3 for second
order index 1, except results for this measure alone versus the index containing three

115

measures were more significant and the significance was more widespread. The
significant results for education level were not as pronounced as age, with Models 2-4
being the only models with a significant amount of variance (p<.05) explained by
education. Parameter estimates for education were also negative throughout all models,
signifying those with less education were more likely to believe they will be the victim of
a violent crime, although the level of negativity was slightly reduced with media
exposure across diverse platforms.
Ethnicity was not a significant predictor of this measure except in Models 4 and 5
for respondents who identified solely as Black (p<.05). Parameter estimates were
negative for this group throughout all models, and those negative parameter estimates
became significantly more negative in Model 5, when YouTube consumption was added
in, and in Model 6, which saw the addition of TikTok. These results suggest that Black
respondents were less likely to believe they will be the victim of violent crime, and with
more consumption on social media platforms, they became even less likely to feel as
such. Once again, the Republican political view was highly significant, with this area
being the most significant predictor in the whole regression study; results were at the
p<.001 level for Model 1, and at the p<.01 level for Models 2-7. Republicans’ parameter
estimates were all negative, indicating that they are less likely to believe they would be
future victims of violent crime, which again partially mirrors the results found in RQ3 for
second order effects index 1. However, there was not as sharp of a decrease in the
negative parameter estimates for Republicans on this question alone with the addition of
consumption on diverse social media platforms, as there was with the index. Instead,
parameter estimates fluctuated slightly as each additional social media platform was
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added in. The neither political category was not nearly as negative as that of Republicans,
but it was still negative. This category also operated in a similar fashion to that of
Republicans in that the level of parameter estimates’ negativity fluctuated when media
usage across platforms was included in Models 2-7, suggesting that certain social media
platforms attenuate and others intensify the viewpoint of possibly being a violent crime
victim.
Models 2-7 were loaded with social media consumption level independent
variables, with Facebook, then Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram
entered into Models 2-7, respectively, as was the case with the prior regression analyses
for RQ3, with the exception of TV consumption being included as a control variable. The
model summary showed the control variables accounted for 6.2% of the variation in
Model 1 (∆R2 =.062). The adjusted R squared revealed that Facebook, Instagram, Twitter,
TikTok, and Snapchat usage were not significant predictors in Models 2-7, although
Facebook did show significant results in positive parameter estimates for Models 6 and 7,
both at the p<.05 level. With Model 5, which included Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and
finally YouTube exposure, the variance explained increased to 10.1 percent, a slight but
significant change in adjusted R squared (∆R2 =.101, p<.05). This indicates that YouTube
consumption, as it did for RQ3 second order index 1, contributes to the belief in the
likelihood of violent crime victimhood. For Models 5 through 7, the positive parameter
estimates for YouTube were significant at the p<.05 level, but the estimate was greatest
when YouTube and then TikTok were included (.10 for each), then dropped by .01 with
the inclusion of Snapchat usage.
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Propriety of Uncivil Conduct. The second hierarchical multiple regression
analysis for RQ4, which assessed the view that uncivil behavior toward those who have
differing views is acceptable (see Table 14), followed the same variable hierarchy as the
previous regression with the same dummy-coded variables. In terms of demographics, the
only noteworthy results were gender in the political leaning categories. In Models 2 and
3, gender was significant, with p<.05 significance. With a positive parameter estimate,
observations in the higher of two gender-coded values (men as 1 and women as 3) are
more frequent. A negative parameter estimate indicates the reverse, meaning males are
more likely to support uncivil conduct toward someone they disagree with; this negative
effect was consistent across all seven models in the regression.
The Republican political view, as it has been in all regression analyses of this
study thus far, was extremely significant. Findings were at the p<.001 level for all models
of this regression. Republicans’ parameter estimates were all negative, suggesting that
they are less likely to agree with the propriety of uncivil conduct when dealing with
someone they disagree with, which like the first regression for RQ4, partly matches the
findings from RQ3 for second order effects index 1. Also similar to the index findings in
RQ3, with the inclusion of consumption on various social media platforms, there was a
reduction in the negative parameter estimations for Republicans on this issue, denoting
diverse social media consumption contributes to Republicans being more likely to agree
with the propriety of uncivil conduct. Results for the neither political group were not as
negative nor significant as the Republicans; however, negative parameter estimates were
significant at the p<.01 level for all models of the regression.
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On the other hand, there was not as sharp of a reduction in the level of negativity as there
was with the Republicans as social media platform exposure was added in.
Models 2-7 were loaded with social media consumption levels as independent
variables, with Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram being
entered into Models 2-7, respectively, as was the case in previous regression analyses for
RQ4. The control variables accounted for 5.6 percent of the variance in Model 1 (∆R2
=.056), according to the model summary. Facebook, YouTube and Snapchat use were not
significant predictors in Models 2-7, according to the adjusted R squared, but YouTube
did show significant results in positive parameter estimates for Model 5 at the p<.05
level. The variance explained rose to 6.6 percent with Model 3, which added Facebook
and Instagram, which was a significant increase at the p<.05 level. Two other models also
saw noteworthy increases in the amount of variance explained – 7.8 percent in Model 4
(∆R2 =.078) and then 9 percent in Model 6 (∆R2 =.09), both of which were significant at
the p<.05 level. This rise in adjusted R squared, from 5.6% to 9%, a change that is minor
but statistically significant, is the largest increase in adjusted R squared in any of this
study’s regression analyses. These results suggest that Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok
use all contribute to the view that uncivil behavior is acceptable when dealing with
people with differing opinions, with Twitter use being the most influential for this belief,
according to parameter estimates.
Number of People Involved in Violent Crime. For this regression analysis, all
independent control factors were loaded into Model 1 (Table 15) with the same dummycoded reference categories as the previous regression. This regression saw a number of
significant independent variables, with gender being the first.
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Significance was at the p<.001 level in Models 1 through 6, and significance at the p<.05
level in Model 7. Its positive parameter estimates raise the likelihood of the dependent
variable, with females who have the greater of the two gender values (1 for male, 3 for
female) being more likely to think a higher number of people are involved in violence
each week than males. Conversely, age and education level had the opposite impact, with
both having negative parameter estimates at all levels and significance for education level
being more widespread than age, a trend which was also present in RQ3’s first order
effects index analysis. For age, Model 1 had a p<.05 significance level, whereas Model 2
had a p<.01 significance level. For education, Models 2 through 4 had a p<.05
significance level. According to the negative parameter estimations, younger individuals,
as well as those with less education, are more inclined to believe in the frequency of
violent crime – another similarity to the RQ3 first order effects index analysis.
For additional demographic findings, the ethnicity “other,” demonstrated
significance at the p<.05 level in Models 1, 2, 6, and 7. Significance was at the p<.01
level for Models 3 and 4, indicating that Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube use had an
impact on results for this group. Since “other” was made up completely of people of
color, the positive ethnicity parameter estimates suggest that individuals of color who do
not primarily identify as Black or White are more likely to think that violent crime is
widespread, at least to a degree. Respondents who identified as Black had no significant
parameter estimates across any of the regression models. Lastly, Republicans exhibited
significance in all regression models at the p<.05 level, indicating that this group believes
in the frequency of violent crime, with Model 5, in which YouTube was added in,
showing the highest parameter estimate of all models.
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The media consumption level independent variables were put into Models 2-7 in
the following order: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, and Snapchat.
Demographics accounted for 9 percent of the variation in Model 1 (∆R2 =.090), according
to the model summary. The adjusted R squared revealed that time spent on Facebook
each day (Model 2) raised the variance explained to 10.7%, which was a small but
significant shift in adjusted R squared (∆R2 =.107, p<.01). After examining both
demographic parameter estimates and Facebook parameter estimates that were significant
at the p<.01 level for models 2 and at the p<.05 level for models 3-7–8 (all of the models
that included Facebook consumption), it is clear that Facebook consumption decreases
belief in the pervasiveness of violent crime for most groups. More diversified media
consumption had minimal influence on the connection between Facebook use and a lower
belief in widespread violent crime, with parameter estimates only decreasing by .01 for
Models 2-7, resulting in a parameter estimate of 0.09 for Models 2-7. Trends for this
measure largely followed the trends for the first order effects index, with significance in
both adjusted R squared and parameter estimates related to Facebook.
Percent of Crimes That are Violent. Model 1 was loaded with all independent
control variables for this regression analysis (Table 16) with the same dummy-coded
reference categories as the previous regression. Gender was a significant independent
variable in this analysis throughout Models 1-7 at the p<.05 level. Its positive parameter
estimates indicated that the larger of the two gender values, females, were more likely
than males to believe that a greater percent of crimes are violent. Age showed no
significance as an independent variable in any of the models.
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Education, conversely, was highly significant (p<.001) in all models, making it the most
significant predictor of this regression. This demographic measure had negative
parameter estimates at all levels, indicating the greater level of education, the less likely a
respondent is to overestimate violent crime rates. The education findings for this single
measure are yet another resemblance to the RQ3 first order effects index analysis. But,
the effect of education was more pronounced for this single measure than it was for the
index.
In another reversal from the previous regression analysis which concerned the
number of people involved in violent crimes per week, the Black ethnicity category
showed significant results at all levels of the regression, with Models 1-4 at the p<.01
level and Models 5-7 at the p<.05 level. The positive ethnicity parameter estimates
indicate that Black respondents were more likely to believe that the percent of crimes that
are violent is higher than other ethnicity categories, but the parameter estimates were
reduced as varied social media consumption was included in Models 2-7. This suggests
that increased media consumption across a variety of platforms may lessen the impact of
race on the estimation of violent crime rates. Republicans showed significance in all
regression models at the p<.05 level, signifying that this group believes violent crime
rates are higher than other groups. As it was with the previous regression analysis, Model
5, which included YouTube, had the highest parameter estimate of all models.
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, and Snapchat were included as
independent variables in Models 2-7, respectively. According to the model summary,
demographics were responsible for 11.4% of the variance in Model 1 (∆R2 =.114). Time
spent on Facebook each day (Model 2) increased the variance explained to 12.2%, which
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once again was a modest but statistically significant change in adjusted R squared (∆R2
=.122, p<.05). Examining both Facebook parameter estimates, which were significant at
the p<.05 level for Models 2 through 7, and demographic parameter estimates, it is
apparent that Facebook consumption reduces belief in higher violent rates crime for most
groups; although diverse social media consumption did negate this effect at a low level.
As it was with the previous regression analysis, this measure’s trends were similar to
those of the first order effects index, with significant differences in adjusted R squared
and parameter estimates for Facebook.
Percent of U.S. Doctors that are Black. The final hierarchical regression for RQ4
(Table 17) was informed by Gerbner’s contention that on television there seem to be
more African Americans working in difficult-to-get jobs (such as medical doctors),
leading non-Black Americans to believe that American institutions are more diverse than
they are (Earp et al., 2010). This first order effects measure, which asked respondents
what percentage of medical doctors in the U.S. are Black, followed the same procedure as
the previous regression analyses for RQ4 in that all independent control variables were
loaded into Model 1. Control variables, which included television consumption,
accounted for only 1% of variance in this model.
Consistent with the procedure used in all previous regressions, dummy-coded
variables had reference categories of White for ethnicity and Democrat for political
leaning. The demographic results were not as significant as the results of the previous
regressions. Gender and age were both not significant, which was a departure from
previous results in this study. Education level was significant in Models 1-5 at the p<.05
level.
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In all models, this demographic measure had negative parameter estimates, indicating
that the higher a respondent’s educational level, the less likely they are to overestimate
the number of Black medical doctors in the U.S. In another turn away from results in
previous multivariate analyses, Republican political views were not a significant
predictor throughout the regression analysis, although Republicanism was significant for
Models 1-3 at the p<.05 level. Republicans’ parameter estimates were all positive,
indicating that they are more likely to overestimate the proportion of U.S. doctors that are
Black. Estimates did decrease with increasing varied consumption of social media,
suggesting with greater consumption comes a more accurate understanding of the number
of Black medical doctors.
In terms of adjusted R squared, the findings of this regression analysis were less
pronounced than those of any of the preceding studies, with all independent variables
accounting for just 2% of variation in Model 8. Model 4 saw a significant change in
adjusted R squared with the addition of Twitter consumption (∆R2 =.018, p<.05), and
parameter estimates, which were negative, were significant in Models 4, 6, and 7 (p<.05).
Negative parameter estimates for Twitter became more negative with the addition of
TikTok and Snapchat consumption, denoting higher, more diverse social media
consumption helps to ameliorate respondents’ estimation of Black medical doctor
percentages.
Summary of Findings, RQ4. By and large, RQ4 results followed similar patterns
of those for RQ3, except results were more widespread since this research question did
not utilize indices as the previous research question did. For second order effects (Tables
13 and 14), YouTube was once again significant, as it was in RQ3, for the possibility of
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violent crime victimization. Conversely, Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok consumption
accounted for a significant amount of variance for the question on the propriety of uncivil
conduct with those with whom you disagree. This measure had the most widespread
significance of consumption of all measures in the entire study, implying increased
consumption across a range of social media leads to greater acceptance of uncivil
conduct. For first order effects, once again the effect of Facebook use on first order
beliefs regarding crime (Tables 15 and 16) were significant, with the measure asking
respondents to estimate the number of people involved in violent crime/week being the
most significant our of all five multivariate analyses for this research question. Another
significant result was the relationship between Twitter consumption and the estimation of
what proportion of medical doctors in the United States are Black.
Social media consumption once again tended to temper beliefs when considering
gender, age, and education for first-order measures. However, the Republican political
viewpoint did not follow this pattern for the first order measures regarding crime,
denoting that for Republicans, varied social media use brings with it the belief that crime
is more widespread. For second order effects, there was less of the tempering tendency of
social media consumption for the measure that dealt with crime for the demographics
gender, age, and education, although it was still present; the acceptance of incivility
measure was largely the reverse, i.e., greater use contributes to greater approval of uncivil
conduct.
Returning to the core issue of this research question – how platforms other than
Facebook affect cultivation patterns, it is clear, firstly, that Facebook is the platform with
the greatest cultivating effect, as it had the most significant change in adjusted R squared
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(p<.01) in all regression analyses. Be that as it may, it is clear that non-Facebook
platforms also have an effect that serves to tone down beliefs in some cases, and
exacerbate in others. Specifically, YouTube use was tied to beliefs regarding the
pervasiveness of crime and Twitter was linked to a more accurate understanding of what
proportion of medical doctors are Black. Use across platforms other than Facebook,
especially the visually-based platforms of Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, was shown
to contribute more strongly to an acceptance of incivility, denoting that these platforms
have cultivation capabilities that Facebook does not, at least for certain beliefs. The
capability of social media platforms to cultivate negative worldviews particularly will be
addressed in this study’s final research question.
RQ5: Does social media consumption increase the likelihood of a user developing
mean world syndrome?
To address this research question, hierarchical regression was utilized to ascertain
the amount of variation in cultivation levels that could be explained by consumption
levels of six social media platforms. The following media-related predictor variables
were treated as continuous variables: hours spent on Facebook, hours spent on Instagram,
hours spent on Twitter, hours spent on YouTube, hours spent on TikTok, and hours spent
on Instagram; TV hours/day, gender, race, age, education level, and political leaning
served as control variables. Age was found to be collinear with another independent
variable (Snapchat use) and therefore removed from the multivariate model. The mean
world index served as the outcome or dependent variable, which included three questions
that were drawn from the traditional cultivation studies of Gerbner et al., measuring
whether respondents believe other people can be trusted, whether they are just looking
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out for themselves, and whether they would take advantage of others if they got the
chance.
The mean world index was evaluated by loading all independent control variables
into Model 1 (see Table 18) into the hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Dummycoded measures were demographic categories for ethnicity (White) and political leaning
(Democrat) once again. For this index, there was broad significance across multiple
demographics. Education was highly significant with a p-value of .001 in the first five
regression models and a p-value of .01 in Model 6. Negative parameter estimates were
consistent throughout all models of the regression, showing that those with lower levels
of education are more likely to exhibit negative worldviews, or view the world as
“mean.”
There was a significant relationship between ethnicity and this index for the “other”
category (composed entirely of people of color), with positive parameter estimates being
the highest in Models 3, 4, and 7. For Models 1-6, results were significant at the p<.01
level; parameter estimates increased the most in Model 3, which saw the introduction of
Instagram to the model, indicating Instagram consumption has a strong relationship with
mean worldviews for this category of ethnicity. There was no significance for
respondents who identified solely as Black.
There was also a strong relationship between the index and political views for
Republicans and the “neither” category, with Republican political views being a more
highly significant predictor (p<.001) than neither, which had significance at the p<.01
level for Models 1-5 and at the p<.05 level for Models 6-7.
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Parameter estimates were all positive, but they were much higher for Republicans, with
the highest estimates in Model 5, which included YouTube consumption. Overall, for
both political categories, parameter estimates were reduced for Model 7, which included
Snapchat. For those who identified as Republican, parameter estimate levels fluctuated,
indicating social media consumption had a varied effect on beliefs for this group,
depending on the platform. For those who identified as neither, estimates decreased in
Models 3-6 and then again in Model 7. Overall, these results indicate that diverse social
media use generally tempers political views, but certain platforms do intensify them for
those who identify as Republican.
In the model summary, demographics accounted for 12.8% of the variation in
Model 1. Examination of Models 2-8 revealed Instagram and Snapchat consumption were
significant variables in the adjusted R squared. With Model 3, the variance explained
grew to 16 percent with the addition of exposure to Instagram. This was a highly
significant change in adjusted R squared (∆R2 =.160, p<.000), indicating that Instagram
consumption contributes to a greater likelihood of negative worldviews. Parameter
estimates for Instagram were all positive and all significant, at the p<.001 level for
Models 3-5, p<.01 for Model 6, and p<.05 for Model 7. Additionally, the addition of
Snapchat consumption (Model 7) also showed a highly significant change in adjusted R
squared at the p<.001 level. The parameter estimate was .18 when Snapchat consumption
was added in – the same parameter estimate level that was present for Model 3. Both the
significant changes in adjusted R squared, along with the highest of positive parameter
estimates indicate Instagram and Snapchat use contribute significantly to negative
cultivation effects regarding the mean world syndrome.
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Chapter Five:
Discussion
This dissertation was borne out of a very simple question – what is social media
doing to us? Cultivation theory has similarly been concerned with the effects of
television, and is a theory that on its face seems ripe for a new analysis expanding the
scope of cultivation to the realm of social media. There are some issues that crop up,
however, when conceptualizing a cultivation + social media formulation relating both to
the nature of cultivation and the mediated environment of today. Traditional cultivation
theorists will ask, “What about the content? Isn’t it too diverse?” And indeed, it is true
that in today’s times, the media menu of options is so broad and so multifarious that it is
highly unlikely any two people anywhere are consuming the exact same content in a
single day, much less on a day to day basis. But, that does not mean cultivation isn’t
happening in the modern mediated environment. People are still watching plenty of
television, and in addition they are spending hours on social media every day. At any
given moment, a single person has at a minimum hundreds of hours of television
programming at their disposal, along with millions of pieces of social media content.
Above all, this dissertation has sought to mitigate concerns over the modern
mediated environment’s content diversity – in particular the diversity of social media
content – by taking a new approach: removing content from the equation, at least to a
certain extent. Following this perspective, in today’s times, the content of the media a
person is exposed to is less important than the sheer amount of time the person is
spending existing, consuming, and especially participating in the mediated environment,
which includes television and an array of social media platforms. There has been very
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little cultivation research to date that has applied cultivation to social media, and
essentially none that has sought to deal with the parallel issue of content diversity.
Furthermore, no cultivation analyses have undertaken a study of cultivation across the
mediated environment, i.e., how cultivation patterns fluctuate with the addition of
consumption on varied social media platforms. This study particularly aims to address
these gaps in the current body of cultivation research.
To this end, a survey was created to gauge people’s consumption of television,
along with a variety of social media platforms. The 413 participants who filled out this
survey provided demographic information and reported how many hours per day they
spend watching TV and on six social media platforms; additionally they responded to
items that served as dependent measures used in this study, including questions designed
to test for first and second order effects, as well as the mean world syndrome. With the
survey results that were produced, the researcher performed several analyses including
descriptives, correlations, a principal components analysis, and multivariate analyses.
These analyses were carried out to determine how much time people are spending
consuming media each day, what users’ level of participation in the mediated
environment is, and how cultivation patterns are affected by media consumption across
both television and several social media platforms. The results from these inquiries are
summarized in the next section, along with a discussion of the why and how said results
may have occurred.
RQ1
Research question 1 was straightforward – how much time are people spending
consuming media per day? As expected, based on media use analyses conducted after the
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start of the COVID-19 pandemic (Jones, 2020, Cramer-Flood, 2021), people are
consuming a slew of media across a wide variety of platforms. Television did remain as
the most consumed single platform in this study. Since the survey design produced
ordinal ranges of results (1-2 hours/day, 3-4 hours/day, etc.) rather than continuous data,
means were not computed to answer this question. On the other hand, means are useful
when it comes to ranking platforms from highest to lowest in terms of consumption. For
television, participants in this study had a mean of 3.11, which means the average viewer
in this study was a moderate-to-light viewer, watching between two-three hours of
television per day. Facebook was the second-highest platform with a mean of 2.70,
denoting spending around an hour each day on the platform. For the rest of the platforms,
YouTube was the third most highly consumed, Instagram the fourth, TikTok the fifth,
Snapchat the sixth, and Twitter the least consumed platform.
When considering the consumption of all social media together in comparison to
television, there is a much wider chasm. The sum of the means for social media
consumption was 12.46 indicating that on average, users in this study are spending more
than four times the amount of time they spend watching television on social media, or
around 10 hours/day. The composite amount of consumption across the mediated
environment – the sum of means of television and the various social media platforms –
came in at 15.57, putting the average total media consumption for the sample at ~12.5
hours per day. Although these findings for time spent consuming social media and
composite consumption may seem high, the most recent market research indicates these
results are pretty accurate. Indeed, Schomer (2021) found that in the U.S., adults are
spending 13 hours and 12 minutes/day consuming some form of media; 60.5% of that
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consumption is on digital platforms and 39.5% is on “traditional” platforms, with
Schomer treating TV as “traditional.” So, data from mid-2021 show the average
American adult is spending approximately 8 hours/day using digital media. Taking the
findings of Jones (2020), Cramer-Flood (2021), and Nielsen data from 2019 (nearly half
of Gen Zers and Millennials spent more than 10 hours/day on social media two years ago,
pre-pandemic) into account concerning the much higher rate at which younger adults
consume social media, it becomes clear that this study’s finding of users reporting
spending approximately 10 hours/day on social media is not far out of the ballpark,
especially since 55% of the sample was under age 35.
In sum, on average, users in this study are spending a huge chunk of their waking
hours consuming some form of media, with social media consumption making up the vast
majority of consumption. This finding is significant in the argument for applying
cultivation theory to social media since taken together, the sheer amount of consumption
of non-television platforms is so much higher than that of television. With so much social
media use, it becomes practically unfathomable that social media consumption is not
resulting in some type of cultivation effect.
RQ2
Next was research question 2, which sought to outline the level of engagement
users report when consuming television versus social media. When it comes to social
media, do users spend more of their time browsing or reacting, commenting, and posting?
Understanding whether users see media consumption as a way to disconnect from the real
world or as a way to engage with it more actively is related to second order effects. As
delineated by the plethora of research completed by Shrum and Shrum et al. (2004, 2009,
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2010, 2011) users who report higher levels of engagement, such as becoming engrossed
in storylines and inserting themselves into the narrative of television, are more susceptive
to second order effects. For television, results indicated respondents view television as an
escape from everyday life rather than an extension of it, and also reported frequently
becoming absorbed in the narrative of TV shows, often considering what they would do
in given situations they see on screen. These findings are in line with research by Shrum
et al., specifically, Shrum (2009), Shrum et al. (2010), and Shrum and Lee (2012), which
found viewers who reported being transported by television narratives and considering
what they would do through the lens of their own experiences/incorporating their own
background knowledge were more susceptible to persuasion after being swept up in
plotlines, thereby resulting in greater second order effects, which deal with more deeply
seated belief systems.
When it comes to social media, results showed respondents view social media as
at least moderately important for conducting social life and see it as an extension of
normal life, although more people reported their purpose for using social media is mainly
to view the content of others rather than interact. While respondents also reported that
they frequently do consider what they would do in given situations they see play out on
social media (similar to how viewers consider what they’d do in a plotline they see on
TV), they more frequently actually react to content in a tangible way (liking,
commenting, sharing) rather than merely reacting in a more abstract, cognitive way, as
they would when watching television. Furthermore nearly three quarters of respondents
either selected “agree” or “strongly agree” to the statement that social media has changed
their opinion of others. Nearly 60% of respondents reported social media as the platform
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that is more affecting on their worldviews, compared to 11.9% who selected television
(the rest selected neither).
All in all, the social media findings for this research question were a harbinger for
results that would come in RQs 3, 4, and especially 5, as all of these research questions
showed a significant amount of variance explained by social media use for second order
effects, with RQ 5 having the most significant p values. While consuming most social
media platforms, users have a participatory experience that is highly affecting, but in a
way that is different than the participatory experience of watching television. TV being
viewed more highly as an escape suggests viewers watch television as a way to unwind
from the day, be distracted from the monotony of everyday life, or quite simply to be
entertained. Watching TV is largely not a social function, with the exception of situations
such as a family that always watches their favorite program or sporting event together,
friends who binge watch their favorite show, and couples who “Netflix and chill.”
Indeed, according to Krantz-Kent (2018), only 3.8% of viewers who watch TV each day
do so with people outside of their own household. Television can be a window to the
outside world but it is not really a way to actually interact with it, as it is filled with
content that is distant, meaning it portrays mostly faraway places, people viewers don’t
actually know, and potentially different eras (Adoni & Mane, 1984).
On the other hand, with the possible exception of YouTube, social media
consumption is most certainly a social function, with platforms operating as both a
window and a door to the outside world, allowing users to view content and tangibly
interact with it, if they want. And, at least on some social media platforms, such as
Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat, the content a user can choose to interact with is
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probably created or posted by someone they actually know, thereby making it more
resonant. These two aspects – social media being an extension of users’ actual social
lives and the fact that platforms allow users to not only consume content (as is the case
with TV), but actually do something with that content – are likely at least partially the
reason why the non-television part of the mediated environment has the capability of
producing cultivation effects. The other piece of the puzzle is the massive amount of
consumption users report each day, as shown in RQ1.
RQ3
Research question three was the first of three questions that used multivariate
analyses, which were informed by bivariate analyses, to test for cultivation effects across
the mediated environment, including television and six social media platforms. This
research question used three indices, with one for first order effects and two for second
order effects; the first order index was concerned with violence, the first of the second
order indices primarily dealt with respondents’ perceptions of their own experiences and
actions, and the second focused on the present condition of affairs in the United States.
For first order effects, regression analyses revealed that a significant amount of
variance in the model could be explained by Facebook consumption, a key finding in this
study. Demographics were also important factors, and social media consumption tended
to temper beliefs about the prevalence of violence related to gender, education, and
ethnicity (Black). In contrast, for ethnicity (other) and the Republican political point of
view, social media consumption on certain platforms increased the belief that crime is
widespread. The introduction of Facebook and then YouTube consumption was impactful
upon the belief in prevalent violent crime for Republicans, causing this group to estimate

141

crime rates at higher levels. Facebook use specifically led to significant reductions in
violent crime rate estimates for all demographics except Republicans. YouTube also had
an effect on estimation of violent crime rates and gender. The introduction of the
platforms TikTok and then Snapchat into the model caused decreases in the belief that
violence is widespread almost universally. Television consumption had no impact on any
demographic’s belief in high levels of crime except for those who identified as Black –
this group saw a significant increase when TV was added into the model, indicating that
for this group, the traditional cultivation finding that increasing television viewership is
related to increasing violent crime estimates still rings true.
So, when taking these results into account, there are many implications when
considering cultivation in relation to social media use and first order beliefs about
violence. First is the overall tempering effect of increasingly diverse social media use –
this finding runs reverse of the traditional cultivation finding that the more someone
watches TV, the more dangerous they believe the world to be because of the vast crime
overrepresentation on the television. For social media, more consumption, especially
across more diverse platforms, does not automatically equal greater negative cultivation
effects, but rather positive ones. While television does at least for some groups still have
this cultivating effect, it appears that social media consumption gives users a more
accurate understanding of violent crime rates, which as of late 2020 was approximately
0.4% (Gramlich, 2020). There are many possible reasons for this trend, with the main one
being that social media gives users a more accurate view of the real world because what
people see on social media is an actual depiction of the real world (with the exception of
heavy photoshopping, filtering, propaganda, deep fakes, trolls, etc.). Additionally, results
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showed that consumption across many different social media platforms leads to a
reduction in the overestimation of violent crime – an effect similar to people who read
news across many different publications having a more accurate, triangulated, and less
biased point of view (Ashley, 2020).
This brings up the only group that did not see a reduction in violent crime
estimates from Models 1 to 8 – Republicans. The results for this group largely ran afoul
of the trends for all other demographics. It is clear that for this group, social media’s
overall tempering cultivation effect was simply not present, indicating that more negative
worldviews, which have traditionally been associated with television consumption, are
capable of being cultivated on social media for this group. Why? The answer is likely
rooted in the ideology, psychology, and education level of those who identify as
Republican.
Recent research in the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency has indicated that
Republicans are more polarized than non-Republicans, a trend Klar et al. (2018)
associated with lower education levels. Additional research has found that Republicans
are more susceptible to fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019), and those who identify as
right-wing are overall unhappier than those who do not identify as right-wing (Ward et
al., 2021). Finally, research has indicated that people who identify as conservative or
right-wing are more likely to exist in echo chambers (Eady et al., 2019). In short,
Republicans are more predisposed to see the world in a negative way and have lower
media literacy levels. So, when they see something that is either negative or potentially
downright propaganda on Facebook or YouTube (the two most affecting platforms for
Republicans in this multivariate analysis), they are more likely to be inclined to believe it.
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Furthermore, by existing in online echo chambers, Republicans’ negative worldview is
likely frequently, if not constantly, reinforced.
Moving to RQ3’s regression analyses for second order effects, results for the
indices were less pronounced than those for first order effects. Index 1, which addressed
uncivil behavior and the propensity for respondents to either be a victim of violent crime
or government misconduct, had a significant amount of variance explained by YouTube
consumption. Index 2, which concerned the state of U.S. society, had no significant
amount of variance explained by consumption on any social media platform. The
tempering effect of social media consumption was once again back for gender and the
ethnicities Black and neither. Some interesting trends did emerge in Index 1 for age,
education, and the “neither” political view which were not present in the analysis of first
order effects. Results revealed there were some small changes in the levels of agreement
with the index measures, with increased diverse social media consumption being related
to greater agreement with the index. RQ4, which did not concern first versus second
order effects but rather dealt with how social media platforms other than Facebook
affected users’ responses to specific survey questions, analyzed two of the three measures
that were used in Index 2, and showed that the question in the index pertaining to
respondents’ belief that they would be a victim of government misconduct did not have a
significant amount of variance explained by media consumption, but the questions on the
propensity for a respondent to be a victim of a violent crime and the propriety of uncivil
conduct on those with whom you disagree did. As such, a more in-depth discussion of
these two questions will be included in the RQ4 section below, since the insignificant
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results for one of the questions for Index 2 indicate considering the individual questions
would be more informative.
Taking the results of the results of the first and second order indices into
consideration in light of the core concerns of RQ3, which were whether television or
social media was more impactful on cultivation patterns and whether users in the study
were more susceptible to first or second order effects, it is clear that for this analysis,
social media was more impactful on cultivation effects, with Facebook consumption
particularly having a bearing on first order effects. Facebook’s power to cultivate views
was of particular interest of this study, as Facebook is the most widely-used social media
platform in the United States and world.
RQ4
As noted earlier, this research question addressed two of the three questions
which were included in Index 2 (second order effects), and also addressed three first
order effects measures, two of which were included in Index 1. Second order effects
comprised the first two regressions for research question four, and both of these analyses
saw a significant amount of variance explained by social media consumption. The first
measure inquired as to whether respondents believed they would be a victim of violent
crime in their lifetime, with YouTube consumption being the significant platform in
terms of variance explained. When considering the effect of consumption on
demographics, there was less attenuation than was present for first order effects.
However, there was still a tempering effect present for ethnicities Black and other, with
both groups reporting they were less likely to be victims of violent crime with increased,
diverse consumption across platforms. Certain platforms also affected the level of
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agreement with the measure for age, with Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter use
contributing to lower beliefs in the likeness of violent crime victimhood.
Consumption had the opposite effect for respondents who identified as
Republican, who once again reported more negative worldviews as more diverse social
media use was added in to the model. The trends for Republicans were interesting since
respondents in this category strongly disagreed that they would be victims of violent
crime (although media consumption did temper this view slightly), but also much more
strongly reported believing that violent crime rates are high. So, for Republicans, they
view the world as more dangerous, a perspective that is exacerbated by media
consumption, but simultaneously believe they are at least partially immune from that
violence, although YouTube did most strongly negate this view. It is likely that YouTube
has the greatest impact on this measure because YouTube is the social media platform
most similar to television, yet results showed that YouTube consumption is impactful in a
way that TV is not, as television did not contribute significantly to the amount of variance
explained in any regression analyses for this entire study.
The next second order measure for RQ4 addressed respondents’ beliefs in the
propriety of uncivil conduct, and several social media platforms significantly accounted
for variance in the models, specifically Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok. Unlike most
other regression models, there was less of an overall belief tempering effect of social
media consumption. For age, ethnicity (other), and Republicans, social media
consumption contributed to a higher agreement with the belief that incivility is
acceptable, although these different demographics were largely affected by different
platforms, with consistent results not seen across the board. When it came to age, the
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results indicated that for young people, the consumption on the platforms Facebook,
YouTube, and TikTok was related to higher agreement with incivility. For ethnicity
(other), it was Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. Republicans’ level of agreement with
the statement was affected by the platforms Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, and Snapchat.
There are many reasons why these three platforms, Instagram, Twitter, and
TikTok, accounted for a significant amount of variance explained across the model.
Starting with Instagram, the purpose and nature of the platform are likely bound up in
greater support for incivility. Research has shown that Instagram is the social media
platform to showcase, “Living your best life,” (Mahoney, 2020, p. 3). Mahoney also
notes that on the platform, it is very common for comments to be of the “roasting” type,
meaning users will lambaste others for the person being too fat, ugly, annoying, or some
other negative reaction. Stein et al. (2019) also linked Instagram usage to young people
having disordered eating and say that the platform has the capability to foster negative
self-images. So, it is plausible that consumption on a platform in which this type of
negative behavior is common could lead to a greater acceptance of incivility.
Additionally, whether users are the ones doing the negative commenting or receiving the
comments may not necessarily matter in the cultivation of uncivil behavior, since it is not
uncommon for those who are bullied to wind up becoming bullies themselves (Ma,
2001).
In terms of Twitter, this is the platform that ostensibly seems the most capable of
promoting uncivil behavior simply because of how Twitter was used by former President
Donald Trump and how it is still being used by many politicians and powerful people to
pillory their political opponents, the news media, or anyone who levels criticism at them.
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Indeed, post-2016 research has directly linked the platform (and its use by politicians,
celebrities, and other people of power) to uncivil discourse (Bratslavsky et al., 2019).
What’s more, Theocharis et al. (2020) linked uncivil Twitter usage by politicians to the
adoption of uncivil Twitter behavior by members of the general public. And, while it may
be tempting to believe such uncivil behavior is only being perpetrated and accepted by
those who lean/identify as Republican or conservative, Munger (2020) found that not to
be completely true, as many who identify as Democrats also display uncivil behavior on
Twitter, along partisan lines. In this study, Twitter consumption caused the sharpest
change in agreement for Republicans on the question of incivility.
As Twitter is primarily a textual rather than visual social media platform, its
cultivation capabilities are different than other forms of social media because text is a
form of content that is a more direct, explicit message, whereas more visually-based
platforms, such as Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, and Snapchat, communicate messages
in a way that is more implied and symbolic. In addition, as of 2019 more than half of all
tweets are retweets and 10% of those retweets are from verified accounts, i.e. people in
positions of power (Leetaru, 2019). It appears that retweeting is an avenue for an average
person to express their opinions in a way that feels at least a degree removed from the
messaging (especially if the messaging goes against social norms, such as civil
discourse), since, as is commonly plastered across Twitter bios, “Retweets do not equal
endorsements.” Overall, undoubtably the combined effect of a user seeing their leaders
and peers act in an uncivil way leads to cultivation of the belief that incivility is
acceptable.
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Finally, in terms of TikTok, the major explanation for why consumption on the
platform is related to a greater acceptance of uncivil behavior is demographics. Of
TikTok’s 80 million active monthly users, according to Doyle (2021, para. 10), “60% are
female, 40% are male. 60% are between the ages of 16-24. 26% are between the ages 2544. 80% are between the ages 16-34.” The key statistic of these demographics is age,
since throughout this study younger people have viewed the world as more dangerous,
themselves more likely to be the victims of violent crime, and as was the case with this
analysis, more accepting of uncivil behavior.
Jenkins et al. (2016) note that Gen Z reports being the generation that has most
highly been the victim of incivility, so it is possible that, like the trends with the bullied
becoming bullies themselves (Ma, 2001), those who have been victims of incivility
might, in turn, become less civil. Also, Lane (2017) explains that changing social norms
among generations has caused animosity and a mischaracterization of younger people.
For example, younger generations (Millennials and Gen Z) may see nothing wrong with
texting during a dinner or messaging their professors at all hours of the day and night
with emails that are formatted similar to text messages, whereas older generations,
especially Baby Boomers, view both behaviors to be rude and uncivil, thereby making
younger generations feel they are being admonished for behavior they view as completely
acceptable. In research by Gonyea and Hudson (2020), they found that Gen Z’s well
known tagline “OK Boomer” was adopted as direct backlash to being steadily berated as
“snowflakes,” who are unable to do anything for themselves because they were raised by
helicopter parents (p. 53). Although the empirical research for Gen Z is at this point
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exiguous, as the generation continues to reach adulthood, the reasoning for these patterns
of cultivation will likely become more available and widely known.
The final three regression analyses for RQ4 were first order measures. The first
two dealt with violence, while the third dealt with conceptions regarding racial equality in
hard to obtain positions, specifically, the proportion of medical doctors that are Black.
For measures related to first order beliefs and violence, both questions saw significant
results in relation to Facebook consumption. Demographic results were less significant
than most measures in the study for the question that dealt with the number of people
involved in violent crime per week than they were for the question on the percent of
crimes that are violent. Results for these two questions largely reflected the results of the
first order index for RQ3, with the exception of gender and education.
For gender, women were more likely to overestimate crime rates. This is
reflective of cultivation trends in general. While according to Morgan and Truman
(2020), violent crime victimhood is pretty evenly split between women and men, for
decades women have reported a much greater fear of being victims of violent crime
(Smith, 1988; Lane et al., 2009). Women being fearful of violent crime is in no way
surprising. Research shows women overall are more fearful of violent crime because they
have either personally been victims of violent crimes perpetrated by domestic partners or
people in their household, or know other women who have been (Smith, 1988; Mesch,
2000). Women are often conditioned to be afraid of men, or of what men have the
capability of doing, by family, friends, and society as a whole because men are
overwhelmingly the aggressors in sexual assaults. According to the National Sexual
Violence Resource Center (2015), 91% of sexual offenders are male. Moreover,
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according to the U.S. Department of Justice (2000), 17.6% of women report that they
have been raped in their lifetime; 81% of women in the U.S. report being sexually
assaulted and/or harassed (Chatterjee, 2018). In the wake of the #MeToo movement
which began in 2017 and was proliferated on social media, internet searches for sexual
assault skyrocketed 86% (Caputi et al., 2019). Considering these statistics, it is clear
women’s fears are not unwarranted and may not be based completely upon media
consumption (with the exception of the #MeToo movement), but rather personal
experience or the personal experiences of others, which potentially could have been
shared on social media.
Education-wise, it is once again not surprising that those with higher education
have a lower estimation of crime rates that more accurately represent the actual crime
rate. Altogether, this finding is not surprising considering the body of research on the
relationship between crime and education. First, research shows those who are less
educated are both more likely to be perpetrators of crime and victims of crime (Lochner
& Moretti, 2004), thereby making them more likely to believe crime is rampant.
Additionally, it makes sense that those with higher education (and literacy) levels have a
better understanding of the crime rate, since it is well understood that those with higher
education levels consume much more news and statistical data regarding day to day life,
thereby helping them to be more capable of understanding the difference between
anecdotal versus empirical evidence and making them more attuned to the actual versus
perceived state of society (Kleinnijenhuis, 1991; Anderson, 2018).
Lastly is the final regression analysis for RQ4 on the percentage of medical
doctors in the United States that are Black. The findings for this measure reflect previous
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cultivation research that contends the percentage of Black people in prestigious jobs on
television is an overrepresentation of the actual share of high-status jobs Black people
hold, resulting in people making inflated snap judgements (Earp et al., 2010). Signorielli
(2009) found that in prime time television programming, Black people account for 34.5%
of the jobs that are considered prestigious, such as doctors and lawyers. On its face, that
number might not seem like that much of an overrepresentation, since according to the
Bureau of Labor and Statistics, as of 2018, 31% of Black people who are employed work
in, “Management, professional, and related occupations—the highest paying major
occupational category,” (2018, pp. 4-5).
On the contrary, when taking a deeper dive into the statistics, racial disparity for
hard to obtain positions, specifically ones that require graduate degrees in programs that
are traditionally highly regarded and garner the highest pay upon graduation (such as
medical or legal degrees, MBAs, etc.) is much more apparent. For example, recent
research shows people who are Black make up just 8% of MBA students (Green, 2021),
7.9% of law students (Gallot-Baker, 2020), and 7.7% of medical students (O’Donnell &
Robinson, 2019). When it comes to Black people working in those fields, the numbers
are even more bleak. Black people hold only 3.2% of key positions (such as upper
management, VPs, CEOs, etc.) in major American corporations (Brooks, 2019); 5% of
lawyers (American Bar Association, 2020) and 5.4% of U.S. physicians are Black
(Rivero, 2021). When compared to Black people’s representation on TV, this data shows
there is a clear discrepancy between the number of Black people who actually work in
prestigious fields versus what is shown on television. How social media comes in to play
in this equation was at least somewhat explained by this measure in RQ4.
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Twitter was the social media platform which accounted for a significant amount
of variance in the model, with estimations of the number of medical doctors who are
Black falling for the categories of age as well as political views Republican and neither.
For Republicans, estimations continued to fall across models as social media
consumption across more diverse platforms was added in. Interestingly, for respondents
who identified as Black, estimations increased with Twitter usage.
All in all, the effectiveness of Twitter in giving users a more accurate
understanding of the proportion of medical doctors who are Black is likely tied to the
textual nature (and the messages in that text) of the platform, along with Twitter users’
penchant for retweeting, which was discussed above. Moreover, Twitter is the platform
most highly used by journalists, with 74% saying it is their most valued social media
platform (Strong, 2021); as of 2015, journalists made up 25% of Twitter’s verified
accounts (Kamps, 2015). Considering users’ affinity for retweeting from verified
accounts, it is plausible that the news content on Twitter has an outsized effect. Indeed, a
plurality of Twitter users, 71%, say they get news from the platform (Hughes & Wojcik,
2019). Finally, Twitter users are both more educated and more wealthy than the general
public (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019). All of this likely adds up to a user base that is more
educated than average Americans on the subject of racial disparity in prominent, high
paying professions not only because they are more educated period, but also because they
are using a platform more dominated by news written by actual journalists. This finding
also suggests that for certain platforms, social media content may actually be more
affecting than the overall environment, at least for certain user groups.
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RQ5
The final research question of this dissertation dealt with the mean world
syndrome. Instagram and Snapchat consumption accounted for a significant amount of
variance in the model. Another key result was the overall effect of consumption on the
demographics of education, ethnicity (Black), as well as the neither political view.
Results showed decreases across the board for these groups, meaning with increasing
social media consumption, these groups cultivate progressively negative worldviews.
There were also steady decreases for the reference category, which contained the
variables of ethnicity (White) and political leaning (Democrat). This was the only
measure that saw more consumption resulting in progressively more cultivation effects
for the majority of demographics, which supports the overall premise of this dissertation
that cultivation is happening across the mediated environment and that media
consumption across platforms can have a cumulative effect. For the mean world
syndrome, a different platform does not equal a different effect for the majority of
demographic groups.
Before discussing why Instagram and Snapchat are ideal environments for the
cultivation of mean world views, it is important to note that the variable age was
excluded from this analysis because it was collinear with Snapchat use. Nevertheless, the
majority of users on both platforms are either Millennials or Gen Zers; 69.8% of
Instagram users are under 34 (Sehl, 2021) and 75% of Snapchat users are under 34
(Barnhart, 2021). So, even without the age demographic included in the model, Instagram
and Snapchat consumption being significant is still possibly related to age. In terms of
why Instagram and Snapchat users would view others as only looking out for themselves,
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more likely to take advantage of others, and less trustworthy, the results are likely bound
up in the nature of these two platforms and the types of behaviors they display.
Firstly, Instagram users largely adhere to the aforementioned “living your best
life” mantra in content they post, and it is not uncommon for users to encounter posts that
are either directly described by the caption as intentionally “thirsty” (Psarras et al., 2021)
or for other users to drop the term in the comments, meaning the person is deliberately
seeking attention from followers. The “thirst trap” effect is more prominently apparent
for Instagram’s half a million influencers (Barnhart, 2021). According to Jones (2017,
para. 6) a female influencer, “…needs her images to circulate yet risks accusations of
posing and profiteering. In short, she can be accused of insincerity.” Lee et al. (2021) say
that in their research, Instagram and the influencers who use it are directly tied to
materialism, and that people tend to follow influencers because they are envious of them.
They further note that the technique of “FOMO” (fear of missing out) is frequently
utilized by marketers and influencers (p. 17).
However, whether a person is an actual influencer isn’t necessarily relevant in the
perception of thirsty behavior. As Jones (2017) points out, “The pious selfie may be
accused of anti-social, narcissistic impulses,” calling out the ‘desperate’ and ‘thirsty’
appetites of female social media users. Global admiration and vitriol for celebrities such
as Kim Kardashian exemplify contrasting opinions about the genre’s allures and risks.”
What’s more, according to Richard et al. (2020), the Instagram algorithm actually
promotes posts to the top of users’ feeds that are attention seeking, especially those that
feature nudity, although Instagram contends that is not how their algorithm works.
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A final important aspect of Instagram is the number of businesses that use the
platform and the amount of engagement their posts garner from users. Approximately
200 million of Instagram’s one billion users are business accounts; approximately 36% of
all users say they use the platform specifically to follow brands, and 90% of all users
follow at least one brand (Barnhart, 2021). Among content shared by average users,
influencers, and businesses, the most popular types of posts on Instagram are related to
travel, beauty, fashion, health and fitness, lifestyle, parenting, music, food, and pets.
Other posts that are very popular either feature very high-quality photography or share
information on how to start a business/side hustle to make money (Razo, 2021). What all
of these Instagram statistics add up to is a mediated environment that is much more
materialistic, with users being conditioned to yearn for what they do not currently have,
whether that is possessions, a certain beauty/fitness level, the ability to travel, etc. In
combination with Instagram’s apparent promotion of egocentric behavior, it makes
perfect sense that consumption on the platform is related to users reporting cynical views
about their fellow man.
Contrary to the nature of Instagram, Snapchat likely cultivates mean world views
for an entirely different reason – namely its well-known reputation for being a platform
that facilitates sexting and cheating. With only 293 million users (Iqbal, 2021), it is the
smallest of the social media platforms included in this study. Along with Facebook, it is a
platform that likely cultivates views based largely on the behaviors exhibited by users.
According to Poltash (2013), “Snapchat was born in the spring of 2011 in a Kappa Sigma
fraternity house,” at Stanford University (p. 6), hinting that from its very inception, the
platform’s purpose was likely not a noble one. By 2012, Snapchat had already been
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definitively linked to sexting due to its format of self-destructing messages and photos
that also were deleted from Snapchat’s servers; although message recipients could take
screenshots of what they received, that would notify the sender. As early as 2013, the
platform was also linked to students cheating on tests and revenge porn (Poltash, 2013).
As Snapchat has evolved technologically, it has added several tools, such as the
“best friends” list, which allows users to see who others most “snap” with – this tool was
removed briefly in 2015, which caused an uproar online for “Snapchat stalkers,” such as
former significant others and jealous admirers, as well as for those in committed
relationships who wanted to monitor their partner (Hooton, 2015). It was brought back
shortly thereafter, to many users’ relief. This feature, along with Snapchat use in general,
is linked to jealousy in relationships, according to Utz et al. (2015). The platform has also
afforded other more sexually promiscuous capabilities to users, such as people asking
random strangers to send sexual photos (Moore, 2015), and worse, random strangers
sending sexually explicit photos to others unsolicited, a trend which Van Ouytsel et al.
(2021) connect to early sexualization of adolescents. Ringrose et al. (2021) found 67% of
teen girls aged 11-17 had received unsolicited sexual photos, a.k.a. “dick pics” and 70%
had been asked to send sexual photos of themselves (p. 5); virtually their entire sample
attributed their receiving of these photos to Snapchat.
Finally, a feature added in 2017, the “Snap Map,” which allows users to share
their location with people they are friends with on the app, has been linked to both
increased jealousy in relationships (Dunn & Langlais, 2020) and dangers related to
stalkers (Habib et al., 2019). With all of these findings, it is readily apparent that
Snapchat use has the ability to cause users to lose trust in others and have a more mean
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worldview for both interpersonal relationships and mankind as a whole, especially
considering the rates of unsolicited sexualized messages that are sent using the platform.
Major Findings – The Why
There were several consequential findings for this study, including a connection
between first order beliefs and Facebook consumption, increased acceptance of uncivil
attitudes in relation to non-Facebook social media use, and the cultivation of mean world
views linked to consumption of Instagram and Snapchat.
The relationship between Facebook and first order effects was significant. It is
clear that Facebook consumption is related to the cultivation of more positive and
accurate first order beliefs pertaining to violent crime. This is probably because cases of
people seeing actual violence on Facebook are relatively rare. Unlike television which
consists of programming that is violence-laden, when violent content pops up on social
media, that content is most likely dealing with cases of actual, real-life violence. With the
actual violent crime rate in the U.S. sitting at approximately 0.4% (FBI, 2021), it makes
sense that the amount of content related to violent crime that makes it onto social media
platforms is relatively low, unless the user exists in an environment that is prone to
highlight violence.
Social media affords users a much higher level of control of what they see and
interact with than television. This creates a situation in which users self-sort themselves
into homogenous groups, cleaving the different and the “other” off from their proverbial
virtual herd. What results is an echo chamber, and users who exist within them appear to
be much more susceptible to cultivation effects. Gerbner often spoke of the
homogenizing role of television (Earp et al., 2010). TV has the capability of taking

158

people with different belief systems and disparate backgrounds and making them have
similar outlooks on the world, according to Gerbner. By giving users the capability to
create and remain in their own personal echo chambers, social media is arguably even
more homogenizing for those who exist in a digital bubble in which similar messages
reverberate on an almost constant basis.
Echo chambers are likely at the root of demographic results in this study that
indicated for Republicans, there are entirely different cultivation trends for this group
than for all others on first order effects measures involving violence. This is likely
because many conservatives are existing in a highly polarized mediated environment that
simultaneously paints the world as violent while portraying members of the group as
strong, valiant, and noble. It likely is not just one piece of content, or even pattern of
content, that is cultivating views. Rather, it is the environment of the echo chamber itself
and the online behaviors of those within it, whether those behaviors be posting, reacting,
sharing, or commenting, creating a sum total that is the cultivation of certain views.
Similar environmental trends on non-Facebook platforms seem to be happening,
especially in terms of incivility, although not necessarily along partisan political lines.
The possible causes of the uncivil attitudes also directly tie into the mean world
syndrome and consumption of Instagram and Snapchat. Are people selfish or selfless?
Can people be trusted? Are others honest and behaving with good intentions? All of these
are essentially questions of civility.
Since younger people are much more likely to use social media platforms other
than Facebook, it makes sense that non-Facebook platforms are where cultivation effects
are cropping up for younger generations, with certain platforms being more effective at
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cultivation than others. And yet the cultivation of a tendency toward an acceptance of
incivility for younger people such as Millennials and Gen Z may be a reaction toward
these groups’ potential debasement across the mediated environment. Young people often
leave Facebook because “only old people use it.” One can only be called a “snowflake”
or a “libtard” or see endless posts about how Millennials buy so much avocado toast and
Starbucks that they cannot be a real adult and buy a house so many times until a reaction
is bound to happen. That reaction might be the adoption of less civil viewpoints, or to flee
from Facebook altogether for friendlier skies on other platforms. Many young people do
both.
On the flip side, it might be that the sheer amount of social media use and the
transparency and vulnerability that comes with said use is creating an overall
environment that leans toward incivility; younger people are more likely to “let it all hang
out” online, and doing so is risky because it can prompt disrespect. Or, it might be a
combination of the two scenarios – younger people lashing out at what they perceive as
mischaracterization and mistreatment by older generations and thereby adopting less civil
attitudes, only to have those uncivil behaviors bleed over to their peers and the social
media platforms dominated them. Finally, some may have become less civil because of
the former, and others because of the latter. In the end, young users are thrown into the
melting pot of more diverse social media platforms together with plenty of uncivil
behavior to go around. The bottom line is, for both partisans on Facebook and younger
people on non-Facebook platforms, the behaviors that have been cultivated are related to
the processes behind how cultivation happens in the first place.
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The How – Social Media and Cultivation Processing
Understanding how social media’s environment cultivates views is vital. It is best
to begin with what we already know about first and second order effects and the
processing models associated with them, i.e. the work of Shrum et al. Although Shrum
has been mainly concerned with processing tied to television, much of what he and his
colleagues have delineated is relevant and applicable to social media.
Shrum et al.’s body of research (2004, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2017) regarding
the cognitive processes that go into cultivating first order viewpoints, i.e. the heuristic
processing model, indicates first order effects are largely tied to accessibility and
retrievability. Considering this study’s first order results through this lens, the most
significant of which were associated with Facebook, it becomes clear that the sheer
omnipresence of the social media platform increases the accessibility and retrievability of
certain constructs, in this case the infrequency of violent crime.
Following the heuristic processing model, in classic cultivation studies, when a
person who was a regular television watcher was asked to estimate the quantity of crime
in their area or city, they were able to access the construct of crime prevalence more
easily and rapidly since it was often reinforced on television. Facebook users are able to
access constructs quickly and easily in the same way, except the constructs they have
access to are the opposite of the constructs promoted by television for crime. When
Facebook users are asked to make an estimate about crime, their estimate is informed at
least partially by what they’ve seen on Facebook, which is that crime, especially violent
crime, is relatively rare. This study’s results show that in modern day, Facebook is more
impactful on first order cultivation effects than television or any other social media
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platform. While descriptives showed that people are still consuming more TV than
Facebook, nonetheless people are still spending hours every day on the platform, and in
turn that consumption has a cultivating effect.
For significant second order results, which dealt with an acceptance of incivility
and the mean world syndrome, it is quite probable that there are two aspects of second
order cultivation processing at play. First is the sheer ubiquity of social media in general,
and the high use of certain platforms by younger users, such as Instagram, TikTok, and
Snapchat. While high media consumption is generally associated with the concept of
accessibility, which is tied to first order effects, Shrum (2009) notes that for second order
effects, “viewing frequency” is still “positively related” to the cultivation of certain
beliefs (p. 68). However, those effects are increased when a viewer engages with the
content, which brings up the other key processing aspect when it comes to social media
and second order cultivation effects – the participatory nature of social media and its
interactive, engrossing atmosphere. As summarized in Shrum (2017), throughout years of
research, Shrum et. al found that for television, second order effects are tied to
motivation. A more motivated viewer gets absorbed in the plot, becoming intensely
immersed, mentally engaged, and emotional, thereby making them more persuadable (i.e.
more prone to cultivation effects). As noted in the results and discussion of RQ2,
respondents in this study reported social media is an environment that promotes
participation. So, it is likely that motivation is likewise a major factor in social media
consumption being related to cultivation effects because of the level of participation
afforded to and reported by users.
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Since social media is an actual part of users’ social lives, content that is
encountered, unlike television, is not abstract or distant, which relates to the amount of
background knowledge a person must supply in order to make meaning of what they are
seeing. As outlined extensively by Shrum (2009) and Shrum et al. (2010, 2012), in the
cultivation processes for second order effects, absorbed, interactive viewers bring in their
own background knowledge and experiences, both of which inform the program’s
messaging as constructed by the viewer (much in the same way an actor may harness past
experiences or trauma to bring emotion to their performance of a certain scene). On
social media, users must also bring in background knowledge to contextualize content or
interactions they are seeing play out. While television content is more often offered up as
a “complete” package for viewers (the context of scenes, scenarios, or plotlines is
shown/explained through the program’s exposition, or with other devices, such as “in the
last episode” montages), messaging on social media is almost never presented in such a
way. Rather, content and interactions represent patterns of behavior user(s) have
displayed over time, meaning that other users necessarily rely on background knowledge
to understand the context of what is happening.
For example, let’s say a woman is having problems in her marriage and is posting
cryptic memes every few days to her Instagram story for several weeks. An unmotivated
user may see one of the memes and think nothing of it. A motivated user, on the other
hand, will think back to the woman’s previous posts and online behaviors. The motivated
user may also think back to times others or they themselves have displayed similar
cryptic messaging due to relationship problems, and conclude that the woman’s marriage
may be on the rocks. Furthermore, if the woman is part of the motivated user’s real-world
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social life, the motivation ante is upped, since most people want to know what is going on
in their friends’ lives because they care about them. In short, encountering content and
interactions that have an actual bearing on users’ social lives because they are
posted/perpetrated by people users know likely significantly increases the motivation
factor. Quite simply, social media is not only omnipresent, but immersive on multiple
fronts, both in terms of the participatory capacities afforded to users and their inherent
motivation, meaning social media platforms are fertile ground for second order effects.
Aside from the key processing factors of user participation and motivation for the
cultivation of second order effects on social media, there is another important aspect –
how users can participate in the social media environment, which also helps to mitigate
the issue of content disparity. How do social media platforms communicate stable,
consistent norms in an atmosphere in which violations of social norms run rampant? Just
as TV violence is related to mean worldviews, social media’s version of violence – the
violation of social norms – operates in much the same way. It is likely that content or
behavior users view as a violation still has a cultivation effect. However, not all social
media content or behavior acts as a violation of morals or values, but rather as a direct
reinforcement of the user’s already-established worldview or behaviors the user already
agrees with.
This means that much of the content users encounter on social media either acts as
a reinforcement of what users (and their echo chamber) already believe, or is a violation
of what the user holds as a social norm, which may cause a reaction. If a user sees or
interacts with a piece of content or behavior that does not reinforce their alreadyestablished worldview (or downright violates it), they can reject the messaging by
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removing it from their feed through unfollowing, unfriending, clicking “see fewer posts
like this,” etc. In the case of content that rises to the level of what the user feels is a
violation, they may simply filter it by using the aforementioned methods, or may choose
to directly react to it by commenting or sharing the content in order to express their
disagreement/outrage. The need for a reaction, whether that reaction is explicit or merely
filtering the content, reinforces a negative worldview. Once the user has reacted, they
have further refined their echo chamber to one that exhibits more reinforcement.
Other users may exist in an echo chamber that is less negative or partisan, and
more equitable and balanced. Some may not exist in an echo chamber at all, as a lot of
people actually seek out a diversity of views in order to triangulate their own beliefs.
Users who fall into these two categories likely have a more positive and accurate
worldview, which is why results showed positive cultivation effects, such as a more
accurate understanding of crime rates, for some groups. One of the survey questions in
this study asked, “The majority of what I see on social media aligns with beliefs I already
have,” and 43.7% of respondents selected “neither agree nor disagree.” This implies that
nearly half of users likely do not exist in an online mediated environment that is
supportive of the cultivation of negative worldviews. However, 26.6% either agreed or
strongly agreed; 28.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed. So, around a quarter of users are
existing in an environment that provides reinforcement, and another quarter exists in one
that is likely to prompt reactions (which in turn leads to reinforcement). Indeed, recent
research into media effects (Shehata et al., 2021) supports the study of long-term effects
in relation to whether the media the user consumes contradicts or supports what users
already believe. Results in their analysis showed a significant factor in long-term media
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effects was whether media content was congruent or incongruent with users’ beliefs, with
both congruent and incongruent information having an effect, although those effects were
different.
Ultimately, understanding the aspects of reactions (related to violations of social
norms) versus reinforcement (related to echo chambers) in mediated environments helps
to conceptualize how online cultivation of negative worldviews happens in comparison to
traditional television-based cultivation, despite such high content disparity. For reactions
spurred on by violations of social norms, those violations certainly feel “closer” to the
user than violence they see on TV because they are often perpetrated by people the user
knows. Seeing violence on television is like seeing it through the window of a person’s
home that you do not know; seeing it on social media is like seeing your friends or family
members get in a brawl in your backyard. All in all, the capabilities social media
platforms afford to users and the ensuing actions and behaviors which play out as a result
are fundamental to second order processing.
Limitations
This research began with the goal of expanding cultivation theory into the realm
of social media by considering cultivation effects as a result of existing and participating
in the online mediated environment. To begin, since no preceding cultivation research has
addressed cultivation patterns across several social media platforms (previous studies
have only considered one platform, at most), this study addressed that hole by first
operationalizing the amount and diversity of social media consumption, and then
analyzing effects vary based on said consumption. Based on this study, cultivation effects
are present as a result of social media use, with some effects being localized to single
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platforms, and others being present due to consumption across platforms. Finally,
analysis was offered to explain the cultivation effect patterns which were found.
Despite these significant contributions, this research has some shortcomings that
must be addressed. To begin, the sample’s demographic makeup was overwhelmingly
female. Aside from that, the sample was more well educated, younger, and leaned more
Democratic in political outlook than the total population in the U.S. As a result, the
ability to generalize results to the general population is somewhat restricted.
There are also some limitations regarding the measurement of media
consumption/exposure, as this study used a self-report method. As outlined in the special
issue of Communication Methods and Measures, “Measuring Media Exposure in a
Changing Communications Environment,” measuring media exposure in modern day is
problematic for most collection methods because new technologies have allowed users to
be bombarded by diverse messaging across a number of platforms and channels. For selfreporting, there are the additional issues of differing understandings of what it means to
be exposed to media. de Vreese and Neijens (2016, p. 72), ask, “Is it being present in the
room, facing a television set, looking at the screen, watching the whole program with
attention, or recall of media content?” Overall, there is evidence to suggest people do
overreport their exposure levels. For Facebook specifically, Ernala, Burke, Leavitt and
Ellison (2020) note users tend to overestimate the amount of time they spend on a
platform, but underestimate the number of times they access the platform. Essentially,
users are popping on and off of Facebook throughout the day, so they feel as if they are
“on” it all the time. However, in some contexts, users may underreport their consumption
time in certain contexts, based on “social desirability,” (p. 1). Some users may have such
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high levels of consumption that they are ashamed to report accurately, although this is
more rare than overreporting, according to Ernala et al.
There are a couple more possible measurement issues for this study, firstly that
consumption was not measured in a continuous way, which would be a highly beneficial
change for future analyses. Lastly, Cronbach’s alpha levels for the four indices used in
research questions three and four were lower than the standard of .7 level which is
accepted in social sciences research, although due to the experimental character of this
study, there were valid reasons to apply a less stringent definition of significance. Finally,
for questions used to measure how much user participation and how they feel social
media has impacted their lives (ex: Which more greatly affects your views on the state of
society and world as a whole – television or social media? When using social media, how
often do the content or interactions you see prompt you to actually react by liking,
commenting, or sharing?) respondents were asked to assess media’s effects on
themselves. This could be potentially problematic because each person’s approach to and
understanding of the questions is different. Also users are so engulfed by media that they
cannot see its effects, i.e. McLuhan’s “fish in water” metaphor, which states fish have
lived in water their whole lives, therefore they do not “see” the water. However, it should
be noted that questions requiring users to assess how they are affected by media have
been used in previous cultivation studies, namely Shrum (2011), who asked respondents
their level of agreement with comparable statements such as, “I was mentally involved in
the storyline while watching the program,” (p. 57). Considering these limitations, in the
last section of this chapter, some ideas for future cultivation studies will be addressed.
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Future Research
When considering cultivation and social media platforms, it is ultimately
necessary to associate effects with the mediated environment rather than a single message
or even pattern of messaging, because frankly, content is so multifarious that no two
users are on the receiving end of the same consumption cocktail. It is less about the
messaging within the environment and more about the capabilities afforded to users and
what they actually do within the environment as a result of those technological abilities.
After all, content winds up on social media because someone created and/or posted it.
The mediated environment is the message because the environment is where the actions
of users take place, whether those actions be sharing a message or perpetrating a certain
type of behavior. It is those actions which result in reinforcement and reactions. Users
are, in a sense, the actors and the online mediated environment is their stage. Through the
process of living their social lives online, users are the ones communicating the norms
and values of society through the actions they take.
Under this premise of understanding cultivation effects as a result of social
media’s environment (and actions and behaviors that the environment contains), future
research into how users directly feel about various social media platforms would help to
inform why certain ones are associated with negative worldviews. Does the platform
seem overwhelmingly negative? How often are people on the receiving end of direct
mistreatment from others? What types of behaviors committed by others have people
observed on the platform? While this study did inquire as to whether respondents felt a
sense of inferiority as a result of social media use, it would be informative to understand
how users cultivated those views. Cultivation studies have traditionally not directly asked
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users about how a certain platform affects their beliefs on certain topics (i.e., a question
phrased as, “Based on what I see on Facebook…”). However, the survey instrument for
such a study would need to be thoroughly parsed out and tested to ensure users can
reliably assess media’s effects on themselves from a third-person perspective, as such a
request can be problematic, as noted in the limitations section above. In the end, while it
is clear cultivation is happening on social media platforms and in some cases across
them, the why and how is not fully clear.
This brings us to another major area in need of research – cultivation effect
processes on social media, especially since content is so fragmented and individualized.
If consistent messages cannot be universally transmitted in the social media environment,
the cultivating force is likely the actions and behavior of others at work. For example, a
Baby Boomer could potentially cultivate the view that all young people are weak in
character because the Boomer sees them act in a flippant or asinine way online. The
behaviors or actions displayed by younger people could be highly varied, with one person
acting recklessly and another acting in a childish manner. These two behaviors send
different messages but ultimately result in a single viewpoint. Following Meyrowitz’
(1989) work in No Sense of Place on front stage versus back stage behaviors and how
new media technologies tend to blend them, it is clear that at least some beliefs are being
cultivated by different groups being exposed to differing behaviors and actions on social
media that they otherwise not be privy to (whereas TV opened up the adult world to
children, social media has opened up the unfiltered world of youth to those who belong to
older generations). Ultimately the cultivating force of actions and behaviors is related to
the second order effects processing aspects of reactions versus reinforcement that were
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theoretically addressed in this study’s discussion – quantifying how those concepts align
(or do not align) with Shrum’s model of online processing is essential for an
understanding of cultivation effects processes across the mediated environment. Another
processing model may well need to be conceptualized.
Finally, as noted in the limitations of this study, collecting data in a continuous
manner would allow for better research into whether more consumption results in more
effects period. Although there was evidence of this trend in this study for both
Republicans and the mean world syndrome, having a continuous data set would allow for
better, more accurate testing of the cumulative effect of consumption across the mediated
environment, including both television and social media platforms. Since the realm of
social media continues to grow and be more diverse, consumption will likely grow along
with it, and having a comprehensive understanding of how ever-increasing media use
affects people is vital.
In sum, this work is a first step toward furthering cultivation research into the
realm of social media and forming a new understanding which prioritizes the mediated
environment and the actions and behaviors it contains rather than solely prioritizing
content. This research had limitations concerning demographic sample limitations, as
well as some allowances in statistical thresholds due to the study’s experimental and
investigative character. And yet, the results do demonstrate that consumption on multiple
social media platforms was related to cultivation effects. Most significantly, this
dissertation and its conclusions open the door to future studies that will serve to
strengthen the understanding of how cultivation occurs in an ever-diversifying mediated
environment.
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Appendix A
Survey Instrument
Survey Consent Form
Dear Respondent,
I am a PhD candidate in the Rhetorics, Communication and Information Design
program at Clemson University, and I am conducting a study on television and social
media. I would very much appreciate your participation in this survey, which will provide
data for my research.
Please know that your participation is voluntary, and if you choose to participate,
your responses will be kept anonymous and completely confidential. You also may
discontinue if you so choose.
Should you have any questions or comments about this questionnaire, please
contact Dr. Bryan Denham (bdenham@clemson.edu), who is supervising my dissertation
research.
ELECTRONIC CONSENT: Please select your choice below. Clicking on the “yes”
button below indicates that:
•

You have read the above information

•

You voluntarily agree to participate

•

You are at least 18 years of age

Do you agree to the above terms? By clicking Yes, you consent that you are willing to
answer the questions in this survey.
o Yes
o No
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•

On a typical day, about how many hours do you spend watching TV?
o 0
o Less than 1 hour
o 1-2
o 3-4
o 5-6
o 7-8
o More than 8

•

How many years have you used any form of social media?
o 0
o Less than 1 year
o 1-2 years
o 3-4 years
o 5-6 years
o 7-8 years
o More than 8 years

•

How many years have you used Facebook?
o 0
o Less than 1 year
o 1-2 years
o 3-4 years
o 5-6 years
o 7-8 years
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o More than 8 years
Please note for the following questions, usage time includes any time you are viewing
the app/website, from passively scrolling, to commenting/liking, posting, viewing
photos/video, etc.
•

On a typical day, about how many hours do you spend on Facebook?
o 0
o Less than 1 hour
o 1-2
o 3-4
o 5-6
o 7-8
o More than 8

•

On a typical day, about how many hours do you spend on Instagram?
o 0
o Less than 1 hour
o 1-2
o 3-4
o 5-6
o 7-8
o More than 8

•

On a typical day, about how many hours do you spend on Twitter?
o 0
o Less than 1 hour
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o 1-2
o 3-4
o 5-6
o 7-8
o More than 8
•

On a typical day, about how many hours do you spend on YouTube?
o 0
o Less than 1 hour
o 1-2
o 3-4
o 5-6
o 7-8
o More than 8

•

On a typical day, about how many hours do you spend on TikTok?
o 0
o Less than 1 hour
o 1-2
o 3-4
o 5-6
o 7-8
o More than 8

•

On a typical day, about how many hours do you spend on Snapchat?
o 0
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o Less than 1 hour
o 1-2
o 3-4
o 5-6
o 7-8
o More than 8
The following questions will ask about your reasons for using various media
platforms and your experiences while doing so.
•

How important is social media in conducting your social life? Note: In this
instance, social life refers to your communication/interaction with
those outside of your household for non-work purposes.
o Not at all important
o Slightly important
o Moderately important
o Very important
o Extremely important

•

Social media makes me feel like I am not performing as well as I could in life, or
not performing as well as others appear to perform in their lives.
o Strongly disagree
o Disagree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Agree
o Strongly agree
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•

Do you view television as more of an escape from or extension of your everyday
life? (slide scale, with 0 representing a strong response of more of an escape and 5
representing a strong response of more an extension)

•

Do you view social media as more of an escape from or extension of your
everyday life? (slide scale, with 0 representing a strong response of more of an
escape and 5 representing a strong response of more an extension)

•

When using social media, do you use it mainly to just view others’ content or to
view and then participate/interact with others? (slide scale, with 0 representing a
strong response of just to view and 5 representing a strong response of mostly to
participate/interact, in addition to viewing)

•

Which more greatly affects your views on the state of society and world as a
whole?
o Television
o Social media
o Neither

•

When watching TV, does what you see (storylines or interactions) remind you of
times you have been in similar circumstances?
o Never
o Rarely
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always
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•

When watching TV, does what you see (storylines or interactions) make you
consider what you would do in the given situation?
o Never
o Rarely
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

•

When using social media, does what you see (content or interactions) remind you
of times you have been in similar circumstances?
o Never
o Rarely
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

•

When using social media, does what you see (content or interactions) make you
consider what you would do in the given situation?
o Never
o Rarely
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

•

When using social media, how often do the content or interactions you see
prompt you to actually react by liking, commenting, or sharing?
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o Never
o Rarely
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always
•

What people post on social media has changed my opinion of them.
o Strongly disagree
o Disagree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Agree
o Strongly agree

•

The majority of what I see on social media aligns with beliefs I already have.
o Strongly disagree
o Disagree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Agree
o Strongly agree

The following questions will ask about your general world views.
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements:
•

I believe I will be the victim of a violent crime during my lifetime.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
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o Agree
o Strongly Agree
•

It is acceptable to respond uncivilly to someone whose views I believe are
incorrect.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

•

Everyone believes what they want to believe, regardless of facts.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

•

I believe I will be the victim of police or government misconduct during my
lifetime.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree
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•

In today’s times, U.S. values, such as liberty, equality, and justice are consistently
upheld.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

•

On the whole, the United States is headed in the right direction.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

•

Most men cheat on their wives.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

•

Judges should punish criminals more severely.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
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o Agree
o Strongly Agree
•

The lot of average Americans is getting better.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Neither Disagree Nor Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

•

Generally speaking, do you think most people would try to take advantage of you
if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?
o Most people would try to take advantage of you
o They would try to be fair

•

Generally speaking, would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful,
or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
o Most people try to be helpful
o They are looking out for themselves

•

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
o You can trust most people
o You can’t be too careful

•

During any given week, about how many people out of 100 are involved in some
kind of violence?
o About 1 out of 100
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o About 5 out of 100
o About 10 out of 100
•

What percent of all crimes are violent crimes-like murder, rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault?
o About 5%
o About 10%
o About 20%

•

Do most murders take place between strangers or people who know each other?
o Between strangers
o Between people who know each other

•

What percent of medical doctors in the U.S. are Black?
o 5%
o 10%
o 15%

•

Gender: How do you identify?
o Man
o Non-binary
o Woman
o Prefer to self-describe, below
o Self-describe:

•

What is your age?
o 18 to 24
o 25 to 34
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o 35 to 44
o 45 to 54
o 55 to 64
o 65 to 74
o 75 or older
•

What is your ethnicity? (Please select all that apply.)
o American Indian or Alaskan Native
o Asian or Pacific Islander
o Black or African American
o Hispanic or Latino
o White / Caucasian
o Prefer not to answer
o Other (please specify)

•

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you
have received?
o Less than high school degree
o High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
o Some college but no degree
o Associate degree
o Bachelor’s degree
o Graduate degree

•

As of today, do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic
Party?
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o Republican
o Democrat
o Neither
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Appendix B
Figures

Figure 2. Proportional visualization of social media importance to social life
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Figure 3. Proportional visualization of social media as an extension vs. escape
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Figure 4. Proportional visualization of television as an extension vs. escape
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Figure 5. Proportional visualization of social media vs. television effect on user worldviews
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Figure 6. Proportional visualization of social media’s effect on opinion of others
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Figure 7. Proportional visualization of social media’s effect on self-efficacy
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Figure 8. Proportional visualization of social media’s alignment with current beliefs
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Figure 9. Proportional visualization of belief in violent crime victim likelihood
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Figure 10. Proportional visualization of uncivil response acceptance
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Figure 11. Proportional visualization of beliefs despite of facts
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Figure 12. Proportional visualization of belief in government misconduct victim likelihood
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Figure 13. Proportional visualization of belief in U.S. values being upheld
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Figure 14. Proportional visualization of belief in U.S. being headed in the right direction
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Figure 15. Proportional visualization of likelihood of men to cheat
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Figure 16. Proportional visualization belief judges should punish criminals more severely
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Figure 17. Proportional visualization belief that American lot improving
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Figure 18. Proportional visualization, people would take advantage of you vs. be fair
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Figure 19. Proportional visualization, people trying to be helpful vs. looking out for self
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Figure 20. Proportional visualization, people can vs. can’t be trusted

239

Figure 21. Scree plot showing “elbow” in Eigenvalues
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